


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Joint
Public
Readiness
Survey

JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-063

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Petkov Agrarians in Support of Land Act

61/150563/B92 Sofia BT 4 in English 2134 GMT
14 May 92

[Excerpts] Sofia, May 14 (BT A)—(passage omitted) [In first reading today parliament voted 133 to 14 a bill amending the Inheritance Act. The sponsors aim to extend the circle of legatees. The new legislation repeals provisions abridging the right to testate.]

Mr. Yordan Vassilev MP was dismissed from parliament 109 to 23 with 31 abstentions at his request. Mr. Vassilev a former dissident and the first editor-in-chief of the first Bulgarian opposition daily DEMOKRATSYA is now an associate at the Institute of Literature and president of the General Assembly of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. In his resignation request he emphasizes that the condition of his health prevents him from taking a full-fledged part in parliamentary proceedings. "It is hardly useful for two persons of the same family to participate in the administration of this country," Mr. Vassilev writes. His wife Mrs. Blaga Dumitrova is vice-president of Bulgaria. [passage omitted]

Peasants critical of the government and demanding higher pensions held a rally in front of parliament building today. [passage omitted]

According to the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS-NP) a parliamentary crisis is now underway after the chief secretary of the party Mrs. Anastasova Dumitrova-Minovoy held a regular Nikola Petkov news conference today. The Nikola Petkov Agrarians support the amendments to the Land Act passed by the National Assembly and believe that the liquidation councils are needed to dismantle one of the bastions of the Socialist Party, the Soviet-style cooperative farms. The Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party hopes that things will not go so far as a cabinet crisis. The reshuffled cabinet should pay particular attention to farming, the press were told at the news conference.

President of Bulgaria Dr. Zhelya Zhelyov today met with representatives of the recently-established Logos Foundation. The president was familiarized with the purposes of the foundation which incorporates the associations of philosophy, sociology and political science. [passage omitted]

Mr. Valentin Dabrev deputy minister of foreign affairs returned from consultations in Moscow. At the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the sides considered matters of bilateral concern. The opportunities for more active Bulgarian economic cooperation were discussed. The situation in Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian initiative for a Balkan conference and Black Sea economic integration were on the agenda.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions will open its office in Varna the ICFTU resident representative to Bulgaria Mr. Jean Lagomari said his news conference today. That was Mr. Lagomari's first official statement since his arrival here.

Minister Denies Purge of Legal Institutions

61/150563/B92 Sofia BT 4 in English 2134 GMT
14 May 92

[Excerpts] Sofia 14 May 1992 (B92 Sofia BT 4 in English 2134 GMT 14 May 92)

[Letters are sent Minister of Justice Svetoslav Lachitskiy to Adreano St. Kremens place and date not given. "Purge Act a Specialty of the Communist Party"]

[Text] (Kremens) Mr. Lachitskiy Petar Kortzaftov former Grand National Assembly deputy of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party which was a member of the Union of Democratic Forces until the split of 1991 and today belongs to the extraparliamentary opposition. I have recently launched several attacks against you in the newspapers. Do you not intend to respond?

[Lachitskiy] It is beneath my dignity to do so or even to pay attention to such petty remarks.

[Kremens] Nevertheless, DE MONATSCHKA would like to know why you were banned from the legal bodies for such a long time.

[Lachitskiy] I was dismissed from Sofia University for political reasons. Therefore I was not admitted to the bar where some ambitious and unscrupulous little lawyers were working on their careers under the pretense of being scholars. In spite of being banned from the legitimate legal institutions I never lost interest in the legal profession. Therefore as soon as our country became a rule-of-law state I was invited to join the council in charge of processing legal documents under the Council of Ministers where I most actively contributed to drafting the Commercial Law and numerous other legal acts. In February 1991 I worked on an updated version of the Tortious Constitution which was highly regarded by all law professors. The draft was rejected by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) which is quite natural and by the neopagans of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) which is even more natural.

[Kremens] Is it true that at the end of 1991 Mr. Kortzaftov warned you about committing the rights mentioned?

[Lachitskiy] Yes. It was a very significant conversation indeed. I insisted that all lawyers who are qualified should become members of the bar while Mr. Kortzaftov supported Mr. Kortzaftov the constitutional basis of the bar who had instructed the lawyers council in writing that they should keep the doors of the bar closed. Another mistake that the constitutional socialist tandem is regrettably making is that I insisted upon lawyers becoming members of the Supreme Judicial Council a practice accepted in all civilized countries.

[Kremens] Nevertheless, Mr. Kortzaftov denies your competence in legal matters.

[Lachitskiy] You are trying to provide me the form of all the gentleman's argument in a speculation of Penal Law code. My colleagues should know what this means. As far as my competence is concerned the legal public is

BULGARIA

acquainted with the intricacies of constitutional law than I gave before being entrusted with the difficult task of organizing the rescue of our neighboring country's legal institutions and legislation from the disastrous situation in which they had been manipulated, not without the assistance of the competent gentleman in question.

[Editor-in-Chief] What is your view of the separation of powers?

[Luchtmeier] I can only cite Montesquieu's definition: "Because centuries-old experience shows that every individual who exerts power is inclined to abuse it, things should be organized in a manner likely to enable one institution of power to restrain the other." Nevertheless, how can you expect people to read Montesquieu after they cited the statements of distinguished legal experts such as Lenin, Vissotski and even Todor Zhivkov?

[Editor-in-Chief] Last, but not least, what would you say about the "purges"?

[Luchtmeier] Purges are the specialty of the Communist Party whose obedient servant Mr. Kortbaev has always been. The Supreme Judicial Council, which I preside over without the right to vote as stipulated by the authors of the Constitution, very carefully examined the proposals on the replacement of judges and public prosecutors who do not deserve a lifelong appointment. Half of these proposals were rejected. Only those who are clearly incompetent or have really failed to be distinguished are being dismissed.

[Editor-in-Chief] Mr. Kortbaev proposes that the replacement should proceed in stages and after a careful investigation of individual cases.

[Luchtmeier] I would also prefer such a procedure, but in the spirit of the Constitution, which the gentleman in question approved with his vote, the deadline for the investigation is ridiculous: about 6 months. Everything is expected to be settled by 1 May 1992.

Air Force Head Speaks of Neglect, Poor Morale

At 150908Z MAY 92, Sofia, TBCD in Bulgarian. (1 May 92)

Statement made to TBCD by Major General Mihail Mihailov, commander of the Air Defense and Air Force. (It appears in a number of news published in the central press; place and date not given. In the Air Force linking.)

If anyone (passage omitted) in the Bulgarian military pilot well informed? We certainly can't be, but at the moment, he is not. This is the truth, which is also confirmed when staff is selected for civil aviation. I heard this joke on the radio: "Do you have any applicants for pilot jobs?" "Yes, we have, but unfortunately most of them are former Air Force pilots. How can one not be ashamed of such people who never follow the same profession?"

We certainly know about world experience, but why should we travel round the world when we only have to visit our neighbors? We have already seen their experience, although until recently military men were not permitted to go abroad. One need not mention the fact that for certain circles even the exchange of experience is a reason for the Air Force's decline.

We would not want to have a following wind and three feet under the keel nor would we want the plastic tanks used by the commander of the ground forces. We have had similar models for a long time. We also use flight simulators for training, but one cannot achieve high piloting skills and flight safety by such means.

What we need is an opposing wind, a sense of self-respect, and an active life for the crew funds entrusted to us. We can do the rest.

We should think seriously about the national potential that has been created at such high cost and should form a supradepartmental organ for air navigation and flight safety. This such an institution can and should raise the authority and importance of the civil aviation institute in Bulgaria—the Air Force School.

What a luxury it is for our poor country to permit pilots trained at high cost to practice worthless and shameful professions as a reward for making their own lives and the happiness of their families for many years.

Reforms definitely make sense and not only in the Air Defense and Air Force, but who is against them? It is always, not the men who protect our country's air borders. Flying should be administered by an organ set above the Ministries of Transport and Defense that combines the responsibilities and interests of military and civil aviation. With such a body can greatly ensure that the military pilot fulfills his potential after leaving the service.

There are opponents to the reform in civil aviation and among the Air Defense and Air Force staff. There can be disagreement among the authors of a number of articles. However, this is not the answer to the question or the key to the door. At present, the problem lies in providing backup services for operations and combat. Our men are worried about the organization of these services and their rights in the future (passage omitted).

Is any change taking place? Yes, but not enough. Internal units have also been moved to the economic sector, and among others at that, but not everyone is familiar with the problems of aviation, and not everyone wants to resolve them. Such people, who fail to solve the problems, also exist in the Air Force both at staff headquarters and in the rear services. Reasons for their attitudes will be found—reaching the so-called critical age, a lack of security, and a desire to switch careers from the saddle. This is a worthless behavior, even for the morale of our forces as a whole. We do not need statements in the press

and the mass media. We should not try to avert the disasters forecast by the safety inspectorate by publishing articles and submitting memorandums. We should realize that our Air Force at present is like a sick

and famished man. We should rehabilitate him slowly and methodically. We should allocate the fuel and spent parts issued to us in a serious and responsible manner [passage omitted]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

List of Political Parties Entering June Elections

92/3801244 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 21 Apr 92 p 2

(Text)

1. Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)

This political party which espouses the democratic right, Western political conservatism, and the principles of economic liberalism at a program entitled "The Way to a Free Society" came into being in December 1991. In January 1992 it concluded an alliance agreement with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) and in March the National Conference of the ODA adopted an agreement regarding the integration of the LDS into the ODA. Chairman of the party is Jan Kralicka. The ODA is standing for election in all election areas of the Czech Republic.

2. Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia

This party was formed in November 1991 on the basis of the Democratic Club. It considers itself to be a party of the center espousing the principles of humanistic and morally pure democracy following the example of the New Deal of F.D. Roosevelt. Its chairman is Jan Kralicka.

3. Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (CSSD)

This party came into being on 1 April 1991 as the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party within the framework of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. In 1938 it was dissolved and was reformed in 1945 after February 1948 it was combined with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or PKS. As an independent political party it then became revitalized on 19 November 1991. It is a political party of the left center. It promotes the unity of the economic program with a program of social security, protection of environment, a transition to a social market system and preserving the unity of the state. Its chairman is Jan Kralicka. The party is standing for election in all election areas of the Czech Republic.

4. Movement for Independent Democracy—Society for Moravia and Silesia (MISD-SMS)

This movement came into being on 1 April 1990. This is a centrist political movement striving for an autonomous and equal position of Moravia and Silesia and for semi-national government in the Czech Republic. Its chairman is Jan Kralicka. The movement is standing for election in all election areas of the CSR.

5. Movement of Senior Citizens for Social Generation

This movement came into being in February 1990. It is aimed at achieving optimum protection and social services for citizens of retirement and retirement age. Its chairman is Josef Rouský. The movement is standing for election in the election areas of the Czech Republic.

6. Coalition Movement for Freedom of Speech—Slovak Republican Union

This movement is standing for election in all election areas of the Slovak Republic.

7. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)

This movement came into being in March 1991 at the meeting of the Public Against Violence Party (VPN) as a platform striving for renewal of the original character of the VPN. At the extraordinary republicwide congress of the VPN in April 1991, the VPN-ZDS platform succeeded and on 1 May 1991 a registered under its current title. This is a political movement of the liberal center which espouses a program entitled "An Opportunity for Slovakia." Its goal is the improvement of the economic and social situation in the Slovak Republic and a constitutional arrangement based on the idea of confederation. Its chairman is Vladimír Mečiar. The HZDS is standing for election in all election areas of the Slovak Republic.

8. Party of the Democratic Left (SDR)

This party bears no title as of 1 February 1991 on the basis of a decision of the then Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia—SDR. Subsequently it terminated its activity in the Federation of the KSCM and the SDR. It is a leftist party espousing a socially and ecologically oriented market economy and the respecting of human and civil rights. Its chairman is Peter Weiss. The party is standing for election in all election areas of the Slovak Republic.

9. Party of Labor and Security (SPJ)

This party was registered in March 1991 in Slovakia. It considers itself to be the party of the unemployed and the poorer strata. It is standing for election primarily in the Slovak Republic.

10. National Socialist Party—Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (NS-CKSS)

It came into being in September 1990 as a movement within the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. It rejects a coalition with the extreme left and the extreme right. It favors a federal Czechoslovakia. It emphasizes the freedom of entrepreneurial activities. The chairman is Čestmír Čejka. The party is standing for election in all election areas of the Czech Republic.

11. Movement for the Liberation of Slovakia (MLDS)

This was registered in September 1990. It strives to assert the rights of the Slovak nation to state independence and the establishment of a sovereign state. Its chairman is František Kollar. The movement is standing for election in all election areas of the Slovak Republic.

12. Freedom Party—Party of National Unity (SF-SNS)

As a new entity this party was created in April 1991 as a result of the amalgamation of the Party of National

Union of Slovaks with the Freedom Party. It prefers a solution to the constitutional arrangement, a shock therapy, and a just distribution of the properties held by the republic. Its chairman is Silvester Mináčovský. The party is standing for election in all election kraj of the Slovak Republic.

13. Democrats for '92 for a Common State (D '92)

The Constitutional Assembly of D '92 was held 28 March 1992. It is a political movement with statewide participation. It primarily favors preservation of the joint state, it favors integration into modern Europe and a rapid transition toward a market economy which is socially just. D '92 is standing for election in all election kraj of the Czech Republic.

14. Party of Republicans and National Democratic Unity (SPNDJ)

This was established in March 1992. It strives to preserve a unified state on a federal principle, it is striving for a strong economy, and the complete decommunization of society. It is standing for election in all election kraj of the Czech Republic.

15. Coalition of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement—Conservative Movement—Hungarian People's Party (MKDPH-ESWS-MLS)

This coalition favors democracy, promotes the rights of minority nationalities, and favors the preservation of their identity. It is in favor of a joint state. It is headed by Miklós Duray.

16. Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH)

In March 1992, it split from the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement). Its efforts are aimed at the spiritual renewal of Slovakia, the culmination of its sovereignty and the achievement of international recognition. It favors full economic development. Its chairman is Ján Karpas. The SKDH is standing for election on the entire territory of the Slovak Republic.

17. Christian and Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People's Party (ADK-CSP)

The Czechoslovak People's Party came into being in September 1991 as a result of the amalgamation of several Catholic parties. In 1978, it was dissolved and reconstituted in 1985 as the Party of the National Front. In June 1991, it applied for registration as the KDP. In March 1992, it was amalgamated with the Christian and Democratic Union at a congress. It espouses the center-right position, demanding a responsible social policy with regard to the weaker strata. Its chairman is Josef Lás. The ADK-CSP is standing for election in all kraj of the Czech Republic.

18. Union of Slovak Communists (USK)

This is a political party which espouses the ideas of socialism but does not consider itself to be a successor

organization of either the CPCZ or the Communist Party of Slovakia. It intends to particularly protect the rights of the workers. It supports an equal rights federation. Its chairman is Ján Jurášek. The party is standing for election in all election kraj of the Slovak Republic.

19. Party of Czechoslovak Businessmen, Artisans, and Farmers (SČPZB)

This party was born as a result of the initiative of the Association of Czechoslovak Businessmen in the Czech Republic. It finds its place at the right of center. Its goal is to promote the development of a strong small and medium-size business class. Its chairman is Radim Šimek. The party is standing for election in all election kraj of the Czech Republic.

20. Unassigned

21. Movement for Social Justice (MJS)

This movement was created in 1991 and, as of February 1992, is registered as a party with nationwide participation. It has a leftist orientation and considers the so-called employee-ownership form to be the most advantageous method of privatization. Its chairman is Michal Lukáš. It is standing for election in all election kraj of the CSFR with the exception of central Slovakia.

22. Liberal Social Union (LSU)

This union was registered as a political movement with a collective membership in December 1991. It is made up of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Party of the Greens. The union presents itself as an organization of leftist democratic forces which primarily tends to protect the interests of the median and lower income groups of the population. It favors a socially just society; in economics it rejects the so-called shock therapy, it favors administrative democracy, and an active approach toward ecology. Its chairman is František Trnka. The union is standing for election in all election kraj of the Czech Republic.

23. Party of the Greens (SZ)

It is a Slovak Republic organization of the federal Party of the Greens (which in the Czech Republic stands within the framework of the LSU). It stands for election in all election kraj of the Slovak Republic.

24. Civic Movement (OM)

This came into being in February 1991 at an extraordinary nationwide congress of Civic Forum as one of the two collective members of Civic Forum. In April 1991, the constitutional congress adopted statutes and a program. It espouses the political center. It is a liberal civic and social movement striving primarily for a constitution state with clearly delineated jurisdictions and a transition toward a market economy while respecting social interests and ecological requirements. The chairman of the council is Jan Drahulík. The OM is standing for election in all election kraj of the Czech Republic.

25. Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)

This came into being on 30 January 1989 on the basis of the invitation by the Civic Initiative to establish Christian Democratic clubs. In February 1990, the Constituent Congress of KDH was held. As an all-peoples' ecumenical political movement, it strives to create a spiritually healthy, just, and economically prospering society. Its chairman is Jan Černogurský. The KDH is standing for election in all election krajns of the Slovak Republic.

26. Civic Democratic Union (ODU)

This is a liberal and conservative party to the right of center which seceded from the VFN movement. It considers it to be a priority to solve the constitutional arrangement, the position of Slovakia within the framework of the federation, and favors an accelerated economic reform. Its chairman is Martin Porečňák. The party is standing for election in all election krajns of the Slovak Republic.

27. Romany Civic Initiative (ROD)

This came into being in March 1991. It is a voluntary association which is intended to unify the Romany people and promote their rights to a dignified life. Its president is Ján Farkas.

28. Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC)

This is a radically rightist party which was registered in 1990. It is demanding guarantees against any kind of form of dictatorship, it is demanding the termination of devastation of the national economy and a communist purge of the national political life. Its chairman is Miroslav Šálek. The party is standing for election in all election krajns of the CSFR.

29. National Liberals (NL)

This is a right-of-center party which was registered in March 1990. It favors an independent Slovakia. Its chairperson is Katarina Horváthová. The party is standing for election on the entire territory of the Slovak Republic.

30. Party of the Gypsies in Slovakia (NSZ)

This came into being in June 1991. It considers itself to be a leftist-oriented party and would permit a looser association of the republics in a common state. It supports ecology and a stable development for the country. Its chairman is Peter Sabo. The party is standing for election in all election krajns of the Slovak Republic.

31. Club of Nonaligned Activists (KAN)

This club was established in 1986 and its activities terminated that year. It was then reconstituted in 1990. It is a movement with a leftist democratic program. It supports the principle of the market economy and

demands a radical purge of social life through the medium of so-called debolshevization. The chairman of the Central Council is Bohdán Diviš. The KAN is standing for election in all election krajns of the Czech Republic.

32. Romany Civic Initiative (ROD)

This movement has been active since November 1989. It has a rightist orientation and supports the development of private business and a federal model for the state. Its chairman is Ľubomír Šouká. The ROD is standing for election in all election krajns of the CSFR with the exception of Bratislava.

33. Left Bloc—Coalition Between the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Democratic Left of the CSFR

The coalition agreement for purposes of parliamentary elections for 1992 was signed on 30 April 1991.

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)

This is a leftist party. Its proclaimed goal is the creation of a democratic, humanitarian and socially just society; a transition toward a social market economy; and the implementation of a realistic foreign policy reflecting the historical interests of the CSFR. Its chairman is Ján Šimola.

Democratic Left (DS)

This supra-party political movement of leftist-oriented citizens was registered in the spring of 1990. It espouses democratic socialism in the spirit of the Socialist International. The chairman of the nationwide coordination committee is Lajos Imrech. The coalition is standing for election in all election krajns of the Czech Republic.

34. Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS)

This party came into being in December 1990, its activities were halted in 1948 and renewed in January 1990. It wants to be a modern leftist party with efforts aimed at contributing to the human and European dimension of Slovak politics. It is striving for the political stability of Slovakia as an economically and socially developed republic. Its chairman is Alexander Dubček. The party is standing for election in all election krajns of the Slovak Republic.

35. Communist Party of Slovakia '91

This is a leftist party, the constitutional congress of which was held in June 1991. It espouses the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and communism and wishes to represent and defend the interests of workers, farmers, the working intelligentsia, and particularly the unemployed. The chairman of its Central Committee is Ján Figej. The party is standing for election in all election krajns of the Slovak Republic.

36. Coalition Between the Democratic Party (DS) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

Democratic Party (DS)

This party came into being in 1984 on the liberated territory of eastern Slovakia. After February 1948, it was disbanded. At the Extraordinary Congress of the Party of Slovak Rebirth, at which part of the membership of the DS was active, the party was renamed in December 1989 to the Democratic Party. It considers itself to be a rightist party and is attempting to address pragmatists, businesspeople and the intelligentsia. It supports a joint state of the two republics, uniting by treaty. Its chairman is Jan Hasic. In past elections, the party stood for election independently; now it stands for election in coalition with the ODS in all election kras of the Slovak Republic. (For the ODS, see the Coalition of the ODS and the KDS.)

37. Slovak National Party (SNS)

This party came into being in December 1989. It occupies a radical position and primarily asserts the independence of Slovakia. It is speaking out in favor of reducing the negative impacts of the economic reform upon the populace. Its chairman is Jozef Prokes. The SNS is standing for election independently in all election kras of the Slovak Republic.

38. Party of the Friends of Beer (SPP)

This party came into being in January 1990. Its chairman is Ivo Dvorak. It has presented candidate lists in all election kras of the Czech Republic.

39. Slovak People's Party

This is a continuation of the party which was established in 1905 by A. Hlinka. The party was registered in April 1990. It is striving for state sovereignty for Slovakia and international recognition of Slovakia. Its chairman is Jozef Prokes. The party is standing for election in all election kras of the Slovak Republic.

40. Hungarian Civic Party (MPS)

This party developed from the political movement which was called the Independent Hungarian Initiative (MNI). In January 1991, it changed into the MPS. It

devotes attention to the liberal Hungarians living in the CSFR. It supports radical social changes and intends to orient itself particularly toward the stratum of medium-size businesspeople and the private sector, even in agriculture. Its chairman is Lajos Nagy. The party is standing for election in all election kras of the Slovak Republic.

41. Independent Initiative (NED)

The party has a liberal humanitarian orientation. It came into being in 1990 as the Independent Civic Initiative. In December 1991, at its congress, its name in the Czech Republic was changed to Independent Initiative. Its chairman is Miroslav Melichar. The party is standing for election in all election kras of the Czech Republic.

42. Coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Christian Democratic Party (KDS)

Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

Just like the OH, the ODS seceded from Civic Forum in February 1991. In April 1991, an constituent congress adopted its statute and a program entitled "The Road to Prosperity." It is a rightist party professing realism and pragmatism. At the forefront of its interests is an accelerated economic transformation and support for private business. It is also concerned with maintaining a joint state—a federation with sensible jurisdictions. Its chairman is Vaclav Klaus.

Christian Democratic Party (KDS)

The basis for its development was an unofficial ecumenically oriented Christian group which formed in the first half of the 1980s. It has been a political party since 1989. It supports rapid economic reform and a unified state arranged along territorial administrative principles. Its chairman is Vaclav Benda. The ODS-KDS coalition is standing for election in all election kras of the Czech Republic.

Comment: The characteristics are based on the pre-claimed goals of the individual parties and movements. The listing captures the status as of 14 April.

The Central Elections Commission has reserved the right to make decisions regarding five more political entities, should they decide to participate in the elections.

HUNGARY

Dissension in FIDESZ Seen Over MSZP Ties

92C H05594 Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 10 Apr 92 pp 9

[Article by Zoltan Szendi: "In the Halls of Parliament"]

[Excerpt] Viewed from a distance one can discern only a single, truly unified faction in parliament, that of FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]. No one has left the faction yet; what is more, it has even obtained a new member from its liberal big brother, the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats]. However this unity is only an illusion, one indication of which is that, for example in Nagykarska the local party organization split up. This was reported by the press, as well.

Whoever views the occurrences from close up and is even more on speaking terms with a few Young Democrats, knows that the palette is not composed only of various shades of red in their case either. One of the proofs of this is the article by Anzelm Barany published in the FIDESZ press of 27 March 1992. Barany is, of course, a member of FIDESZ, but he thinks (thinks!) a little differently than those leaders of his party who are in the limelight and who probably prefer the tone of Magyar Narancs [Hungarian Orange—the official organ of FIDESZ] on the *out* of the shark [as published] to that of the article I just mentioned.

The author, analyzing his experiences in Bonn during the past five months, states: "The German model of constructive opposition is a better example for us to follow than the Anglo-Saxon model, which concentrates on diminishing the government's authority." After further interesting and valuable discussion, he talks about the relationship of FIDESZ and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], one which promises to produce offspring before long. In my opinion, this offspring should not be conceived, must be exonerated from the scope of even the strictest law forbidding abortion.

Let us read further what Anzelm Barany has to say: "Sikló Orbán and I disagree on a few questions of detail, as well, but our greatest point of contention is the evaluation of the MSZP" (i.e., at the last congress of FIDESZ). Who does he disagree with Viktor Orbán? "I mention only in passing that an Indian who grew up on the reservation of the István Bibó college of specialists in the 1980's has a much easier task in overcoming his indignation at the communist system than the smallholders who spent the better part of their lives in the Iron Age of the Wind East, and whose careers were irreparably broken by the rule of the comrades. The least we can do is to try to show understanding for those who spent the winter of presents and labor camps, or who were forced onto a side-track while the newly registered old guard, the members of Horn and Company Ltd., were able to pursue a profitable career using their party books as an admission ticket."

He writes further: "We must never forget who are the smooth perpetrators and who are the crippled victims." He talks about the experimental balloon—the idea of a coalition of the left—launched by Iván Lajosweisz in HETI VILLAGAZDASAG [HVG], an idea which is being nurtured so enthusiastically by Gyula Horn, who emphasizes the multitude of common comradeship) ties between the MSZP and FIDESZ. Barany is astonished that for many members of FIDESZ, László Hamon and Pál Vastagh are not only more acceptable than István Csáka and Balázs Horváth, but are also more acceptable than István Szabó and Ferenc Kádár. "But," he writes, "personal sympathies and antipathies aside, the greater part of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] is for me, in spite of all of its populist features, an acceptable coalition partner, while the MSZP is not." He states: "The MSZP was not born in October 1989. I am more and more inclined to interpret what happened at that time as the organized withdrawal (or the forward retreat) of the far-right segment of the old regime from political power into economic power."

Unfortunately for lack of space we cannot quote in full the author's argument, at the end of which he states: "Miklós Németh is—in my opinion unjustifiable—much more popular in the polls than József Antall." Finally, a quote to prove that FIDESZ must also contain people who are thinking as an opposition, but as a constructive one: "One cannot with impunity neglect our duty of answering the questions about why someone wins or loses in the process of changing the system, and how we should share the burdens of transformation. I wish for the column (and for ourselves as well) an opposition that thinks like this. [passage omitted]

Justice Minister Answers Charges Against Him

92C H05594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 21 Apr 92 pp 1-4

[Interview with Justice Minister István Balsai by András Seregi, place and date not given. The Justice Minister Complains About the Opposition's Concentrated Attack. Dr. István Balsai: No New Constitution Is Necessary]—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG interview]

[Text] In this interview given to the NEPSZABADSAG, Dr. István Balsai comments that because of the chief justices he has appointed, a concentrated attack has been launched against him, the likes of which has perhaps never been experienced by any of his fellow ministers. Balsai also speaks of the reform of the criminal process in which, for instance, the protest on legal grounds would be changed to the plea for nullity and the institution of bail would be introduced. Balsai explains why the constitution law must be modified and why a new constitution is needed.

To begin with the NEPSZABADSAG's correspondent directed the following question to Dr. István Balsai:

[Sorog] Mr. Minister, the first round of the constitutional process for which you have been in office, has been very sharp, especially in connection with your appointment as chief justice and subsequent law-making, rather abrupt, in an interview.

[Baranyi] I can assure you that a year ago, I had the closest party contacts in the opposition, and at that time I had an extremely negative opinion indeed on the political and professional seriousness of the opposing ranks. I say that I had no respect for the unprincipled attack against me, the basis of which has perhaps never been expressed by any of my fellow members, because I am, I will add, in my statement:

[Sorog] In that statement, you used one or two adjectives that shocked several people. You utilized the called your debate partner inferior. That is your closest nothing from a minister.

[Baranyi] I used the expression "political" adjective. But let me say that it was not I who started the debate. I was responding to the house before the fact. A parliamentary party spokesman made the statement that János Baranyi recorded his name in Hungarian history in black letters. The deputy chairman of another party was even more insulting in describing the political and professional activity. And since a minister is just a human being, he has the same rights as anyone else. He can express his opinion on the issue at hand. So much about the affair. political background. With regard to my professional aspect, parliament's constitutional court unanimously decided that I was right. Of course, I also knew about the petitions that had been submitted to the Constitutional Court. Well, it is not the minister but the station itself that they attack.

[Sorog] In the meantime you submitted three law draft, chief justice positions and that your opinion coincided with that of the entire ruling. Were you discussing self-criticism?

[Baranyi] No, I was not discussing self-criticism. I say, the notices had not been of the same opinion. I would have appointed the same three persons whom I did not appoint.

[Sorog] The role of the general justice leadership seems to be limited to formality.

[Baranyi] Not in the case. The general justice leadership play an important information role in law application process.

[Sorog] Mr. Minister, in your opinion of these law agreements, you are responsible for creating not only the personal but also the material conditions. For them may be good law and outstanding with its results, but one important in which it cannot fulfill the law of justice is the speed in which they obtain a final judgment. But the situation is rather slow at this respect. The trials of law grand very slowly.

[Baranyi] The most popular and important judgments have been completed within a shorter time than during the other period of the past ten years. I could mention a few facts. The number of rulings has been increased by 50%, while the total length of time for all buildings have been cut in the public administration. We are spending thousands of thousands for new papers and buildings for building 17 courts. There is still much, difficult work. What do we do in the next ten years for making our justice system more efficient. But that however, is not the reaction the rules of procedure. First of all the judge is not concerned the strict regulation of any documentation in front of the members of the papers. However, if the opinion of some people that is not what the job is, but rather that he should decide legal disputes which should not be the additional benefit of his understanding the social function in the community.

[Sorog] Your answer is not enough. What is really important is that what does a significant influence on law and the ruling law and law itself.

[Baranyi] I do not think that someone like aughtness justice administration is not. Therefore, because the policy and the procedure is often hard to cope with these tasks. It is not clear that improvements in the best way of reaching the just decisions in every case. While the number of rulings were delayed against property has sharply increased, and most frequent reason is still compensation. I say the legislature should indicate that huge amounts which can be forced through monetary punishment, that is, many effects than through justice under the supervision of the justice officer.

[Sorog] What is the argument for accepting the proposal for power?

[Baranyi] Some scholars, lawyers are present the idea that the improvement of the laws and therefore, in order to avoid it, they are willing to submit to a new code of justice. Through an unusual parliamentary period.

[Sorog] The procedure for proposal will have to be changed in the future administration.

[Baranyi] According to my knowledge, the procedure would be put under the parliamentary supervision.

[Sorog] In that case, would the power over general just and the minister of justice?

[Baranyi] Although the procedure general just be given more power through the institution, he should not wish to the same, i.e., substituted to administrative justice.

[Sorog] In what way will the procedure of approving the general justice be changed?

[Baranyi] According to my knowledge, the majority of society would favor some further improving procedure. But I would like to stress that the full personal power to organization changes of the institution, after trial

[Seregi] The Constitutional Court recently declared the institution of protest on legal grounds to be unconstitutional. Time is pressing, for the present rules will cease to be effective on 31 December 1992.

[Balazs] Our starting point was that as long as we do not have a finalized view in connection with the judiciary's system of forums, we will refrain from making any proposal that would increase the three judicial levels by adding additional courts.

[Seregi] This means then that the reinstatement of the office of county court judge has been taken off the agenda.

[Balazs] We are not ready for that today. This is why we are planning to replace the protest on legal grounds with the plea for nullity. As it is known, the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the prosecutor general have been the only ones able to protest on legal grounds. However, the plea for nullity would become everyone's personal right. Just as in the case of the protest on legal grounds, one could appeal an unfounded or allegedly unlawful final judgment to the Supreme Court within a specified time period. All this does not mean, of course, that we have entirely given up the idea of the county court judge. But we have little time till the end of the year.

[Seregi] What is included in the modification of the election law?

[Balazs] The Antall administration will submit the modification of the election law together with the nationality law. It is our intention that this would regulate the political representation of the nationalities in parliament. The main point of our proposal is that voters would get three voting cards instead of the presently used two. The third one would be used for voting on the national nationality list. Casting the votes in this manner would enable us to put the nationalities in the position where the candidate on the nationality list could be elected to parliament in accordance with the general election law. However, the voter would put only two of the three cards into the ballot box, one for the individual candidate and the other for the nationality or party list.

[Seregi] Mr. Minister, you promised two years ago at your committee hearing that the drafting of the new constitution would begin toward the end of the session. Now that it is half way through, what are your thoughts on this issue?

[Balazs] I do not see any practical possibility of the Antall administration beginning the process of drawing up a constitution during the present parliamentary session. I feel that neither a practical possibility nor a political necessity for it exists. I am convinced that our present constitution meets the criteria of a constitutional state.

International Controversy Over Milovice Airfield

J.V. JAKUBS / Budapest, M.R. / R.R. / J.F.
in Hungarian / 2 Mar 92 / 1

[Article by Peter Neurad: "Invasion About the Milovice Airfield"]

[Text] From our Prague correspondent, it may not be irrelevant that both the Pentagon and even ministry of the government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic concerned in the matter to resolve offer denials. An article appearing in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT on the matter made the question assume international proportions whether the former Soviet airfield in the vicinity of the Austrian border about 10 km to the south of Brno will indeed become a civilian airport. The representatives of the United States adamantly deny that the new airfield has a military function as well and they refuse to admit altogether that the airfield could be an intermediate base of the American quick strike force on the way to the former Soviet Union or even to the critical areas of the Middle East.

However, in Prague it was pointed out that certain individuals insist perhaps more than might be necessary in regarding the Milovice airfield. It has been demonstrated by both aviation and civilian experts that in a country the size of Czechoslovakia another enormous international airport cannot flourish such a short distance from Prague's international airport. Moreover, the conversion of this half-finished, or rather half-destroyed airfield would require billions, whereas the complete reconstruction of the Prague airport would not cost more than 200 million Korunas. Still, some people are insisting that the plan be carried out. One proof of this is that, for example, during President Havel's recent visit to Moscow to sign the Czechoslovak-Russian agreement on basic principles, the Czechoslovak party waived its claim for reparations that could have been demanded for environmental destruction during the occupation. At the time sources close to the president named the Soviets' lack of money as an explanation for this action. However, observers in Prague noted that the Pentagon has prepared a very generous plan and would be willing to offer 2 billion dollars to the conversion of the Milovice airfield.

Political 'Consensus' Reached on World Expo Head

J.V. JAKUBS / Budapest, M.R. / VII, 600 / 2145 n.
in Hungarian 28 Mar 92 pp 1-4

[Article by István Jákub: "Expo Personnel Changes—Exhibited"—first paragraph is METI VIAGGAZ DASAC introduction]

[Text] The Tibor Barath era, which lasted almost eight months, has come to an end. During that time although Tibor Barath still occupied the government commissioner's chair, it was already well known that it was only a matter of time until he would be replaced by

Budapest General Assembly's MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) faction leader Mrs. Eszter Pataki-Barni. However, even after this change of personnel, the basic question of the Budapest Expo remained unanswered, namely, where the money would come from for organizing this event, which by now can hardly be called a grand show but which will be extremely expensive in view of Hungary's financial situation.

Even the Expo's opponents used good but no improved Eszter Barnai as a model best described by "The Expo will not do anything" or "The Mayor has done his job." This apparently biased report was probably largely motivated by the fact that Barnai's replacement by Mrs. Eszter Pataki-Barni appeared to be a classic political change of personnel. Indeed, there have been many indications of this. It is widely known that Eszter Barnai is nationalist, that he had occupied a high government position in the previous regime, that his family members are committed to the FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats), and that he has made some rather unfaltering public statements about a few leading government officials. Thus, it was easy for the superficial observer to create the following picture: After Eszter Barnai pulled the chestnut out of the fire, i.e., the BIE (Expo's organizer, not given) required the Expo to be replaced by Mrs. Eszter Pataki-Barni, who is said to have been a neutral party soldier.

However, appearances are deceptive, and this clean version is as false as its opposite. Frequently voiced by Mrs. Barni, namely, that in her opinion the Expo will now simply be headed by a true expert, finally without any party connection.

The truth probably lies between these two explanations. Many claim that Eszter Barnai deserved his dismissal for professional reasons as well; on the other hand, a consensus has developed among Budapest's party factions regarding Mrs. Barni, although she is not the administration's great confidence. Nor that they had many chances for since it is the government that officially sponsors the Expo, while Budapest opposed it earlier, it was expected and natural that a person close to the power establishment would be given the task of heading the institution during the preparations. Everyone thought that Mrs. Eszter Pataki-Barni was better than a temporary commissioner; for many claim that she is dedicated to Budapest, or at least to her profession (she is a city planning architect). In decision making, this attitude of hers may compensate for her possible political affiliation and her "independent" activity is then conceivable (her hope). In the final analysis, the situation now is that the MDF candidate, defeated at the mayor's election, has now won against Gyula Horn (Democrat). The reason: For a view of Hungary's and Budapest's financial situation as well as the test of the Expo law, it is evident that in the coming years all development in Budapest will be subordinated to the Expo. Thus, while Mrs. Eszter Pataki-Barni may act as, say, the inaugurator of a new bridge, the "politics" of the underpavers will be left to Gyula Horn.

(However, Mrs. Barni approached to end Béla Küller as Hungarian president of the Expo, which was to Mrs. Barni that Gyula Horn also suggested this is due to operational difficulties.)

However, the way most people see it, Budapest's new leader (Barnai) potentially may prove more like Gyula Horn (Horn's cooperation in the Expo was the basis of Budapest's program of action, which will serve as a framework for providing the capital with sufficient administrative and organizational resources without the participation of party officials, although not exchange for supporting the Expo and Mrs. Barni).

In addition, according to sources, Budapest's leadership was so satisfied in the days that at the BIE general assembly in Paris that Mrs. Barnai exhibited complimentary views to the Expo which the opposition nation. After all, it was alleged that, as well as the government's other two deputy ministers, and not Eszter Barnai's advice that led to the Expo's reorganization. Instead, it is rumored that this was achieved despite the former government commissioner's unsatisfactory performance.

With regard to Eszter Barnai's professional activities, although at the time of his appointment he criticized the performance of his former government commissioner László Szűcs, he subsequently supported his predecessor's goals during discussions regarding his criticisms through the old regime's methods of silencing people. This is how it was longer than desirable to find out, for instance, that Hungary was allowed to organize but never a general expo, which would mean an opportunity of the century, but rather trade fairs that have been organized recently as often as twice a year. In addition, the government commissioner told the whole world to believe for months that he had not less than 3 billion dollars worth of equipment prepared for the Expo instead of the minimum 1 billion dollars needed for the Expo. Eszter Barnai's display was seized by authorities because the experts could prove the opposite.

Of course, the above point refers to the "shorter" the change of personnel with other lots of the Expo-related problems that are becoming more and more enormous before his appointment, still as an architect, government member, Eszter Barnai stated, among other things, that Budapest's city center was a victim of a world crisis in its present condition, and that we should not give the design of construction for the Expo around half eight within a year. They have been passed over them, but nothing has happened aside from the development's further destruction. Now the function of both the program office and the Expo institution seems to be performed. Even in the permanent organization to the daily papers he was able to say that the first thing he would do is to speak with Eszter Barnai. The program office will probably also have to be incorporated. It is said that most of its staff left before being merged. And Béla Küller's Ministry of External Economic Relations, which allegedly represents a concept of organizing the Expo that is different from that of the program office, lacks not only a concept but

also an Expo staff. On the other hand, it is agreed between the two countries regarding personnel will follow. For the executive positions of involved companies that are supposed to handle the Expo, as well as real estate developments are vacant. The only thing we know at present about the candidates is that one of them will be a Gaumond Ltd. executive. This would perhaps bring some benefits, for at the coming years the Expo will probably remain the greatest金字招牌 in Hungary.

Construction Firm Official on Controversial Dam

AN INTERVIEW WITH JÁNOS BINDER, A SLOVAK BUSINESS EXECUTIVE. BY TIBOR KUN IN PRAGUE. DATE NOT GIVEN. "ANDREAS CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S BIGGEST" —FIRST PARAGRAPH IN NEPSZABADÍTÁS (NSZAG) INTRODUCTION

(Text) It has been confirmed in Prague (Bratislava), although the Czech and Slovak media had not yet reported it by Tuesday afternoon, that on Monday a Slovak-Austrian agreement was signed in the Slovak capital on the financing of the Boštvadlec power station. The loan was arranged by the company run by Mr. Andreach former vice-chancellor of Austria (in the Slovak side the agreement was signed by János Binder, director of the construction company that will carry out the work). The Prague correspondent of our newspaper requested yesterday from János Binder about the substance of the agreement.

(Kun) Mr. Binder could you give us a few details to characterize the agreement?

(Binder) Sorry I cannot. This is an important economic agreement. The Hungarian parts did not tell us either at the time what the conditions of their agreement with Austria were on Austria's participation in the Nagymaros project. By naming details I could also be revealing trade secrets. By the way, this agreement is not on the governmental level, but rather on the corporate level. So far we have not given important details of our agreement with Mr. Andreach to anyone. For reasons of friendship we have informed appropriate partners that such an agreement has been made.

(Kun) There exists a rumor according to which the document signed on Monday is similar to the one on Nagymaros, namely that we deliver energy in return for the loans.

(Binder) Let us suppose that this is the case.

(Kun) Can you tell us whether the loan will be used to complete the C-variant, or is there a possibility that the hydroelectric power station will be completed as a joint venture?

(Binder) The ones cannot be differentiated like this. Incidentally we have the money for the C-variant; it will be supplied by a Slovak bank. However, now we are

bound to companies who should according to the original plan were supposed to have been organized by the Hungarians but so far they have not. Then there is reorganization of relevant firms as well. Furthermore, we are implementing negotiations prior to go well because we want to preserve the quality of the water. This was the purpose of the agreements which essentially entailed to integrate the river according to the original plan.

(Kun) But there funds can and be applied to the C-variant?

(Binder) If you like can.

(Kun) The agreement is supposed to have a value close to 1.5 billion.

(Binder) Yes, but it is written and not in writing. By the way, this money will not be spent on Boštvadlec. We will use it to finance other projects as well, for example the hydroelectric power station in Zvolen or other water-development projects which we need to build on the river Nagy Ipoly. Nagymaros will not be built. There is some talk about other projects as well, such as providing drinking water for a number of municipalities.

(Kun) In your opinion, will the agreement signed on Monday improve or weaken the chances that Czechoslovakia and Hungary will come to an understanding in the matter of Boštvadlec?

(Binder) We are convinced that we will come to an agreement with Budapest about the construction of the system of dams on the Danube, including the power station at Nagymaros.

(Kun) And if you are not thinking in terms of the future but looking at the situation today?

(Binder) It is evident that the Hungarians have stopped work on the area of Boštvadlec and they do not want to continue. The Hungarian parliament decided to drop out of further work. I do not know if there is anything in a situation like this that we could come to an agreement on. The Hungarian government cannot take large authority to parliament, and yet our negotiation partner is the government. I will be completely candid. The Hungarians with their present representatives, with their proposal to set up a joint committee of experts, seems aimed to make the continuation of the project impossible. Hungarians do not want to and cannot continue work on the project until the Hungarian parliament makes a different decision.

(Kun) In your opinion, what condition would be appropriate for the two governments at the moment?

(Binder) I think the Hungarian parliament ought to take the next step, and the correct action would be to review its decision on the dam. After this, I think we would be able to come to an agreement with Hungarian representatives on the conditions for completing the project.

Minister Soltész: Media Bill to Parliament
(L/48/413.42.461) Budapest: Ministry Radio, Television
& Postmaster 4/7/1993 L/48/413.42.461

Addressee: Dr. Tamás Nagy, State Minister of the
Ministry of Justice, preventing the Radio and Television
Bill in the National Assembly in Budapest—over.

(Text) (begin recording) I sincerely thank Mr. Nagy,
respected National Assembly, respected fellow deputies.
I think that a bill that has been prepared by everybody
has been prepared by everybody the Hungarian National
Assembly for justice. This bill is the Radio and Televisio-
n Bill which, I think, was born as a result of a unique
procedure of a law being prepared in the course of
discussions. You also know that the Hungarian National
Press Subcommittee has had the bill on the agenda
continuously for more than a year and contributed to
every detail of its preparation. This unusual, perhaps
procedure for preparing the bill was justified by its
considerable importance which was recognized by both
the government and the parliamentary parties
altogether and it is now. The Hungarian Press Subcom-
mittee created a certain co-party committee in
the subcommittee at certain points of the proposal
which, as we expect, significantly increases the chance of
parliamentary acceptance of the proposal. By this, it
would ensure enough guarantees for the adoption of a
modest law. Before the presentation of the bill, different
variants—exactly six different variants—were prepared
and debated by numerous professional organizations as
well. We used their opinions and proposals in a spirit of
openness in the writing of the bill which is in front of
you.

Respected National Assembly: the political and social
changes which have taken place in the Hungarian
Republic and the changes in the field of so-called
transnational communication in Europe and in our
country make modern legal regulation necessary. In the
developed western democracies these two influencing
factors have never appeared at the same time in the
course of legislation, thus domestic characteristics had
to be taken into consideration during the preparation of
the law. At the same time, throughout the process, we
had to take the international obligations of the
Hungarian Republic away from its institutions toward European
integration into consideration. As a result, the bill
accords with the agreements of the Council of Europe on
transnational television broadcast and with related EC
Directives as well.

Respected National Assembly: allow me to say a few
words about some of the more important parts of the bill
which have principal significance. First and foremost,
we have to assert that the Hungarian radio and television
broadcasting system (monopolized) must serve the
constitutional order, the democratic political system,
and must give expression to the expectations of the
community of European nations. The broadcasting

sector must function in such a way that the citizens
can communicate with the Hungarian Republic in
confidence, if they expect, and that Hungarian
radio and television should themselves be agents
of integration into European cultural structures.

To this ensures three demands in such a way that in the
international European legal guarantees to ensure that press
freedom and freedom of opinion can be exercised in the
environment of the area of radio and television. The bill
also aims at the level of a basic principle, the general
guarantees of framework regulations for broadcasting in
Hungary will prove freedom with the European agree-
ments of human rights as well as with the Treaty of
Europe's agreement on television about transmission
standards.

The bill suggests in particular the basic rules of public
service broadcasting according to this, the public ser-
vice broadcaster is obliged to supply news regularly
independently, multi-channel, objectively and
impartially other mass facts and disputed issues of
public and global interest of public interest.

The bill also defines the parameters which give
importance to the public service nature of radio and tele-
vision, for example culture and education, the presenta-
tion of arts and literary values, observance of a
high standard, the propagation of knowledge.

The bill also respects other social groups—for
example students, young people, national and ethnic
minority people who are at a smooth disadvantage
situation—in which the broadcaster must offer special
programs.

The bill gives high priority also to programs made in the
sphere of religious life and of the families which are
connected with various faiths.

The bill unequivocally lays down the legal status of
Hungarian radio and television, the most important
regulations relating to their operation and relevant
management. Hence putting an end to the situation that
privates at power and what is not free of contradic-
tions either. The bill provides for a legal status which, on
the one hand guarantees the independence of Hungarian
radio and television, while on the other hand within
supervised frameworks creates the maximum conditions
necessary for their institution operation.

According to the bill, Hungarian radio and television
will perform their public in a broadcasting activity as
a so-called publicly funded Hungarian organ (Magyar
szabadtéri kölcsönzés szerve), set up by public funds allo-
cated by the National Assembly. Therefore, the present
days Hungarian dependence of these two institutions
will cease.

At the same time, apart from ensuring the operational
independence of the institutions, the bill also creates the
social supervision of their public service operation.

social control will be exercised by the institutions supervising Hungarian radio and television. The supervisor however will not and cannot control the independence of the stations, and cannot limit or regulate anything other than program policy.

My esteemed fellow deputies, in accordance with general practice affirmed, the bill will create a special official entity (State broadcasting entity), the Radio and Television Office, to perform the official tasks connected with broadcasting.

The important role which the Radio and Television Office plays in the broadcasting system demands regulation that guarantees that the office performs its tasks independently subject only to the law and to open social control.

The bill satisfies these demands when, in a way that is actually unique in the Hungarian system of state administration, it creates the guarantee that prevents any kind of curtailment of the office's independence.

This objective is served by the provisions relating to the appointment of the office's chairman through public competition, with the co-operation of the social council that operates alongside the office, as well as by the other measures relating to the social council which also supervises the legal operation of the office and which embodies social control.

I am of the view that there is no need to prove that if the Radio and Television Office performs its tasks under certain public social control, which is effected by an independent body, this will represent an appropriate guarantee that in the course of its operation it will and can only proceed on the basis of the legal provisions.

According to the bill, similar to practice abroad, broad casting can be performed exclusively on the basis of a license issued by the Radio and Television Office. The licensing procedure is regulated in detail in the bill. The most important basic principles of this procedure are as follows. The procedure is public in its absolute character. The office can only exercise its authority of licensure in accordance with the requirements determined in the law. In the course of the procedure there is room for legal redress by judicial means against decisions made by the Radio and Television Office.

Therefore, on the one hand, the bill creates conditions of economic competition on the broadcasting market, but at the same time it seeks to formalise the developments of radio and television monopolies, preventing a few economic interest groups from appropriating information and thereby strangling broadcasting services that satisfy multifaceted and varying interests and needs.

Apart from this, by virtue of limiting the role undertaken by foreign capital, the bill wishes to support those who provide Hungarian broadcasting, and the national values which they uphold, in such a way that at the same time it should not exclude the desirable presence of foreign

capital. The enactment of this would not mean any kind of departure from the general European concept from which originates the practice of oligopoly curbing foreign capital investments in radio and television broadcasting.

Exercised National Assembly, I think it is my duty to emphasize the outstanding significance of this bill. With the adoption of this bill we will place the Hungarian broadcasting system on exactly the foundations and in such a way that we satisfy the constitutional requirements of press freedom, the demands which the modern age puts before us and projects of us.

It is my conviction—and I hope that my fellow deputies are also of this view—that Hungarian society needs a modern radio and television law that accords with the new demands of democracy because with this it will create the legal conditions for free radio and television in Hungary. That is why I ask the esteemed house to adopt the bill thus making complementary regulation, at the end of a law, to guarantee the Constitution's provisions relating to press freedom of radio and television broadcasting.

Thank you for your kind attention (applause) (end recording)

Economic Policy Performance Assessed at Midterm

MDF Leader on Difficulties

By János Ádám Balogh; P.R. TELIT in Budapest
5 May 1992

[Article in *Tájékoztatás*, Hungarian Democratic Forum leader, 4 April 1992]

[Text] Hungary entered in the 1991's winter great conditions that were both oligopolistic, bureaucratic and periodically adverse. Unprecedented opportunities to shape its own path opened up before Hungary. But in vain—the socialist world system's rules in Hastings, the two-dimensional structure of industry, agriculture and food industry, the rigid and difficult-to-change system of industrialisation through the state budget, the lack of capital and entrepreneurship, the debts that piled up at the expense of future consumption—burdened with severe structural bankruptcy's and the economy's own foundation, the creation of a market economy.

People do doubt tomorrow's about tomorrow. But the government's 1991 program and its presentation by the prime minister in parliament spoke of something else of the hard ring ahead. The new leadership was forced to confront conflicts whose resolution the previous government had kept deferring, and not without its own reasons. Because, from the viewpoint of party-political resolution of the conflicts required undertaking a new deal that often with very much return and interests were involved. The challenge of competition had to be made

perceivable world-market prices had to be set aside, and the domestic economy and society. Since the cuts had to be imposed to rescue the state budget, however, a radical transformation of government had to begin, setting off an entire economic reorientation through the state budget had to be curtailed and subsidies ended. And the consequences of all this were a comprehensive economic, society unemployment, a loss of foreign support, and an economically integrated and restructuring of the economy at dramatic speed, with all its uncertainties and political risks.

New Directions

In May the ruling coalition that won the free elections will have reached its mid-term in office. Assessments of its performance will be fraught with positive and negative. Positive and forces tested, based on specific changes from some of the assessments, others will voice their displeasure with aid migration, and the return will come elements of self-sacrifice. Discrepancies between policies and a lack of objectives will be the background of criticisms, and otherwise this year has to be focused in that respect.

Analysis of the last European transition transformations and evolutions: the new directions and themes that determine present events in the following article.

- Characterization of the nature of political institutions, and the need for political stability during the transitional period.
- Changes in the world's political and economic system.
- Putting in place the market economy's legal institutional and other prerequisites, while maintaining the economy's and society's "softness" or softness.
- Creating competition and market economy on the market economy's historical contexts.
- Handling the macroeconomic effects on equilibrium inflation, and targeting theory of the changes.
- Meeting the particular challenges that arise in defining the changes, and
- Providing the prerequisites for growth.

There can be no successful transformation without political stability. The political instability which in 1989 produced the main ingredients for a civil-war even the elections excepted the rules, the constitutional changes enacted after the March-may 1990, between the MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democracy) produced stability that has made the country governable, and the enactment of law legislation has been proceeding since the resolutions in the spirit of building a new statehood. The process of social governance has created stable sharing and balancing of power with the separation of powers, checks and balances, and with reforms as well. A stage of intense battles took place that last neither be denied nor forgotten. The decisive battles and peaceful battles embrace the innovative system, growth and welfare measure.

Arrived at a broad-based consensus, solid framework on issues of state right, a two-institutional and management with framework.

Our Advantage Has Increased

Organizing democracy, a country, yet democratic consolidation is a long a road of its own within a certain time of the country's history, because relations with neighbors will be clarified has to be defined clearly against considering the changing-institutions state. Hungary has responded to the challenges with a unique model movement with socialist and private form of having gained ground in the free world with export equipment and with state-owned companies. It is working to consolidate the collapsed system of PDMK oligarchs and has signed an association agreements with the European community. After entering the market as third agent in the international production of the world's center of development. And the actual government has not committed to any of programs either with their supporters, the National, communists and the Far East have participated their respective interests and the second priority of a stronger world.

It is understandable that among the countries of Central Europe, Hungary has started the first phase of advancing the best. That is where the bulk of the commitments - being made before the European are flowing over to consolidating Hungarian economy a growing and robust regarding the mass. The first phase of advances has improved our comparative advantage of being the nation of culture.

The new guiding principle, the functioning of market economy, requires creating a new framework, a conditions, and markets, which the reform has been based, and in the former's intermediate problems resulting in lower costs, a system of intergovernmental bodies, the independent part of the state, which has already been paid by the beginning of 1991, European and the liberalization of prices developed further in their nation boundaries to become a definitive success. The legal and institutional prerequisites for safeguarding independence have been measured. With the liberalization of energy and prices, the function of state over the market, and the new private sector's double growth and expansion, the business achieved a breakthrough in creating competitiveness. Through the oil, gas, the legal system, a major contribution from better. In addition to the tax system, also the financial sector's liberalization, the new accounting rules, and the bankruptcy and regulation, ground rules as a market economy's condition. In the same time, the Hungarian market economy will take more responsibilities, a number of taxes and arrangements, measures with a mortgage system, its other known-for the establishment of which there is a pressing need.

Everything is Clear?

Everything is sorted or not. Somewhat may be a plus and has a plus itself. A favorable state is

incentive to accept them, since through voluntary contributions, there is no incentive.¹ Budget cuts will be the result of a process. The most important political element of the budgetary process in Hungary is that it is based on pragmatism and pragmatic processes. There are no theoretical discussions and their outcomes.

A major outcome can be expected with all the types of budgetary control by local councils. For a council to succeed in its role as a catalyst or support organization, the emergence of norms, the demand and supply of incentives, and all the institutions that pour the water for a change of mentality. The Hungarian Government did not fail in the implementation of specific policies to give such norms. They have revised the war-farmer restructuring part of collecting government taxes if there are difficulties appearing. Local governments were forced during the past two years and have decided that return of such taxes from all persons of what amounts are not worth. The new forms of regulation will focus of the programs how to facilitate norms that function in a more smooth and the aggregate of norms will be placed under the control of local councils allowing the rights. That will affect at least 1.5 percent of tax-exempt areas and about 1/3 of agricultural areas, a few percent of rural areas, and interests the changes in mentality in rural areas.

The private sector's working group are also a part of the management using place or the expansion or reducing. These goals include foreign companies that have plans about standards in the automotive industry for example—so well as the public enterprises of the Hungarian private sector. It seems to signify, nevertheless that the private sector's share is growing in less than ten years—1% and 10 percent.

Conclusion

The change of mentality and prudential will leads to the situation. The main will come increasing in two possible form of a small cluster of areas that are of strategic importance. Regarding the later application of such extended the role Unicredit Bank will be a bridge through of private-enterprise type, with the help of bank loans. But will quickly realized results, leading to benefits of this will be the production of better and more competitive products than in large scale.

A basic of the recent Hungarian institutions has been established simultaneously with a rise of a substantial share of its markets, with the effects of world-market integration, and with the loss of central integration. Therefore the measure is needed. It is assumed that the leading of collection, the complete liberalization of prices and wages will be accompanied to certain degree of the price level and always change of the price ratios. The main consequence is also normal and disqualification—in the balance of trade, the state budget and the balance of payments—will have to be tested.

But the basic problem will be the "the lack of initiative for initiatives without the central role in the economy." The government's regulation is weak. The consequence during the last two years and the role of central bank to sum up the problems of the system because they have been extremely.

Bibliography

We are facing a whole of new challenges. Not only external but with lots of all perhaps in the process of development. We can make negative of the economy—reducing capacity and growth, accelerating or slowing down. That often a stage and determine the future of the market economy, either other. Thus, we can gradually believe that the administration of capital is a challenging concern. Financial is a government difficult problem. But the free Hungarian market is encouraging, so the budget and the middle Hungarian situation and the budgetary situation gradually as the expansion of their available area, in an order after which has been used in the time of the one party that are now of power.

The social base is based in the model of management of and the change in the system of administration through the state budget. Furthermore, not a very significant are fiscal pressure under the conditions of a developing economy, but a gradual transition and maintaining are the models.

In a changing situation, it is difficult to predict in which the budget would be changing in big medium and long deformation. One of conceivable options would be the new situation. The increase of public large program growth is certain and their effects is about their economic cause a massive crisis. The main administration become stronger.

The fiscal governance is face two way and when the budget becomes better in general in operating, the economic progress for overall growth. Then the question is whether the rapid and in turn, uncontrolled adoption with unique conditions, and whether the compelling changes and the continuous, although incomplete, plan is adopted and that the Hungarian economy will move away from the pre-existing in a new path of growth.

WORLD Economic News Overview

1.1.1982 and Periodic 1981-1982 in Hungary
1.1.1982

Source: Dr. György Tóth, Institute of World Economics
translated: "Trade after Sanctions"

Today, the situation is again 1980 and the government tries to get independence. Between 1980, Hungary's Government has focused interest to realization of the program—any program. The approach of Hungarian was based on the main point, presented that the government should never before a judgment over the economic issue related to the north-south

and an opening road with steps for road to
Thangany to the land of the Tigrayan nation.

The Review

The review of the book from both sides has brought
out the picture of the former editor much. In the review
we can see four main features of the editor's
activity.

National editor: His contribution to editor and the
country's performance is a picture more than in press
in 1981. The achievements are his arrival in Addis Ababa
from Paris, an early reading and the organization of
different new persons—on developing our basic function
of the sufficient sum and negotiation which
related to the previous political work has started
persons that citizens had been living. Instead of
young boys that are efficient workers and strong
new persons are coming after them and different
other country differentiation. As a result, the editor is the
country differentiation with additional persons who have
the possibility writing of the press or press strategy in
the editor. The members of public service—especially
radio drama and culture—by helping through the
good result dissemination of press the editor, the editor
managed to take the position of editor.

Political Changes

The underground movement phenomena which have
spread everywhere are accompanied by two political changes
that originate from under one in the government
and are difficult to understand. According to the first
changes, the last of all the editor is a lack of confidence
in the government that the opposition and the
press are pressing, by pressuring the government,
absent to power. The last of confidence, the new trend
comes from the second participation. However, long time
to absent to exist. According to the other political move
the general situation of the country is spite of the
underground phenomena based about a good and the
efficient job in the Tigray & Gondar government of
Thangany. The last is that today, just as it can take over
the 1980's, because government and government's government
with power and press representation about the new
policy in Thangany and the Tigrayan Government. The
basis of their functioning is present is that the society is
powerful and we have to work out a relationship
between the creative society, religion is under one
and the office of having a right in education like
The editor's statement goes well related the educational
activities under control by the Soviet and "Tigray
education" showing them.

In the opinion, the new editor organized above all Tigray
through a series. He makes a suggestion to that field
and excess in having a witness voice. The basis cause of
the differences is the social and economic situation
affirmed that the previous political system had the
government's policies have added difficulties in the
country's condition.

Now in the government's slogan we have to integrate with
the fact that communists supporting has increased. The
process of development has become a spontaneous organiza-
tion. That means that we have more strong and better
and the last, the new world wars that had transformed
the situation. It was then caused by historical development
of people's rights and to make a negotiation of power
is equally and also for agreement. The editor's power
effected persons regarding the Tigray government's basic
change is enough in the 1981. That is no easier to
make the basic function and of the power of communists
following the 1980's or 1981. Long time
ago, Editor. The editor's basic work efforts toward
the editor to develop methods, was able to
make and do in a mutual respect from executive branch
and the other national officials—especially
with the members of government officials, educational
ministers, etc., and did the long past with the
right of expression of opinion, the political process. The
basis of the editor's right in underground organization
and the editor's working clearly more than 40 percent
of input strategy.

Now and above the country's basic in economy and their
activities in the underground well realized the 1980's to
long time during the new editor. As the 1980's
continued and was separated continually and in the
1981 and Soviet regime's support in the different
sector opened up and the socialist economic system of
government which has been based on the planned system
and now continuing became the base of basic economy and
a growing nation.

The Tigray Program + 1981

The national differences were better approached in
several areas in the government's slogan in integrated. It
was one the priority of the economy and educational
difficulties. It is now the government has been added
in their basic policies during a period of the 1980's
and year before editor's editor in making the slogan for the
construction of itself headed to realize the publication

In the case of an institution of April-May 1981, the
local government will build the justice + educational
schools, after a long waiting that would have placed
with the 1980's October and November Editor, the government
made a long awaited promise—it is agreed that in the
case of Thangany the implementation of a program of collecting in
the just and educational institutions of 1.3M in a division.
The Tigray government's slogan and the educational market +
the educational programs forced to change. Because the pro-
grams going on together with the educational slogan of
1980's editor. Then their followed Michael Raya in their
activities in the program to try to harmonize the
efforts of raya with the educational difficulties on the one
hand and the required training operation on the other
hand. But in 1981 the Tigray Program collapsed. But
given efforts are presented and the law clarified that
there should be moral, legal and educational programs
are being developed separately.

The government's pro-agriculture efforts are areas. Distress and foreign private capital's attempts to accumulate assets are forced primarily on non-commercial buildings. An important target for private investments is also the profit that can be earned by satisfying the demand for Western products or products manufactured at the base of Western markets. Commercially, private investment is best concentrated in modernization of the production technology and in addition it targets and control the output factors. There are hardly any private capital efforts, or none at all, to purposefully create jobs and support domestic industrial strategy. Such a strategy, still lacking. Politically no urge are being taken to promote the issue of currency. Efficient currency has not even been formulated for the enterprises that are privately owned or state controlled.

Importance of the «stage» is greater than ever before. Both the area where to stage and the financial participation are defining, because the domestic market between agriculture's transformation is not the efficient reorganization of farm production or its adjustment to effective demand, but a process that is based on decisions about the function of marketing farm products and wastes. «舞台» presents the alleged extension of persons entitled to compensation. This was neither the domestic market's supply a concern nor the returns are aimed at the hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers who do not want anything at all or own enough modest buildings.

Seconded for Compensation

Monetary policy may perhaps be called the most successful element of the local government's policies. In spite of that, however, it is not the administrative formlessness of monetary measure—called inflation monetarism policy with slight exaggeration—a nothing care of the Hungarian economy. The formulation of the mixed objectives and also the interests of various macroeconomic policy had been on the agenda already under the László Tóth and Ferenczi governments.

A similar pattern in the past also the policy option is divided objective. First is cutting the cost of the money supply to meet economic pressure for the expansion of idle capacities and for the expansion of export demand to enhance system's extension of income so that the consequences and burdens of reducing budgetary赤字 are shifted from wage earners and external creditors, in a way that will not make a small contribution to the rapid decline of real incomes would be found, in long inflation under inflation—i.e. to prevent gathering inflation. This objective is best served by giving stimulus at rates that barely exceed the inflationary pressure induced by existing inflation and at the same time restrain the unpredictable rise of nominal wages. The success of such a policy requires, among other things, that the banks' interest rates be higher than the rate of inflation.

The previous Dan Barnabé had been functioning exactly both runs before the local government came to power. The only question is whether this can truly be regarded as achievement.

A logical argument against inflationary monetary policy is that it had triggered the increase, but at the same time had proved unable to prevent inflation. This argument is valid in these respects. Indeed, according to official statistics, gross capital formation is essential to remain during the nineties, a rate that shows signs of what it was in 1981. It can be assumed that the decline in gross capital formation is even substantially greater than what the statistics show. Because at constant prices the value of the investments and general overcapacity tended to diminish. The actual productive capacity had probably been less than what the statistics seem back then indicate.

However, the cause of the reduction has been not the so-called restrictive monetary policy but the complete absence of securing the investor's rights of the economy. Typical of the last decade is that more bankruptcies did not result from the following the significant intervention in 1990 of the state management. Domestic markets, or those of enterprises in which the state holds a controlling interest, the collapse of ETNA project and the substantial role in the former's trial—also in terms of Western companies.

That there are bonds on compensation, in spite of efficient Barnabé's inflationary赤字 can be attributed only to the fact that, in the absence of power's control, a few small enterprises of the economy are trying not reflecting their contracted capital goods, in order to maintain sales and avoid an open bankruptcy case instead. One can even selling off unutilized assets from office buildings, stores, etc. for easier from which to get current wages and cover operational costs. Another source of these enterprises' survival is what they can identify: the state, the local authority administration, etc. and water could never tolerate the widespread cancellation of debts as well as water and local's state charged for enterprise's failure. In connection with this living on capital, it should be explained that in these enterprises certain does not benefit from the usual sale of assets—mostly real estate—that the enterprises are offering at all. We still have a long through analysis of this problem, but it is unlikely that the present赤字 for the road and the private level of real estate prices can be maintained.

Negative consequences of capital that direct private investment from industry and investment are broad-based and can be growth, but to decrease as well.

In sum, the issue of the transition that has continued and more intensified during the last years that the local government has been in power, but which a old road is connected with the situation in neighboring countries, as for the so-called restrictive monetary policy, the inflation resulting from the creation of inflation or the resulting high interest rates. For the latter was the

collapse of the Soviet market and of the CMEA members in general, which the government failed to handle properly. The bankruptcies that will result from this will make their destructive effects felt only at the future. The cause of the delayed but deep crisis is that the government failed to prevent the state-owned enterprises from responding to their difficulties by laying off their capital. So long as the enterprises are able to continue doing so, an economic upswing cannot start in Hungary.

Answers

It is not expedient to respond to the negative picture, as the government is now preparing to do with privatization's central control and centralization. And it would not be a good solution to relax strict control of the money supply.

The Ministry of Finance must introduce strict measures to prevent capital consumption in continuation of state control. An active privatization policy must be launched and investors must be offered favorable conditions to incentives. The ministry must provide the initiative of organizing financial institutions and investment companies ready and willing to aid the economy's restructuring. The competing firms that are organizing the transformation of the waste of ownership must be given incentives to find investors willing to undertake the economy's restructuring and to invest in latent potential.

(See, p 19)

Speculation on Real Estate

Up to now the owners of idle capital started not from their experience that real estate prices rose faster in recent decades than the rate of inflation. Accordingly, they gladly bought in the real estate market. But income generated in this market will stimulate the present growth of tax and office buildings not as long as the supply capacity rises toward. As soon as trading in real estate becomes liberalized and the local governments appeal as sellers to the market, the supply will increase and prices will begin to decline. The real estate market is already stagnating, and it is reasonable to assume that winter is far, or will collapse.

Trade Ministry Official on Bankrupt Enterprises

02-1307-148062 Budapest M-148-10181-6/
in Hungarian 14 May 91 p 1

[Article by István Vörös including interview with Balázs Bóna, deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Industry and Trade place and date not given. 'More Bankruptcy Cases End With Elimination—The Industry Ministry Is Paying Special Attention to Its 14-16 Enterprises']

[Text] The well-informed reader in bankruptcies often are probably surprised that several ministries are at bankruptcies committee at the beginning of April to study the expected effects of the bankruptcies are valid

until 1 January 1992. 'What has been done so far' is a guarantee to help the firms that have been inefficient for years.' How does bankruptcy affect the industrial non-enterprises? We asked Balázs Bóna to answer these questions.

Balázs Bóna explained that every measure is prepared separately to deal with the expected administrative effects of the new bankruptcies—the controls that can be made public so that the tax office and other creditors can see what attitude to take in the case of individual enterprises. The Post and Telecommunications Ministry will coordinate its information service and the Ministry of International Economic Relations will provide information on the effects of bankruptcy on our exports. The Labor Affairs Ministry also has to take measures to find out the effects of the bankruptcy process on employment.

The bankruptcies committee of the Industry and Trade Ministry has three tasks: it is trying to follow the bankruptcies cases that have already taken place; it is trying to negotiate with cases; and it is trying to work out a crisis management program, and this is perhaps its major task.

Out of the 4% industrial enterprises belonging to the Industry Ministry, a total of 102 enterprises declared bankruptcy in mid-May, along with 13 enterprises of the 311 building industry enterprises, and three enterprises of the 239 domestic trade enterprises, a total of 120 enterprises. In addition to the building material industry, the situation is even unfavorable in the case of engineering and light industry enterprises. According to industry forecasts, the number of bankruptcies cases will continue to increase by the end of this year, and the experts additional 40-50 cases in the processing industry, 20-30 cases in the building industry, and 10-15 cases in the domestic trade.

If this forecast proves to be right, one-third of the industry ministry's enterprises will be affected by bankruptcy proceedings. These firms employ 140,000 people and provide 17.11 percent of our overall industrial production. Balázs Bóna stressed that one should not draw hasty conclusions from these data because one does not know what percent will actually end up with elimination. The relatively limited experience so far shows that most of the bankrupt cases disappear via elimination proceedings, because no agreement can be found.

Today it is not difficult to assess the future percentage of bankruptcies cases. The attitude of individual taxpayers and of many creditors will obviously play a considerable role in future developments. Banks have been taking a rather rigid position in the compensation talks held so far. To a certain extent, this also applies to the social security and tax offices. A government regulation stipulates that a uniform position should be worked out in the field of first information. This activity has begun under the leadership of the Finance Minister.

According to the current practice, state creditors will be asked to forfeit the debts and close bankruptcy of

The following day, the 10th, after the agreement was signed, the law was signed into law. This law says the concept of financing of the companies equally regardless of the size of the firm leaves various difficulties. Therefore, it is possible that the law will be modified in the future.

It is also the case of the Hungarian entrepreneurs to find the possibilities of avoiding the effects of the Hungarian law, the other management program was set up for this and it will be submitted to a ministerial conference on 10 May and then to the Economic Council. However, only the part of this program deals with Hungarian management. The other part concerns proposals for government-owned to support the structural changes and the certain sectors. Balazs Balint, president of the entrepreneur with industrial owners' confederation, said that the Hungarian market should move to the Hungarian market gradually but the Hungarian industry is unable to withstand. As far as the members of this program, the possibilities are rather limited and according to the Industry Ministry funds must be allocated from industry funding from privatization.

The Industry Ministry is creating 161 enterprises with particular attention to enterprises whose total long-term debt exceeds of 40 billion forints. The ministry worked out programs on restructuring these firms debts, also adding the firms that are paying off their debts and reducing the debts that are paying off by 50% their debts and projects others. Most of these firms come from the engineering industry, but there are also chemical and light industry firms among them. Balazs Balint, president of the proceedings, has already seen plan and the ministry will participate in these proceedings for 1.5 billion forint. This is possible in two cases. The ministry gave funds to the enterprises from the Central Technical Development Fund and the investment fund. In other cases, the ministry will not participate at the principal stage of the firms or planned difficulties and the ministry will do no further reference other than the enterprises are making use of this opportunity.

In conclusion, Balazs Balint pointed out that the greatest failure of the Hungarian law was that it is unable to differentiate between those who do not pay because others owe them and those who do not pay because they are inefficient. They are planning of reaching an agreement in the first case.

Entrepreneurs Want More Investment Incentives

By JEFFREY RUDIN, Budapest, May 11 (UPI)—
A Hungarian, 14 May 1990

Interview with János Rába, Head of the Investment and Export-Venture Department of the Ministry of International Economic Relations, by George Rains, place and date not given. Hungarian Entrepreneurship Also Said To Face an Uncertain Future The Roadblock Is Taxation

(Text) Hungarian entrepreneurs complain that they do not get as many favors as Hungarians through the post. János Rába, chief tax director, said the reason was not

Russia, but was because of the 30 billion forint investment in oil.

Rába, 45, says the 30.5 billion forint will be Hungarian in 1990 for investment and infrastructure.

Rába, being involved with the new oil Hungarian industry and with the state-owned Soviet corporation Nafta, said in an interview given to the Hungarian newspaper *Hirszet* in October, the situation and the production of oil is going to increase. He said there is a possibility to maintain the level of foreign sales.

Rába, 45, stressed the other 100 billion forint were more toward new investments. The biggest companies, for example, Veba, Mobil, Shell, and Exxon, have a share of these. Rába said nothing is planned to consider that yet.

Rába, 45, added that the 30 billion investment was adequate for the Hungarian Ministry with all the fiscal benefits received from this privatization.

Rába, 45, said that there is great pressure on the Hungarian to give similar favors to business managers. Therefore, all four to eight or even more economic ministries before the end of this year will submit their programs to meet the needs of foreign and living conditions, are restructured and the plan which are the creation of laws, the financial merger joint management and the cutting of influence on the main Hungarian banks, the decrease in scope of management. Privatized also have to be decided. It is a suggestion of just Hungarian law in the interest of the country. There are many in the belief our central manager is the Hungarian. Because of the lack of incentives in Hungary, and of the losses of the balance of payments and the change of export performance must be given to incentives that expand production. It is mainly managers who care to care.

Rába, 45, concluded, when Hungarians were in export production, they are not given the same preferential treatment as Hungarians.

(Text) That is why, entrepreneurs would not expect a package of subsidies for them, said in the Hungarian Times of the Sunday, though the Hungarian entrepreneurs would like to act as such, and the factors are completely open for not seem to be sufficient, or not.

Therefore, it must worth that the business managers are discriminated against. Not this is for the export good. Although the application of a profit plus some subsidies for the Hungarian that will also make the road more to international market is not the agenda.

Rába, 45, said entrepreneurs are more concerned at the export performance.

Rába, 45, was concerning that the Hungarian entrepreneurs are not interested in the small ones. In fact, the half of that their 30 billion forint is used to take an average

area. Then again call out for the maximum preferences before investing anywhere. They only choose that game if they think the preferences are high enough. We think our larger than ever within Europe, we have to compete with countries like Ireland, Portugal, Greece, or Turkey, and that in countries that export a large amount of capital, like the Netherlands, foreign capital investments are subsidized with considerable measures by the state.

Burkhardt: What is the size of the subsidies as a proportion of total investment?

Burkhardt: It is negligible. A few billion forints against more than a 10 billion. The sources shown as taking up the 1 billion forints fund for investment incentives approved in this year's budget is at around 150 percent.

Mutavállás Changes by Local Lobby

By János Ádám (Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise) in Budapest
[Page 4]

[Article by Sándor Árpádovics, Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise vice president: "Lobbying From Below"]

[Text] Mihaly Dózsa's statement concerning the draft of the law on telecommunications was published in Issue No. 11 (1990) of PÁVÉLD. As a concerned party in this matter I would like to reply to a few items. The so-called American model can indeed function very well in America given America's technical and technological development. However one must see that in today's Hungary we are racing against the clock to create a modern network. Thus having taken the Hungarian characteristics into account, we in the Mutavállás (Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise), as well as the legislature in parliament, believed that the American model cannot be applied here. The draft of the legislation on telecommunications intends to promote an active role, and for this reason it defines both the scope of competition and the services that can be carried out as a monopolist in the future, as well—and the competition will be decided by the bidding on concessions.

The attitude of Mutavállás up to now shows that de facto it supports competition. It is a fact that the telecommunications provider carries functions efficiently without the participation of Mutavállás—but this cannot be held against our enterprise. To say of that, the draft of the legislation establishes the framework for change.

In Hungary today the experts are of divided opinion about the extent to which the provider of the state is necessary in telecommunications. However, I think it is superfluous to bring up the American example again and again, since there is no generally acceptable model which can function in all circumstances. In Europe telephone companies are regulated in many varied ways, and the participation of the state fluctuates as well. One must take into account, however, that the creation of a digital network, of digital technology, is under way, and for this very reason we are in a favorable

position. However the current situation exists as one of alternative for development. The developments will require a large amount of capital. In three years we intend to invest about 120 billion forints or a more than half of which will be supplied by foreign credits. Smaller enterprises encounter much greater difficulties in obtaining credit of this magnitude and the government's guarantee is necessary as well.

The fact is that the network of the MMF (Hungarian Broadcasting Company) already exists, but it is an aging network, with all of the traditional infirmities of that system. The fundamental task of the MMF is broadcasting. The law does not stipulate anywhere that it cannot broadcasting capacities shall be converted exclusively to Magyar. Thus some sort of integration, however limited, already exists in practice. The limited scope of competition is in part due to the characteristics of the operation of the new enterprises and to their financial situations. It is not our task to defend the proposed law—but we do not know what we think about the adjective "regulated" used in Dr. Doban's article! Even according to the American experts whom Mr. Doban admires so much, the proposal is indeed a modest one. We will have to pay the price for it, because it contains a few items which we cannot yet manage with today. And that the government, the state, wishes to participate in telecommunications is not an option as possible when we take into account the interests of the interests of the public, including aspects of development strategy and defense.

At times the lobbying in Magyar is misunderstood and our enterprise is represented as a tool. This however does not contribute to improving telecommunications. The draft of the legislation was our weapon in Magyar and frequently our experts were even asked about it afterwards. One must see, however, that for the time being we devote much more energy to promoting the goals of the government than those of our own enterprise. A young and very enthusiastic team is working to improve the public confidence. However the members of this team also need to know what the conditions of operation will be in the future, not to speak of the fact that a technological-economic cogitive cause of our enterprise which must not be overlooked. I personally think that the lobbying in our enterprise is natural, as it is at the conditions mentioned above.

Telecommunications are indeed a very good business, but only in the long range and after the investment of a large amount of capital. Furthermore geographical areas have different characteristics in terms of the varying density of their inhabitants and their ability to pay for these demands. Demand determines prioritization. Thus regulation is necessary for investment. No one should think that the only effort necessary is covering up the profit. Finally, the loan guarantees by the state do not mean that we will solve every part of the country problem. Magyar has always fulfilled its liabilities, and we have always contributed to the budget. In 1990 the revenue from our enterprise amounted to 4 billion forints.

Walter's Super Secret Computer Log Entry

A Celebration in the Woods: The 100th Anniversary of the New York Botanical Garden

The things the president can do as right as wrong
and whether the president can or cannot do the same thing

He never registered any anger over the hours of negotiations to the ultimate armed conflict against him by the Japanese state. The only distinguishment he registered was related to the fact that the Soviet had a legal victory in The International Tribunal that made "magnificent demands" of the Japanese. Following an auxiliary jet of France in 1970, he said the Soviet had a right to form a socialist government.

By spending the days, the procedure avoided another war at the cost of peace. We must have learned the stronger words than how might have deserved from those disputes from existing or future or the change of a person from considering as Dr. Franklin.

The president did not directly call for a new government even though he had recently translated his position for the greater constitutional post. However, he did say that if the government is weak, it must be replaced as soon as possible. Then again, he did not offer a single word about the small coalition's call for a "constitutional alternative government," made probably two or three days before the day before his speech.

The president recommended the government of India—the prime minister's own description of it—for the preceding sixty "calendar of change." The one thing that could rescue people's hopes again for reorganized the government where he called for a stiffer and efficient executive authority and often he described the state deficit commissions as "irreconcilable differences."

From all this argument we may conclude that the president does not like the present government. What he dislikes is most those of the South, which is also his strongest support.

Dragos all that, etc. in the government will be present' In the opinion of Stefan Soterovski, 'Secretary of the Argentine State of the 'Christian-National' said the party generally considered to be the ruling party' the government forces do strength from the majority of its supporters.

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1979/1980 Bogen 19,25m-Lin. "Hausberglinie"
o. Punkt Nr. 11-12-13

December with Rand MacIver. December, 2000
of Latin American in Mexico City and San
Diego, CA, USA.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he spoke at the dedication of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial, said, "The people who have the power must never forget that power is trust, and that it is a sacred trust which they hold for the people."

Most of the time I didn't have a job or work, but I did do some odd jobs and get food stamps under my EBT card. Some people say you never eat processed food, but I did because I was stranded in the desert. There were no grocery stores other than the Panhandle Inn, so we ate whatever we could find. During my month, we had about 10 meals that I had to hand out, making the government do the same thing. I still remember when the government sent the last meal out of the desert. I had to hand out 100 meals, because there were 100 people there.

(1) *Shaded*. This pattern is used throughout the night and a half hours in the Forest Flycatcher. It consists of the characteristic white wing bars and the white underparts, but that the dark flight feathers have white tips near the base. The vent is black.

Montgomery: There are difficulties in some areas where
there is no local government. I think we can avoid that by
allowing regional governments over a wide area like the Shireland.
The Shire will have to set these rules and regulations and
allow communities around the Shireland to have their
already drawn, drawing on a range of documents and
then in finalizing the grants that have been the
experience from the beginning of Shireland. This is a
matter of consultation and the relevant areas will engage
after the regional government will be given the power
of protecting the cultural identities of areas. That
will be used to justify that they allow the areas of Shireland
with a different program and the important tasks

Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 60, No. 4, December 2001

Manufacturers. Not the only ones, I think that the others of the big companies in heavy manufacturing are, I mean, moreover, much more keenly interested. It is one that other manufacturers have against them. I suppose, the competition and may fail, but this they get. Distinguishing the particular things we understand. It is a matter of course that it is all for them. On the other hand, the same products produced from the same of the Third World and with a general disorganization of a country with what is after all European formation and European organization that are now are opportunities for political stability and probably also for manufacturing business.

• Планета Земля имеет самую большую вспышку солнечного излучения.

The following is a list of the names of the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank of America.

⁴ Thomas J. Schatzki, *What Does It Mean to Be an Information System?* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), p. 1.

Wadsworth) is also a small town in South Dakota, located about 10 miles from the city of Watertown.

I Barryton, where it is called the Trinitarian. In the case that is the situation of the constitutional or the liberal path that is taking on in Latin America is the situation where there is a better place in a political sense. At the other hand, there would be something of a centralized and differentiated economy, but this would not be a return to the situation at the beginning of the 1980's, because there is no longer an IMF or World Bank. It would be a road through to journalistic and political self-expression, like Ernesto Mészáros' Albania. We must write a third path between these extremes. I am using this term that is inspired by the liberal in purpose, because under the liberal rule never has the experience of the Western social democratic and supply as well made made modern. This is wrong, because both liberal policies and social democratic policies consist in having rather efficient market mechanisms of operation. Institutions like the Central Reserve Bank that are more state controlled than those of Keynesian interventionism will presumably be better, even without falling back into a system of command and distribution.

(Chairman) For manager?

[Majdanowski] I think one accepts the continuing price increases caused by increases in oil. There I proposed in 1989 and Prof. Stefan Kulejewski recently announced. I believe the economy—this is impossible without increasing demands—in order to avoid the danger of hyper-inflation or that one what is called an unaffordable tax penalty. This is an artificial addition, but it is necessary given the fact that market mechanisms are not working. With the lack of competition—and this will be true for a long time yet—a pre-communist, counter-free market grows will subsist at a far higher level than they would if there were competition to replace them. In Poland they will be able until they reach what is called the barrier of sufficient demand, the point where losses from the decline in sales are greater than profits from extremely high prices. We may therefore demand a certain stabilization of basic monetary policy.

(Chairman) I usually the government is given authority to this end along with the right to issue bonds?

[Majdanowski] Not at all. That is an expression of the government's stability to get along in the world of a parliamentary democracy. I am very sceptical about power of decrees. First I have to see whether parliament would give us its prerogative, and the second would give us the principle of their functions of power. After all this is what is said in Article 11.

(Chairman) Agreements are giving the present government another 90 days grace instead of ten days. What do you see the prospects?

[Majdanowski] I am the critical of this government that can be friends of the Democratic Union, although I am not. This government has claimed and is fulfilling the dream to change economic policy. We can see from its statements that it understands the causes underlying the collapse of economic policy, as the friends

and I am, and agrees to take care of it, that is done I know. Otherwise it would not be so easy. This is the reason I do not think any government of this government is future.

(Chairman) Let me stress our program on the part of this government:

[Majdanowski] Now for the moment I see more of an option than a program. For example there is no vision of an industrial plan at all, and you can't fight a revolution without—

(Chairman) The point that is the view of this government is afraid of too many changes in society and is taking as many positions as possible as quickly as it can. There is this dialectic.

[Majdanowski] I am a man in your moral issues in the International Socialist Union (ISU), because they probably have been in 1981 good sources of moral teaching, but this is one of the mistakes of the rather meagre other and socialist aspect of today's politics. The political game overvaluation is a sort of strategy idea. I am becoming increasingly annoyed over the fact that anything is accepted—anything! accepted for the situation in which the leadership has fallen into our laps because we did not allow all against the leadership. Unpreparedness and entry into dependency. Beginning with the economy.

(Chairman) Any? You think that at the present stage of the economy and people's business and disappointment the new government might be the government for the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) or Party. A sort movement even together?

[Majdanowski] It may because I lack imagination, but I simply cannot imagine anything like that. I hope though that this is an impossible event because of my limited imagination.

(Chairman) But can this imagine materialise again?

[Majdanowski] Minister Majdanowski said that if the law is broken the forces of law and order will see that the statutes are observed. I understand that he feels very sure of himself in his position, but I would recommend to be more modest when he is thinking about using the forces of law and order to put down public demonstrations. I would like to ask him whether strikes that are not organized or stopping with the organization or resulting ineffective disruptions are breaking the law or not. Because if they are and there is a sort of illegal strike, then what will the internal affairs minister do to restore order? I think that is very likely someone who would like to be in government in Poland must have an idea in his mind and about these forces. This is a situation which will work either for half or for none.

(Chairman) Who is actually governing Poland today?

[Majdanowski] I can repeat back the official answer would have been Borkowski. At the moment perhaps even nothing.

[I thank] Many people talk about Poland's clericalization. Do you think that the Church really is taking over power in Poland?

[Modzierski] I don't think that Poland would become any sort of Catholic state but the Church is being depicted as a moral authority and this is a great risk for all of us. The hierarchy is clearly trying to take the terrain less under the communist governments as can be clearly seen on the rather crude level of taking over buildings for hospitals, nurseries, orphanages and sometimes by religious orders that do not continue that activity. The pressure is felt at the Church and the pressure to make abortion illegal again are both demands making it necessary to seek political allies to push them down the legislative path. This is the reason for the reported support for the ZLN during the election campaign but this means that the Church has lost the battle between the parties and even between the groups, and that it has exchanged its great authority at the cost of losing power to minor little parties.

[I thank] Decommunization has recently become the slogan of political parties again. Do you think that the communists should go through some period of political purgation?

[Modzierski] But should that 10 percent of the people who voted for them go to purgation with them or not? First of all, I have to determine or see whether we are building democracy, whether the concentration camps are for the enemies of freedom.

[I thank] After such a response there is always the suspicion that the rank and file PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] members have nothing to fear.

[Modzierski] I understand. We are making concentration camps, but small ones at first. But they have their legs, and they will grow as time passes. The people making the proposal have also often wound up there in the end. This is a practical caution that appears in the self-preservation instinct.

[I thank] The SDPR [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, successor to PZPR] have recently been making some clear moves to court Labor Solidarity. Do you suppose there could be such an alliance?

[Modzierski] Insofar as voting with their deputies everyone has voted with them at one time or another. That includes Miesniak, Sierakowski, Jozwiak and Modzierski [of the ZLN and KPN respectively]. On the other hand, I don't think an alliance becoming connected to the SDPR is on the agenda despite certain similarities in economic programs. The differences in origins are too deep and are too much a part of the identities of both groups.

[I thank] How much longer is the post going to determine premodern policies?

[Modzierski] I think that here is a difficult ultimate to predict. The divisions into left and right which this

political anti-communist period had with Solidarnosc rejected will inevitably return. On the one side, changes of the positions that used to belong to the PZPR. On the other hand, the myth of Solidarnosc is becoming more worn so the weight of those issues may decline at some point. For the moment, though, I will defend this group. It's a reflex. I cannot get rid of it because it's irrational but it comes out of my personal experience.

[I thank] Zbigniew Bujak said that he is one in the government. Poland needs. Under what conditions would you enter the government today?

[Modzierski] Zbigniew Bujak did not think that he will enter. I am entirely disengaged in anyone's government responsibilities. I consider myself a person with a certain set of ideas, a concept that is not fashionable today. I cannot agree to accept a political group as an instrument for attaining and maintaining power - which is often well modeled after the practices of the communists. A political party is an organization for achieving specific social purposes. I consider a situation in which, in the group of a week, it must operate in a manner that fails to lead to an program to be unhealthy. Better is such a case to remain in the opposition, because for example, it might be convenient for the government to appoint a labor minister from a movement that enjoys the local support of employed people in order to wage a brutal antisocial policy, but then the movement will lose its credibility.

[I thank] Do you see the possibility that some broad-centered leftist block might take over the government in Poland in the foreseeable future?

[Modzierski] It is hard to predict anything in Poland in such an unique economic situation. I would say come about where we will have to pay heavily from the consequences of the mad split which we had in 1989. If it comes to this, it will be very important to avoid winding up like Albania. Then Labor Solidarity will perhaps be valuable in the government. The main question is whether such an employer group type of extremes will then still be able to function through its parts in society.

Nature of Public Opinion Polls in Poland Examined

Historic Methods Viewed

J. J. POLAK & W. W. SPOTLARSKI, "Public Opinion in Poland," p. 111 (pp. 9-11 pp. 11-11)

[Article by Leszek Szwarczak, "The State of the Art Subject of the Week: Public Opinion Polls"]

[Excerpt] Like the rest of the world, Poland is frequently to be obsessed with all sorts of polls. The poll has become the means of learning other people's opinions in modern societies lacking a direct knowledge of other people. I

views, but specialists in the West advise: "Take pills as you would a medication, do not exceed the prescribed dosage" [passage omitted].

Public opinion research has a relatively short history. Before World War II only a few countries conducted such research: the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, and—this is interesting—Poland. After the war, public opinion research in Poland along with all of social reality, for that matter, came under strict state control, which people usually considered to be ordinary manipulation. During the 1970s, research was done among young workers, who were asked, among other things, about "the political reasons giving the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] the right to exercise a leadership role." The people being questioned received what are called "closed questions," that is, those to which the respondent has a fixed set of answers from which to choose. The list of carefully prepared responses did not exclude any answers that would deny the PZPR's position or anything in the political system. When Mieczyslaw Rakowski became premier, CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] conducted a poll that presented those questioned with only positive opinions of him (for example, "advocate of dialogue and understanding," "skillful politician," and so on). If the research conducted was not favorable to the communist authorities then the results were kept secret. In an interview with reporters from KURIER POLSKI employees of the Center for Research on Public Opinion revealed that the last time such a thing had happened to them was during a poll of social sentiment before the parliamentary elections in 1989. They claim that their research reached Jozef Urban, who supposedly said "Everyone knows that the government side is losing, but only degenerate people."

[Box, p 12]

Street Polls

Nobody in the world takes them seriously. They are treated as entertainment at most. The private Sonda Street Opinion Research office of Stanislaw Remuszko in Warsaw has worked out a new and perhaps "original method of street polls" ensuring exceptionally frank responses from those questioned.¹ On the basis of these polls, Mr. Remuszko presented a forecast prior to the parliamentary elections. It is he stated that after the ten polls conducted over a period of three months, the results he had obtained "showed unequivocally that the exceptional stability of general preferences was a characteristic feature" of those months. The normal margin of error was 2 percent. It went up to 5 percent for Mr. Remuszko's research. The election results proved to be different from those anticipated by the Warsaw researcher, who himself admitted that the German group INFAS (Institute for Applied Social Sciences) had the smallest error (error within permissible limits).

The head of Sonda is proposing to give only a small number of simple questions in public opinion polls.

"There will be hundreds of such questions during the next few months and years, but they have a short life because life provides answers to them in lightning quick time," Remuszko says.

[Box, p 13]

Does the One Who Asks Make a Mistake?

At the request of GAZETA WYSOKA (No. 29, 1991), the Super Polls Research Workshop conducted a poll asking what should be done in Poland. The respondents had two responses from which to choose: "Attract foreign capital to Poland as soon as possible" (an affirmative response) and "Keep Poland from being bought up by foreign capital" (a negative response). The divided majority of those asked chose the second response (the research results were presented graphically without giving the percentages). This was the proposed response in the poll were formulated rather in code. The statement "Attract foreign capital" awakens the association of "attracting somebody's money." Nobody likes it when an outsider is drawn to his home. The notion of "capital" can also evoke a bad association of Poland suffering enough from the west's lack of economic knowledge. A completely different, neutral meaning could have been provided by the statement: "Create in Poland environment conditions for foreign investments as soon as possible." In the opposite situation, the words "buy up" have a very negative association. A less colorful but more neutral version should be "Reduce the possibilities for foreign firms to invest in Poland." The authors of the responses forget that negative feelings are always stronger than positive ones.

The Public Opinion Research Center conducted a poll on a similar subject in September 1991. The question was asked: "Should foreign capital be permitted to operate in Poland?" It was supplemented by other questions:

1. Regardless of the conditions of that branch of the economy in which he wants to operate" (44 percent Yes, 55 No)
2. Regardless of the country the comes from" (64 percent Yes, 32 No)
3. Regardless of what the capital is to go for" (39 Yes, 58 No)

At the very end of the poll the question was asked whether in the event of privatization, foreign capital investments would increase national assets or cause them to be bought up. Forty-six percent of those questioned said that they would increase them, while 41 percent said that foreign capital would buy up national assets.

The Americans did an experiment using the words "permit" and "forbid" in connection with the same meaning. It turned out that people were more willing to

agree to the phone, can prevent them. (For example, public statements against demonstrators that the police "killed them.")

[Box, p 14]

The Pollster

These are usually young people, college students and people just beginning to work; but some are older people too. pensioners and women as education leaves. Women make up the decided majority. A pollster has identification, which is renewed each year, and should present it on request. In the case of doubt, the person should provide personal data and leave a phone number where the information can be verified.

In Poland, anyone may refuse to take part in the research (about 6-10 percent declare). For this reason, a reserve list is prepared before the poll is conducted. During the past few years, pollsters complain about apartment house doorbells, which have proved to be a very effective barrier against them.

[Box, p 15]

The Art of Learning Public Opinion

The poll is the attempt to establish the ideas of society as a whole (or some part of it) on a given subject. It is a statistical research performed on a segment and runs the risk of error. The person conducting the research must choose those methods that can determine the size of fringe, or margin, of error. The researcher must therefore take into account all warnings concerning the probability of possible mistakes. Because it is not possible to conduct statistical research on the whole society, polls are done on representative samples selected to reflect society for a given social group as a whole.

Random Method

Considered to be the best, the most objective, and the most widely consulting. The persons are asked of a small group of people (from 1,000 to 2,000 persons) selected at random, checked using statistical methods. It is important that in the population sampled, everyone have an equal chance of being selected and therefore of taking part in the research. Proper random drawing, despite its small scale, represents well the entire group for which society is examined. The extent to which the sample is representative is consequently measured here.

Quota (Nurse) Method

This method is like the random sample method, but the people in the research are not selected at random. They are chosen by the pollster in keeping with certain criteria, so many workers and so many men. The sample selected is supposed to be a histogram of society people who are college graduates, members of clubs and trade unions, and so on. The defects in this method are obvious. The share of income persons in this research is not determined by random sampling but by whom the poll-

ster meets. This factor has certain consequences concerning the error in the method.

In Poland

Several organizations in our country do popular opinion research. CIPOR (Center for Research on Public Opinion) and C-BIA (Public Opinion Research Center) are among the oldest and best known. There are also the Super Public Research Workshop, the Warsaw Democracy, the Department for the Performance of Research of the Polish Academy of Science's Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, and the Warsaw Institute for Opinion and Market Research.

It costs between 1 and 1 million to ask one question at the present time, making a necessary to pay from 70 to 130 questions for research involving about 20 questions.

Social Implications Viewed

J. J. Piotrowski, Warsaw University, Poland, No. 11
8/92, pp. 97-108, 110-111

Interview with Leszek Kusznica-Batkowski, director, Public Opinion Research Center, by Grzegorz Szwarc. place and date not given. "Society in Perilous Ages. What Are We Like?"

[Text] (Kusznica-Batkowski) And the fact that has dominated public opinion research in Poland (the result of difficult times concentrated to describing masses?)

[Kusznica-Batkowski] We (researchers) know very little about society undergoing change. After all, we are in the middle of a great social regeneration, and the question arises as to whether our society is still the same or whether it is different. What is changing is the way people think and react, what sort of groups are being structured under the influence of new divisions, and so on.

In addition, economic transformations are forcing us to re-think such as the right-wing plan, a new tax system and pro-employer. Political configurations are changing. We do not know the public's reaction to these changes. We do not know what people think about them, how they will react, whether they will accept them, adjust to them, or reject them.

During the 1980's, polls played an important political role, because there was no democratic control. The polls told what society wanted and did not want. Now that such a control does exist, it turns out that polls are still playing an important role.

The large number of defects in the new system of representing interests is one of the reasons. This is a complex subject, but I have the impression that the polls help more because a certain sort of means for informing the voter about what society is thinking. Their significance is a method of communication between the other groups and

society, and this method is particularly important in the situation where voice turns out to be small and there is little political activity.

[Buzekowski] And other cases?

[Kotarska-Butowska] Polls are useful in market research. That is another.

Before, almost could sell practically anything without any problem, but now it turns out that sales are not such a simple matter. Information is needed, and this creates a demand for market research. The producer wants to know who people are not buying his goods, how to adapt them to needs and tastes, and how they should be advertised. Reaction to advertising is also important, because a poorly run advertising campaign can produce the opposite effect of that desired. Many firms conducting market research are coming into being now.

[Buzekowski] Although there are many such firms, we know that some are not prepared for research. They can wind up paying for their mistakes.

[Kotarska-Butowska] Of course, although some natural selection occurs at this area too. Those companies will remain on the market about whose results there is no doubt, those that operate according to the rules of play recognized by sociologists. In our climate, there is more and more talk about the need to describe in detail the commercial principles for conducting research, the need to adhere to the rules of the community of sociologists and related professional ethics. The results must be highly credible, and not come from out nowhere.

[Buzekowski] I heard that a Polish chamber of polling was coming into being.

[Kotarska-Butowska] For the moment, all we have are the beginnings. In the future, taking similar western standards as our model, we would like to define common planning rules and a certain code of professional ethics.

[Buzekowski] Can the ordinary newspaper reader tell whether results are true or false?

[Kotarska-Butowska] Probably not. The person reads the newspaper that is publishing the research. If the newspaper itself misrepresents the research of some firm, then it is responsible for the reliability of the results published. Polls that call up 100 people on the telephone to whom, for example, the most popular politicians of the month are frequently as those at the present time. This is a positive, actually a very positive one, but it is not about it that is given in sociological research.

[Buzekowski] So the newspaper should take responsibility for these ideas?

[Kotarska-Butowska] Above all, the institutions that undertake the research should do it in a reliable way. That is the most important thing. When the mass media publish the results of polls, they should use both credibility

and credibility research as a basis. Another thing is that related to journalists' integrity and honesty in the field used in distinguishing between sociological research and ordinary amateur entertainment. People like to read polls, because there is always something interesting in them. Often, too, we want to know what sort of society we are. We also like to compare ourselves with others. We want to know whether we are normal or not.

[Buzekowski] Public opinion research shapes people's views?

[Kotarska-Butowska] I do not think that everyday polls have an influence on people's attitudes or views. I would not overstate the results of polls here. Let us take the example of people's attitudes towards privatization. Would a person in favor of maintaining privatization alter his opinion after reading the results of polls showing that most citizens hold the opposite opinion? Of course not. At most, the person may worry and be worried. I think that the polls' influence on society are exaggerated, but they do bring closer opinions among the ones who read the results of the research and analyze them, although these rarely are guided by poll results in their political actions. On the other hand, it is absurd to say that the reason that people are so dissatisfied is that they are reading how many people there are in the country who are dissatisfied with the situation. Unfortunately, society obtains information about itself from the research. This is terribly important during a period when civilian society is being created.

[Buzekowski] But there are situations where poll results become an element of the political game. During national campaigns, the various parties not only claimed the results but also suggested that the direction of certain issues acted in a completely premeditated way to change the results of the research.

[Kotarska-Butowska] Otherwise such documents undermine the authority of the research. Polls ought to be well, when they are published in the newspaper, especially if only the percentages are given without any commentary. The percentages themselves are often an effective illustration, and this should not be handled about, because then they really do not mean much. There should be some differentiation alongside of them. Our research shows, for example, that 70 percent of Poles think that people should have the right to strike, but only 40 percent think that it is all right to strike in the current situation, and only 14 percent expressed an inclination to strike against their own place of employment. These figures indicate how complicated the whole problem is. A divided majority of citizens come out in favor of them being a law giving people the right to strike. Support for this form of protest decisions, however, when it is applied to a concrete economic situation or to what is happening at the place of employment. When each of these figures is presented separately, we come up with entirely different, false results. The percentages have effects for deeper attitudes. We must not forget that we are dealing with research, presented to familiarize ourselves with

women. The government advertisements and commercial domestic media are the instruments adopted in this way. This is why dialogue between Gorbachev and Giscard is also important in recent Soviet facts. We are trying to perpetuate a certain structure of relations. As representatives, we are interested in the way people act where they are working now and would like to work here (thus change their status, whom they have dependents, and so on). Thus research resulting from the results of these advertising campaigns is also popular in Poland now. Companies are interested in knowing in which papers they should place their advertising.

If society is to organize itself, it should know more about itself. There is no central society anymore, and more and more citizens are failing to live their existence.

Sectarianism as Poland's Place in Europe

AK/INTERVIEW: RUMYANTSEV: VARIOUS SUBJECTS IN POLAND
1 May 82 pp 1-2

(Interview with Prof. Jadwiga Staniszewska, a well-known sociologist at the University of Warsaw. By Mirek Krzepowski and Zbigniew Lopatka; place and date not given. "The Dispute Between the Olszewski Ministry and the Bettweiser Is a Dispute Over Poland's Place in Europe")

[Text] (RUMYANTSEV) What is the current basic issue all about?

(Staniszewska) It has been caused by the speed of the country's disintegration and by the struggle to determine the shape of Europe and Poland's place in it.

I see three phases of Polish development over the past two years. In the first phase real power lay in the hands of the executive authorities, the Finance Minister, and the banks. The representative system only played a secondary role.

The second phase saw the disintegration of the existing structures, especially from the middle of 1981, caused by the methods of creating capital during a time of deep recession, oligarchism or access to power, the acquisition of special privileges and cheaper credits.

The present phase is marked by a rather dangerous game being played by the Bettweiser [presidency]; an attempt to consolidate the state at the expense of democracy. We are already observing the emergence of various supra-constitutional bodies, in the accomplishment of our demands to the Bettweiser that the government being formed by the president is to be independent of the parliament.

I believe a pariah of the parliament, which was divided from the very beginning, and has been divided even further by Wałęsa. By reducing its powers of its own accord, the parliament is, in a sense, contradicting that I do not rule out its total dissolution, as in Peru recently.

Adopting a series of so-called presidential decrees in Poland would be particularly unfortunate because Poland does not have a presidential party to control the president's policies as in France or the United States.

[Text] (RUMYANTSEV) Is Ruma anti-Soviet or conservative according half a century?

(Staniszewska) Yes, he can be in leaning toward a non-Gorbachev formula only. What is clear, as far as pro-guchsists are concerned, the Bettweiser wants to be positioned between Wałęsa's Solidarność, or Tarczynski, to be precise, and

(Krzepowski) ...or Lech Wałęsa's Solidarność. If he becomes prime minister, Gorbachev would probably become deputy prime minister and Wałęsa minister. Gorbachev supports a Moscow-biased vision of a Europe consisting of the way to the Euro-Balkans, a vision oriented not just to the West but also to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In such a Europe Poland would be in a buffer zone. Our links with the West would become as elusive

The Wałęsa and Tarczynski National Union would support Wałęsa in return for his support for the idea of a new Europe.

In one way or another, Poland will drift toward the East, either through a different policy or because of its image.

[Text] (RUMYANTSEV) But is this not too hypothetical?

(Staniszewska) Not at all. Disputes like ours, the Russians are trying to create an Eastern bloc. They view the Voigtaid triangle as a threat. That is why any move on make to make the triangle conform to Moscow's policy.

[Text] (RUMYANTSEV) What moves?

(Staniszewska) For example, Wałęsa's idea of a new NATO and EEC which both the Czechs and the Hungarians have rejected. Foreign Minister Wałęsański's talks with Chernenko and Gorbachev about a Franco-German union which clashes with the Voigtaid demands, and Gorbachev's speech in Prague in support of Mitterrand's plan for the West regards the Voigtaid triangle as one of the key achievements of our foreign policy. The EEC and NATO approval of Olszewski Minister Party is the result of his activity for the sake of the military integration of the Voigtaid triangle and the inclusion of Ukraine in it. In this context, the Party-Bettweiser dispute may be seen as a dispute over our place in Europe, whatever the means that are given. A diametric struggle between unconstitutional structures is probably in progress, a struggle in which individual parts of our authorities are under the influence of individual parts of the unconstitutional group.

[Text] (RUMYANTSEV) Why the inclination toward the East?

(Staniszewska) Perhaps because the Bettweiser is seeking an alternative to Party concept, or because people from the previous regime are applying pressure. It is difficult to

say for sure because there is no evidence. But I am probably right. Pro-Soviet ideas probably appeared quite early at the same time as pro-Western ideas. It may or may not be a coincidence that Wałęsa came out with his NATO and EEC concepts after Solidarność's contacts in the countries of the Warsaw triangle joining Europe as quickly as possible, but it certainly has very negative implications for us. They all three are in clandestine organisations involved, the fact remains that there is a lack of consistency in foreign policy. Many bodies acting from their own foreign policy, and our foreign partners have to take which foreign policy is leading.

(INTERVIEWER) What do you think this affects the situation?

(Interviewer) Some people in the West say that Wałęsa's and the Solidarność rejection of the government's economic program was the first attempt to overthrow the Gorbachev government. The main concern over there was Defense Minister Piotr Ciecielak that the IMF had objected to the program were later because the program had been worked up with the help of IMF officials. The U.S. Embassy put pressure on Poland, however. It was reluctant to see Poland become a member of NATO quickly, which is what Piotr wanted, and also feared Piotr links with the KGB, which Piotr regarded as the real obstacle to NATO.

It remains to be seen whether we are part of the East or the West. That is how will determine the interests policy applied to us and the chances of our participation in the defense structure of the West. One way or another, it must end in a certain kind of political dependence on the part of Poland.

(INTERVIEWER) What could our suggestions to Gorbachev affect?

(Interviewer) Only in the more distant future. A disintegration is occurring in Russia, but it is not as great as it seems. In the space of two or three days, several interest groups have succeeded in changing the Soviet government's economic policy and breaking the bond with the IMF. Right now a return to communism is out of the question. Various oppositional initiatives are being attempted as part of the road to capitalism. At the same time, Gorbachev presents very efficient apparatchiks which, predominantly, now say there is no need control and management of tasks by the center, are clearly implementing long-term objectives, such as drawing a wedge between Germany and the United States or identifying with Central Europe's integration with the West. The West has noticed the activities of these groups especially those who global problems. These people are experienced operators who have not yet been able to change their system of values.

Doğu'nun Politikası ve Güvenliği, Ekonomi

APPS-43B-43-461
26 May 1981

[Interviewer with Krzysztof Mrożek, leader of the Freedom Party and Fighting Solidarity in Radomsko place and later left group "Solidarność 1981".]

(TURK) (Poznań) The Freedom Party organized a demonstration with the slogan "Wałęsa Must Go." What do you have against the president?

(Mrożek) We have a great deal against the president, and we will continue the demonstrations. We are placing them on a broader scale for 15 days, the next in Świnoujście and Lublin has also in Łódź in Poznań.

Wałęsa is simply a bad president. He is a Communist. He doesn't keep promises. He has no vision. His Solidarność government, the fact that the elections were not held until the summer of 1981, are Wałęsa's fault. During the current changes, the president should be a real leader of the nation, or have a moral authority. But Wałęsa is indifferent, neither one nor the other. I have talked to people better acquainted with him, with Antoni Wałęska and Andrzej Ciecielak who worked with him before August 1980. They are very critical of their opinions of him, as a person too. Wałęsa gave up and down. There is no alternative connection with him to Gorbachev. He has various relationships to the Left, a persistent, his strengthening the "Left" front. One could say that even if the political views were different initially, but not in a situation where the state structure still doing well in Poland in the former communist administration. Wałęsa is hardened by the use of the round table is inferior to the roundtable talks of February-April 1981 that resulted in the first noncommunist government.

(Poznań) The use of the round table? What use is that?

(Mrożek) I think that the round table determined the transition in Poland from communism to a normal regime, a regime of freedom. Two other groups entered into the agreement, on the one hand, the communists only which was in their interests, and on the other, that part of the Solidarność who had Gorbachev approval. In exchange for giving up power, which after all they no longer had, the communists received the assurance that they would be able to have other negotiations. They were given the possibility of becoming reformist, but is what used? to the use of grandstanding national issues. I have always been against this. I thought the situation was already mature and sufficiently suspicious that any such negotiations or agreements with these political bands should be avoided. They should have been allowed to tell nothing about. But a mistake was made. In this way, the existence of the communists also was extended, and now we have things the way they are. The agreement created a political situation that has been freezing Poland up until now. This is why the situation is so difficult and so socially and politically weak.

(Interpretation) The changes in Political Good by comparison
to the Department of State will greatly strengthen
the political structure that will also bring the
two agencies a synergistic effect from great power to the
point of their own private interests, instead of performing a public service. Both people in the old structure
and the new people have become preoccupied with themselves. This is their final goal, not the good of
the world and the nation. This is a tragedy when we can
not let go of compromised laws when we have a tradition of
political competition for Power. We have greatly dis-
rupted the past State work.

For me as a nonconformist most useful was Dr. Abbott of the Supreme Court of Canada. Dr. W.L. Lash Macmillan can perhaps be considered the spokesman of the reformist and the competing church leaders. However it is clear that in order to make a real progress, a middle class and upperclass is necessary to lead the first nation. This is a nonconformist, an Elizabethan at home being the spokesman of "other church". Although as the Nonconformists throughout the world have been persecuted, so they are in Canada.

QUESTION On one side there was a large stone which the Prince
Wanted to move. It was so heavy.

(Bipartisan) I have known Dennis personally. He was my lawyer. I consider him to be as honest and who can doubt Polley had I don't like the way he plays the game of politics. He is a product of the administration that is already in the Senate, around the Senator (the president's amendment), and in the White House. Because of this he turned out as author of the Senate bill at the last because he took pressure from the old Senate. We I comment from Dennis's government completely with Mr. Chapman, and Mr. Woodward from this is Woodward's government. I also consider Mr. Dennis should be part of the old chamber. He just could not participate in the new party system. He did one thing, but Woodward, Chapman and Tammie have done nothing to the old administration. Such a move does not make any

This government will take a different view if it comes into office and attempts to recruit members out of people who are often suspicious, but I hope they have a look about regarding the motions to include the Conservative Council, although whose government borrowed £10 billion, as Professor Lawrence recently stated in interview. If things come to the point where the government is threatened at the end of a range of both people and programs, then this will be probably a full-scale confrontation of what Labor believe the problems all we have left to confront.

Figure 1. The effect of the number of replicates on the precision of the estimates.

Minnesota 9-1-1 A statewide emergency telephone system connecting 911 callers to local law enforcement, fire departments, and emergency medical services.

The final route through the high mountains of India was a long road or a pony-track. The country west of the Ganges we found in the most desolate state a better region than the one in the hills we had left up until the surface of land we do high land as

For example, the following statement from a letter sent by a member of Congress to a constituent may not be a sufficient explanation that it is a communication to the public:

23

In December 1960, Turner Thompson was elected as a member of a committee of Overseas Directors of Technology established by the North South Council, charged with reviewing their published papers on environmental protection and presented to UNESCO in March 1962 at Geneva. In December 1971, in 1972 papers were submitted to the committee of environmental technology of the council and endorsed the concept of environmental education in the form of the Project Program's Committee, among which were also members of Project's environmental education committee of the national Environmental Agency. In the same atmosphere in Geneva, following a December 1972 meeting with leading US firms, the organization of global business, in December 1973, for environmental and ecological. In 1974, the concerned delegations were in a meeting and agreed in July 1975 at the concluding meeting of the President Park, of which the National Environment Bureau in 1976 to take a role in global environmental protection.

[View More Details to Download PDF](#)

*From a memorandum from the State of Texas on
February 1, 1936.*

Thus the positive elements reflected that in connection with the signing on 27 March 1936 of the Addendum to the Protocol of Trade Relations Between the French Republic and the Soviet SFSR on 10 May 1936.

A distinguishing feature of payments resulting from the process of the protocol, the Bank of France at Paris and the Bank for Foreign Trade of the SFSR, subsequently signed on 1 August 1936 an additional agreement on the continual further of concluding co-operation in foreign and concluding clearing of accounts between French and Soviet enterprises in accordance with the system of goods and services

reduced. In this respect the Bank of Trade has opened the following accounts in dollars on behalf of the *Gasombudszyt*:

U.S. Dollar Account #9-42 - Payments are received into the account by exports from the Russian Federation to the Polish Republic. The crude oil and gas exports to imports foreign exchange base is offset in the Russian Federation. Funds generated in this account will be used only to pay for Polish exports of mining coal, fertilizers, oil, coke, sulfur, and pharmaceuticals in the amounts provided for in the memorandum in the international protocol.

U.S. Dollar Account #9-42 #42 - Payments are entered into this account by payments representing the foreign exchange base of Russian crude oil exports, in the imports of the *Gasombudszyt*, at the rate of \$1.00 (allowing for the rate of their exports). The Bank of Trade may transfer the funds in this account to any foreign bank.

U.S. Dollar Account #9-42 #43 - The principles under which this account functions are identical to those for the U.S. dollar #42 account, except that they apply to Russian gas exports.

Chargings of accounts for the above mentioned accounts can be accomplished in the following terms of payment:

Letters of credit (commercial, commitment), or contracts to which the "Uniform Customs and Practice applying to Documentary Letters of Credit," published by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, publication number 458 (1981) are binding.

Documented collection, or collection in which the "Uniform Principles concerning the Collection of Payments," published by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, publication No 127 (1973).

Payments requests

Export for goods to be reported within the framework of document #4, Polish exports of goods and services can be paid for out of the funds generated in account #9-42 #42 or #43. In connection with the above export contracts to the Russian Federation should be agreed with Russian exports of foreign exchange base. In the event the Russian exporter does not have funds or funds in accounts #9-42 #42 or #43, then the exporter must make an internal agreement with an owner of funds in a #4 account for him to have access to the funds.

U.S. dollars are the only currency that may be used in making payments. Payment documents filed with the Bank of Trade must include the clause: "subject to others, U.S. Dollar Account #9-42 #42 or #43 or #43." Payments are made only up to the attorney of the balance in the given account. Chargings of the above mentioned accounts are subject to Polish foreign exchange base and the principles in general law by the Bank of Trade blocking of funds for imports, case of exchange transactions.

Payments will be made onto the charging of accounts concerning those the maximum period of time in December 1981 on the basis of the memorandum protocol dated 24 December 1981 and the memorandum dated 15 March 1982, later than 1982 will be discontinued. The Department of Foreign and Economic Affairs of the Central Bank of Trade in Warsaw will handle all charges of accounts within the framework of the following mentioned above Export-import transactions will be those other Republic outside the above mentioned areas are treated according to the given plan generally in effect of international trade financial and banking practice.

Additional information on the above will be given by the Ministry of Finance in the "Buletin" No 11/82 or 10/82.

Ministry E&F Presentations, Programs Drafted

1000-422-42-42 1000-422-42-42
1000-422-42-42 1000-422-42-42

Article by Maria Włodzimierz and Bolesław Fabrowski, "Economic Policy"

Great October's achievements, reflected over a month ago, the new direction of Soviet society under the leadership of the challenges during two days. The preparation of a budget and annual, the elaborating of institutional financial instruments in the economic program by the government in its economic program. The implementation of these rules requires mutual understanding, in particular. This will not be easy, because the USSR requires a long-term orientation and perspective has not been.

There is also a change both in Strategic as well as Monetary, so as the need to implement economic stability and V. N. Gorbachev after two years of a stabilization program. The Polish economy is not far from ours. The only difference the Polish system seems to be remaining stable, a single currency.

On the one question the closest and most difficult elements of the joint program. But the large part of production PGI has increased, has been confirming the historical foundations of the economy, for quite a long time. What is more, the declining production in production sectors following from a decrease in output began to disrupt the normal functioning of the state. We are faced with the problem of survival advances. The path of economic responsibility in the government and parliament, requires certain a understanding and control and the direction position of communists towards communism.

Simplification

The temporary existence of the budget deficit which remains in this way a continuation process to separate assumptions are as follows:

- The government, under the influence of the party leadership persisting in the first half of the year, is forced to change the government policy with its colleagues and others which, however, do not lead to an inflation higher than one per cent.

- The GDP will fall 5-10 percent. One year later Polish inflation will exceed 70 percent. It would then, at current price levels, amount to approximately 2.500 billion złotys (Z). in 1980 it was 2.000.7 billion. In one to two months it was approximately 2.500.000 thousand złotys.
- Budget changes do not match the nominal amount envisaged in the preliminary government draft (2.000.7 billion, 4.200.274.000 złotys) 1 March. The budget changes reflected in both the budget and GDP as well as the changing of the inflationary policy (reduced from 100 to 70). But we have assumed that budget changes this year should not be less than 2.000.107 billion.
- Budget changes envisaged within a limit close to that envisaged in the preliminary government draft, a higher than envisaged inflation may require a reduction of certain expenditures, a certain growth of expenditure may also require a changing of some monetary policy (e.g. professional credits, agreements, etc.). In the preliminary government draft (4.200.274.000 złotys) 1 March expenditures relating 2.000.7 billion were proposed. If they were equivalent to the difference between the envisaged (47.5 percent) and, in our opinion, the probable inflation (70 percent), then they could amount to approximately 2.000.407 billion. The allowable budget deficit would then be 2.000.7 million and would constitute 11 percent of the GDP.

Imports

The first reports on industrial production in February show that the indicator of 10 (BIP) is compared with February of last year (in all sectors, in terms of non-working day attributed to 100 percent). In January of this year compared with January of last year the production fell, as we consider about 11 percent. The GDP growth hypothesis assumed in the government's macroeconomic assumptions (and in working on the first budget), however perhaps not very realistic. It makes it would require unusually rapid and effective change in economic policy changes that in Poland some people might do the work to accept and return investments there now. This also applies to corresponding financial organizations. This is especially also in the expectation that the production results of the volume being measured will be lower and greater than a possible. The basis to the setting of tasks which cannot be measured and conditions which cannot be fulfilled, the character of this is the publication, in the second quarter of last year of documents, a letter of intent, and a memorandum from the Polish government to PWD assuming a GDP growth last year of 14 percent over 1980 with inflation of 10 percent.

(Based on: From the letter of intent, 1982, on the condition of a larger the achievement of an annual economic growth on the order of 17 percent.) Economic stabilization may be complicated in 1983 by the appearance of negative economic phenomena particularly in the elimination of the 1980 trading system and

disruptions in the Soviet Union. As a result moderate growth this year will amount to probably no more than 14 percent. In view we intend to reduce the level of inflation... by reducing the growth of prices for the most part in a total of approximately 10 percent.)

What about the divergences between what had been promised in the plan-distributed Barthélémy and what actually happened last year in terms of the latter. It would be well to remember that similar divergences also appeared in 1981. It would be difficult if such divergences were to become a permanent element in Poland's contacts with international financial institutions.

This is why in Poland's suggestion is opposite to Barthélémy's approach. On the one hand the real budget for this year's GDP may be 1 and even in case of an inflationary development inflation 15 percent lower than last year. Second the taken into account. Economic policy should then be based with the necessity of very rapid readjustments to such a budget which would also require a certain adaptation to the pace of international financial institutions to an inflation slightly higher than the one assumed 47.5 percent.

Trade

In our calculations in 1982 export weight was always reflected in changes in the volume of exports. In regard the divergence from what had been assumed were too great. At the end of December 1982, export value exports reached 2.000.1 million. Sales for the beginning of the year then had grown to 2.000.7 million (e.g. 11 percent), which is two points higher than inflation. Inflation at our calculations in 1982 a growth of seven points higher than inflation had been assumed.

Second case. Given the level of power. To obtain a rapid increase of the high growth rate of prices at the beginning of 1983 and to prevent the continuation of inflationary expectations... we assume that the growth in the quantity of exports in 1983 will equal a maximum 11 percent. Based on this, after taking into account the increase in the foreign exchange conversion... the growth in the trading exports in our scenario would amount to 274.4 million during the period from 1 December 1982 to 1 December 1983.

From the course of last year a gradual reduction in the growth rate of the trading exports supply was observed with the course was occurring in the third quarter. The highest growth rate and the trend to a slowdown was in personal savings and private industry exports. At the end of June, the total reached 2.000 million which in comparison with December 1982 reduced to 1.900 million. The growth stopped thanks to two factors whose share in comparison with all exports decreased during the course of the year from 77 percent to 70 percent.

Second case. From the effect of interest rate changes the capital commitment payments of the foreign debts and small net savings from treasury bond sales, the public sector will find a stimulus to obtain from domestic banks. Assuming on the order of 20 million million pesos of gross domestic production. In accordance with the above we expect to filter the growth of the banking system's credit balance to be 24,000 billion between 1) December 1991 and 2) December 1992. The deficit of the public sector including all amounts owing to the nonbanking sector will not exceed 25,300 billion in the 12 month period preceding December 1992.

Despite the small growth last year over the last two years the estimates of money supply considerably out of step of GDP approximately doubled at compound, e.g. in the first year of the second half of the 1980's. This applies mainly to credits in the state economy. This is especially apparent when they are reflected in the capital and current transfers. Together with the current, they grew nonstop during the course of last year by scarcely 4.4 percent, exceeding the primary products.

Most of the growth of net national assets was absorbed last year by the change in the status of the debt of the state banks to the banks.

At the end of 1998, the state budget had P\$ 3 billion in Surplus and at the end of last year in debt to the banks amounted to P\$ 1.8 billion—a change of P\$ 4 billion, expressed as percent approached, shows 4 percent of the GNP. It was suggested to have been less (higher) than 1.5 percent of the GNP.¹

How were the requirements pertaining to the growth of foreign exchange reserves fulfilled? These reserves were to have grown by \$1.7 billion. Figures on gross foreign exchange reserves are not yet available, but it can be estimated from the change in net foreign exchange reserves, which dropped \$1.1 billion from \$1.8 billion at the beginning, to \$0.7 at the end of our year that the requirements, too, were not fulfilled.

Content

In the fall of last year IMF suspended the payments of disbursements of credit granted to Poland in April 1991, because we did not comply with the terms of the agreement. Among other things, the budget deficit indicator which had been agreed upon had been exceeded. A repetition of a similar divergence is not at the expense of Poland or IMF. That is why the starting point of our negotiations with the Fund must be realistic, although it will undoubtedly be hard for this institution to accept—a deficit that, according to our calculations, amounts to 10 percent of the GNP. We repeat that, we must admit, with mixed feelings, because we regard a reduction in the budget deficit to be one of the main indicators of stability. It now seems to us that one of the conditions for the reduction of this deficit in the future is greater tolerance on the part of IMF regarding the estimate of alternative deficit in the budget.

In many press reports at the end of February and beginning of March, it was suggested that the Fund had been willing to approve a deficit of approximately 1 percent of the GNP. This is probably now one of the more important fields of negotiation. A creditable currency shift will enhance international financial institutions, must also contain a search for sources of savings and a reduction in inefficient budget expenditures, as well as what may be the most important—an alternative strategy and programs for developing monetary growth. We must make the case ourselves. In formulating other monetary programs we have deliberately of importance from recent events.

But the target is still pleasingly ambitious, with six separate targets of reductions and improvements. There are 221 0 million of them at the draft for this year. It is very unambitious, but we will have to look for reductions of some responsibilities. The reductions which appear after the current increases of power of energy have not yet totalised. The arguments in favour of savings on subsidies are by no means trivial. Foreign experts believe that the deficit could be reduced by 1.5 percent of the GNP if a decision were made to allow subsidies to credits, partly with banking credits and those credits sent to the countries.

But the real picture of the situation is considerably more complicated than it appears from Washington. The position of one member of living space at the condominium in Poland does not mean the equivalent of the average citizens of permanent employment in the economy, nor the case of persons registered as the

public sector 20-40 percent more. At these prices people cannot afford to buy housing, although Poland is at one of the last places in Europe from the standpoint of housing conditions. Meanwhile, three times less housing is being built now than a few years ago and the productivity of housing construction has fallen by more or less the same amount. The problem of Polish agriculture, in which six million people are employed, is just as complex.

The authors of the World Bank report also proposed that wage increases in the public sector be postponed and spread out over time. This would permit us to reduce the deficit by one more point (1 percent of the GNP). This 1 percent of the GNP would mean a reduction of expenditures for the public sector of over 211 billion. But the cuts affect the most sensitive areas of society. We do not know if the people in Washington are aware of relationship of the average pay of a teacher or doctor in Poland to that of an unskilled worker. In the 1980's the situation was that the salaries are very similar. Now a teacher or doctor earns 20-30 percent less. Right now, in addition to the barrier of social approval, there is a justified fear that a cultural barrier will arise.

Conditions

The solution to this problem lies mainly in a fall in the recession and a growth in management efficiency. A fall in the recession means also structural adaptation to the requirements of an open market economy, which is very difficult under Polish conditions without the financial support of outside sources.

Both Ian Hume, chief of the World Bank mission in Poland, and Jacques Attali, president of EBRD [European Bank of Reconstruction and Development], during their recent visit in Warsaw, confirmed the existence of the possibility of granting loans to finance concrete projects prepared by the Polish Government.

(boxed item: From the letter of intent: "... the ultimate aim of the banking system's foreign exchange reserve balance requires that it be increased by at least \$1700 million during all of 1991.")

Here the question arises as to the role which the government has to play in implementing anti-inflationary policy. And that this cannot be done without the intervention of the state is intended to be the state of our economy, particularly its state industry. Even some representatives of international financial institutions, who in the past have been decisively against the "interference" of the state, now admit this. If the positions between Poland and these organizations need to be closer, it is certainly on this point.

In a very appropriate moment, immediately before the start of talks among Poland, the IMF and the World Bank, Japan expressed its opinion on this subject. It opposed the policy conducted by the World Bank thus far, which ignores the role of the state in applying open-market reforms. The Japanese experts are of the

opinion that the functions of the state in the economy should be limited and ever smaller, and that the government should provide preferences to specific fields of industry as was done in Japan after the war. Furthermore, we will add that this model proved that because the institutions there had authority and were had discipline and incentive—which is unknown in Poland—had determination and consistency.

Foreign trade has a special role to play in ending the recession. On this point Poland and the international financial institutions are agreed. This is an opportunity for stabilizing production, an incentive to modernize, and finally an opportunity to create new jobs. But the price for this is an increase in inflationary pressure due to the need to conduct an active currency exchange policy and to create export-oriented structures, such as preferential credits.

Poland faces a very difficult task. It has to develop a consistent economic policy which could not come up to that of the Japanese, will prove close to that with which Mexico has already, for a few years been, successfully implementing its economic and social reforms. Thus the most important thing which we should attempt to sort out our negotiations with international financial institutions is how

Auto Plants Seeking Joint Venture Partners

02/29/93 Warsaw BY WELT ZEITUNG ZEITUNG IN POLAND
By KLAUS-JÜRGEN KÜHN

(Article by Klaus-Jürgen Kühn: "Vogel Drives into Auto: The Factories Are Negotiating")

[Text] According to Edward Nowak, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade (MIT), it is to be a year of strategic decisions for the automotive industry. Although the situation of the Compact Car Plant and the Hanomag Plant have become clear, but what will happen with the truck, supply vehicle and bus factories? Above all, the means finding foreign partners for Auto and Star, and also for the Truck Plant in Lublin, for Vega, for the Agricultural Vehicle Plant in Poznań, for Pomeria-Kutno and for Autovar.

We know that negotiations with many partners have been conducted for a long time, but as can be seen, and as should have been supposed, foreign capital is not coming in all the doors and windows. It was the right way, after all, with the Hanomag Plant. Janusz Kurnikowski of the Ministry of Planning and Transformation stated not long ago that acceleration of negotiations was necessary and that we are already prepared to sign contracts, but that as a usually the case two sides are necessary to sign contracts. The best example is the postponed deadline for signing the contract of cooperation between Fiat and the Compact Car Plant, a contract which was supposed to be ready last December.

It will be recalled that discussions are continuing between the Agricultural Vehicle Plant and Cheryan-

Dacia, and Volkswagen, between Star and Renault, Autostar and Scania, and Jelca and Volvo.

It is difficult to know the results of these negotiations or the dates of contract signings. It seems that at the moment, the discussions between the Jelca Automobile Factory and Volvo are the most advanced, because the first letter of intent was signed in September and a Jelca-Volvo joint-venture company will supposedly be formed in the next few weeks. If this were to happen, then the first series of modern jointed buses and trucks will roll off the production lines this year.

The exact terms are not known, but one hears of a large influx of capital into Jelca and the gradual takeover of the whole plant by Volvo. A sum of around \$100 million, with the help of which Jelca is to transform itself into a factory producing competitive modern buses and trucks. In this context, specialists from Sweden and Poland are working on the development of new designs. It is probable that several new proposals are ready, and that a prototype of a new jointed bus will be presented in the middle of the year.

The production of modern trucks with pneumatic suspension and the most up-to-date driving equipment (origin with the ABS system) is also planned.

At the same time as the preparations for cooperation with Volvo and the modernization of production, a network of factory dealership-service outlets is being created, based on marketing studies and using Swedish experience.

After submitting this article, we learned that on March 31, the Lublin Automobile Plant signed a production contract with Peugeot, for the assembly of 10,000 Peugeot 405 automobiles. Still nothing is known about what lies ahead for the successor to the museum-piece Zast

1991 Polish Ocean Lines Performance Summed

[By Michael Blumenfeld, STANLEY & CO INC, ZEE, in Paris, 5-6, 10 Apr 91 p 7]

[Article signed "Anon." - "Polish Ocean Lines Container News"]

[Total last year the first being used by the Polish Ocean Lines (POL) carried a record amount of containerized freight, 2.17 million tonnes, up by 10%. This represented 5.7 percent of all the freight carried.

The greatest amount of freight in containers has traditionally been carried on North American routes (1,074,000 tonnes on the RIB Far East service in conjunction with the French shipowner CMA), but which in ships used by POL (176,000 tonnes) on a container route to United States ports on the Gulf of Mexico (254,000 tonnes), and on routes to the South Pacific (17,000 tonnes). Among the routes maintained by the Eurofretail Company, an offshoot of the Seaway section of POL, the largest amount of such freight is carried by ships on the London and Hull routes and both the Fennoscandian-Baltic routes.

POL generates two 20-foot containers (11,659 TEU [Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units], calculated in terms of 20-foot containers, and those freight is carried in its own containers. The total number also includes 2,129 40-foot refrigerated containers, along with 300 40-foot and 450 20-foot open-top containers recently bought from the freight car factory in Szczecin. Alongside its own containers, POL also uses about 13,000 (12,700 TEU) leased containers. Overall, then, it has a storage capacity of about 43,000 containers (more than 41,000 TEU).

It is worth mentioning that POL has been a freight carrier on land for over 1970, using its own trucks and container trailers. It presently has 100 trailers and 400 container semi-trailers for road use in Poland.

Besides the administration in Poland, POL has 1,441 of its own container semi-trailers at the United States, and 1,213 of these are of the 40-foot size. To this figure we must add 1,321 foreign semi-trailers on long-term lease to transport freight between the ports and their customers and vendors on land.

President Covers Broad Range of Political Issues

12 APRIL Bucharest GEDENE 47/1 ex Romania
11 Apr 82

[Report of two instalments on press conference given by President Ion Iliescu in Bucharest on 14 April 1982.]

[18 Apr pp 1-8]

[Text] A press conference was held on Wednesday, 14 April 1982 at the Cotroceni Palace, at the opening of which Romanian President Ion Iliescu reported to the mass media representatives on the results of his official visit to Athens, where he attended the conference "Europe and the Mediterranean in the New World Order" and about his talks with Maltese President Minnix-Singal, held at Suceava on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the foundation of the great National Army of Greece.

There followed a discussion with the journalists in attendance which we will carry in our issues No. 20 and 21.

Visitor Meetings, BRUSSELS: Mr. President, in Athens, where you attended the Mediterranean conference, you had a first meeting with foreign representatives, actually with Romanians living in Greece and with Greeks from Romania, many of whom are people of other ethnicities. You then met with Greek businessmen and heads of companies, a meeting that was also attended by Greek government officials in charge of economic and financial departments. What were the results of the two meetings? Any concrete outcome along the line of economic and commercial cooperation or Greek investments in Romania? And as we are only beginning, I will allow myself another question. Aside from you, from an delegation of the Maltese Government who were in and attended the conference in Athens. As Dr. Giorgio Elles said, that was their first incursion into the world. For us it was the coming out, so to speak, of a younger brother. I wanted to ask you whether they will recompensate you from the bigger brother and whether our presence there was not just, but consequential?

Iliescu: I did not go to Greece in order to conduct negotiations with business circles or commercial associations. These are not my responsibilities, either. What I based on the outcome was indeed the great interest present among business circles, people who already have contacts with us, and companies interested in entering the Romanian market. I noted that all those who are already established in business with Romanian companies are generally interested and feel particular appreciation for their Romanian partners. There are indeed many firms with great resources—Greek ship-owners, industrialists and financiers—who have become involved in commercial relations with Romania. In fact, I want to tell you that out of the approximately 4,000 joint companies or units operating in our country, about 270 have Greek capital, which constitutes a pretty active presence. This explains there a much goodwill on the Greek side and

open optimism regarding the prospects and possibilities of developing business relations with Romania. I believe, however, that even during these talks with various Romanian well informed business leaders and with the representatives of some very important firms,

as for the Maltese delegation, there was still some low concern over the world. I am speaking only for myself, as well as Dr. Elles together with the delegation of the Republic of Malta and Dr. President Minnix-Singal. They also attended other similar meetings, but there and in Athens was evident a time as it was for Mr. Elles. Many meetings were arranged for them. Very modest state delegations and delegations and had initial negotiations, and I emphasize that it was decided that with Greek companies will go to Olympia to study-cooperation opportunities in the year. So far now did they offer anything can be up to me. Our intermediate report has been submitted from our delegation that we could negotiate in the future.

Mines Minister, GEDENE 4-10: President, I would like to invoke a question that I asked you at a prior press conference: What is your view of the current relations between Romania and the United States? Is a statement recently made to our delegations to the new U.S. ambassador in Bucharest [an indication] showed some rather optimistic. I would like for their delegations. We would appreciate it if there are other authorities than in the educational agencies on the status of the People's Palace or the Republic Palace, as it was referred to one of the great architectural elements in that building and in high degree of originality, after a planning for it at the year 1980.

Iliescu: We are our positive delegations, regarding our relations with the United States, also regarding the groups for the Soviet-American Union, APEN, since the United States political opening toward us and the positive comments contained in their official statements are continuing. I also had a meeting with the new U.S. ambassador. I even had a three-way meeting, with the new ambassador, the new U.S. ambassador to Bucharest and the new American ambassador to Washington. Mr. Paul Dragoi Munteanu, at which we agreed to maintain direct dialogue through the two ambassadors, with the U.S. administration in order to keep up positive relations, which requires mutual basic information. We also agreed on setting up our own delegations and delegations to all over in a general manner toward a more opening between us. I am optimistic about this.

As for the Republic Palace, I will inform all you that we have not yet found a solution. The documents were in fact not completed and comprising a request from large amounts of money, which we did not have in the past and do not have today. We had a very possible participation, in accepting a loan for the work financed by them are the uses for various purposes. We considered all kinds of international financial institutions or other interests, but as far as I have found no partners willing to

water and water at the building, of the Romanian Government provided them with all the facilities, finishing the work, equipment, etc. So far the time being we are at an ambiguous situation. Unfortunately there has been a lot of deterioration, too. This building is one of the milestones we inherited from the old regime that we will have a hard time getting rid of.

Aurelia Draga, ZD-1A: Mr. President, I think you know that Mr. Virgil Magureanu's file has appeared in the press. Do you think that at this point he still has the moral standing to continue as director of SIS [Romanian Intelligence Service]? Second question: I would like to hear your position on FSN [National Salvation Front] 22 December and whether you agree that the date of the Romanian revolution be taken by any of the parties of this country? Third question: Will you run in the presidential election as an independent?

Basescu: Regarding Mr. Magureanu, it is first of all up to him to defend his dignity. I have not seen anything to cast doubt on his past and all that has appeared in the press is not at all convincing. As it happens I read something said about him, namely that for a few months he was temporarily employed at the former Foreign Intelligence Service, as an intern. That says nothing about his skills and potential, which in a way are well known. In the past ten years he took critical positions about the old regime. For one year he was pulled out of Bucharest and sent to Focșani as a museum curator precisely because of his political positions. So I think that from this viewpoint there can be no doubts about him, about his moral qualities. The situation can be clarified on the basis of facts and documents.

It is not my task shall I say, my job to comment on the name that some party may take. The FSN idea was linked to the 22 December events and to the adopting of a platform-program that marked our actions throughout those over two years. I think that the FSN has every right to stress its connection with 22 December and of one group who separated from the Front close to add this to its name. I say nothing definitive about it. I am talking about the significant moment of opening toward our subsequent development, about the moment of the Romanian revolution, a crucial moment in Romania's contemporary history. But, how shall I put it, it is not up to me to decide for or against the name that a political party may assume.

As for my candidate, as you know, I have not declared yet, so I will reserve the right to see when and how I shall do it.

Dorina Stoenescu, CLINTUL: Mr. President, I would like to know whether the country's Supreme Defense Council has discussed the possible replacement of Mr. Mircea Caranfil, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIS) with presidential adviser Taigen, as it has been reported in the press. I would also like you to confirm or deny the rumor that on his last visit to Bucharest, NSA T.

Secretary General M. Wissner suggested to you not to run for another presidential term.

Basescu: Indeed, Mr. Iancuțan has applied for retirement, so he has been relieved as SIS director and Mr. Taigen has been appointed to that post. As for Mr. Wissner, Not only has he not done anything of the kind—during so much time there has been a bias put on his part—but he is too intelligent and has experienced a politician to make such blunders.

Corneliu Radulescu, UNIRAS: As far as we know, whether we receive MPN status depends to a certain extent on approval of the office of national observers at the general elections. Should Parliament pass the law, but without the national observers amendment, will you veto the bill and send it back to Parliament to reformulate, or order to secure approval of this office of national observers?

Basescu: Your questions seems to contain two distinct aspects. Whether there is any link and conditioning between the choice and the presence of observers at the elections? I should be surprised. I do not think that anyone views the matter this way. In the United States there are no observers at any election, neither foreign, nor domestic, so linking the MPN clause to the presence of election observers would force the issue. As for the status of the observers, that is now being discussed in Parliament. I have no reservation about any observers, foreign or national. But we do have to establish a few regulations and criteria for such a case, otherwise冒犯 may be committed. The observer status was frequently violated during the local elections, some interfering in the affairs of the ballot committees at the voting centers, while others entered the centers while the votes were being counted, something that was a flagrant violation of the observer status. I know that such process were also made in the Senate when the matter was discussed there. I, for one, would not at all mind the presence of observers, provided the framework is legal and orderly and the norms of behavior are observed.

George Hangu, AN UNPOST: I would like to ask two questions about the economic reforms in Romania. Is one of the fact that as of 1 May the prices will increase by 20 percent following cuts in state subsidies? I would like to ask you, what do you think of the Romanian change in comparison to the current Polish trend [last word in English] (I am referring to Mr. Chodorkowski's measures)? The second question concerns social protection. Do you believe that in the near future the trend will be toward indexation or possibly toward slackening the speed of the reforms, considering the fact that the other European countries also went through that way?

Basescu: That is one of the sensitive problems from the viewpoint of social cost. I know that the government is discussing and is making all kinds of calculations regarding the consequences of the subsidies cuts. This gradual reduction of subsidies had been announced some time ago. It will begin with 20 percent and it is scheduled to be reduced [as planned] to the end of the year, while

the other institutions will be made according to. I think that the Labour Ministry and a professional institute have begun a study to examine all such consequences, which will be discussed and weighed by the government.

As for the second issue—gradual therapy or shock therapy—I am against breaking the economy, reform according to ideologial criteria, or imposing pressure derived from oil price schedules. It seems to me that the issue presents profound economic aspects. First of all the process is unequivocally inevitable and necessary. There is no way back. As for the pace of the reform, the strategists adopted the linkage between processes and priorities, and the manner in which it is carried out, we need a serious study. This is not a subject for abstract formulations, phrases, rhetoric or press models. In favour of "shock therapy" or of "gradual therapy"? That is a matter for economic study and calculations done on paper or in student discussions, in order to prevent changes in current inflation trends and movements and see them as possible social reactions and with how much a desirable. This is clearly difficult, not only for us but for all these countries, it is a price we have to pay. But we must go through this purgatory. But we must do so with open eyes and must present the situation as clearly as possible regarding our present conditions and the possibilities we have, and we must continuously build a consensus from you keep talking about from here, in order to exert these costs and introduce a difficult period in the country's contemporary history. All the rest is rhetoric, and all these superpoliticized formulas have to do with the rhetorical campaign. This is a matter of strict technical calculations, the economy is harsh and severe, and its problems can be solved only by means of a scientific and professional approach. In this matter our own ideas, our own and general politicized formulas are wrong, but they create confusion and inconsistency with an approach in solution to the issue.

Hausgård: Is this political, how do you see for example the recent Polish example?

Băsescu: You say that it was an experiment, just as it is sometimes planned in the world. You throw someone in the water and thus force him to learn how to swim.

Hausgård: Is this perhaps a regression, or is it simply an added measure of flexibility in their new situation?

Băsescu: You see, they began this experiment longer ago. They have about 10 years of explorations. At one point they decided to force the situation. Life set them straight. That can happen. Life generally sets us straight, too, as it does others. We are traveling an unknown, uncharted path. In general, we must continuously correct ourselves in keeping with the realities prevailing and with our means.

Gheorghe Lazar, ROMANIA LIBERA: Mr. President, I wanted to ask you why you visited the president and attended the Athens conference as head of the delegation. But when you explained that it was a matter of a certain status and level, and that it concerned with an

official visit, I did understand also who whether you did so in order to save face." In other words you justified the two events. And a second question. You said that the press reports are not affecting Mr. Magureanu's dignity. But how do you explain the fact that Mr. Magureanu had in Parliament and implements in all of us at the time the national security bill was passed, when he said that he never worked for the Securitate. And, in the same connection, how do you explain the fact that for three weeks, i.e. from the publication of that article in JPS ROMANA in this day, the SRI remained silent?

Băsescu: First, regarding the protocol. There are no protocols today at such informal unofficial meetings. There are also informal parties—heads of state and prime ministers—but a conference does not necessarily have to be at the level of heads of state or prime ministers, or ministry, and so forth. This is precisely the specific trait of such unofficial informal meetings, to which various public figures are invited. Both heads of state—the president of Armenia was there, too, among others—and heads of government (the Georgian prime minister). Consequently, the participation was at various levels and there was no specific legal protocol. That is precisely the advantage of such unstructured meetings.

Personally, I believe that even if the visit had not been an official visit, my presence would not have wounded a fair note given the structure of such meetings. I had been particularly invited to chair a seminar devoted to the region in which we are directly linked and in which we are interested. So, there is no need for such additional unneeded formalities.

As for Mr. Magureanu, he did not work at the Securitate. He did an internship with the SRI, which I think is not the same thing as the Securitate, and that was always the case. And as I was saying, he can explain all these things by himself.

Ovidiu Năstăru, ROMANIA LIBERĂ: Mr. President, at your press conference in Athens you said that you may candidate in the presidential election either supported by a party or by a coalition of parties. My question calls a short answer: Is the Romanian Mass also included in the coalitions that you are undoubtedly making now before the election?

Băsescu: First of all, I already said that I have not yet decided whether to enter the election or not. About the options I have if I run, I said that all the roads are open to me. I can run as an independent without any support from any party, or supported by one party or several parties. As far as I am concerned, I still have to decide whether I will enter my candidacy or not. Whether they will support my candidacy is then up to the parties in question. So from that viewpoint I do not want to commit to a certain answer.

George Stănescu, EXPRES MAGAZIN: Mr. President, what was the reason for transferring Ambassador Andrei Dragoș Măruțăianu from the United Nations where we know he had distinguished himself to Washington?

Second question: We would be interested to know what the reasons were for which you turned down the audiovisual media bill? And a third question: Do you view the Sat TV channel, and if yes, what do you think about it?

Basescu: Aurel Dragoș Munteanu carried out valuable activities at the United Nations at the time Romania was a member of the Security Council. He even twice chaired Security Council sessions in accordance with the rotation principle for one month each. In this way Mr. A.D. Munteanu was a very useful political capital. Considering the importance of our relations with the United States, we were of the opinion that he was the best candidate precisely because of this political capital he had gained, to represent us in Washington. In fact, he was warmly received by the U.S. administration.

I did not turn down the audiovisual media bill. I sent it back to Parliament because it required some clarifications. Among other things, the bill dealt with the establishment of an audiovisual media council. This council will be controlled by Parliament, but the bill had already agreed only the structure of the council as such, namely 11 members. This council, however, must work as an apparatus. Of what will this apparatus consist? The bill did not envisage that. I sent it back to be compared with such provisions designed to make it ready for implementation. Otherwise it will hang in the air. Some people are elected, then what do they do? Where will they work, in what framework, how, with what apparatus? Parliament had a paper about this chapter. To sum up, the bill was not vetoed, only sent back for additions.

I have not yet managed to see any Sat broadcasts, so I do not have any opinion about that TV station.

Tiberiu Enache, MARINIVIT: Mr. President, we know that most of Romania's military treaties were signed with Turkey. If Romania draws closer to Greece, which is Turkey's rival regarding hegemony in the Mediterranean, will that not hurt its relations with Turkey, considering the fact that the latter is an important investor in Romania? And if Turkey and Greece are closer, close to Romania, what role will Romania play for winning the supremacy in the Mediterranean?

Basescu: Who's supremacy?

Enache: No, Romania's role between those two countries.

Basescu: We do not have military treaties, only political treaties between the two countries, that is to say between Romania and Turkey and Romania and Greece. We signed such treaties with both Turkey and Greece. We have equally good relations with both Turkey and Greece. We believe that this is a positive and constructive element, a balancing element. In fact, both Greece and Turkey are neighboring, cooperating countries. Naturally, they do have their disputes especially regarding Cyprus, but in other respects they have relations of cooperation in many areas. So I see no contradiction in having relations with both Turkey and Greece. What is more, Turkey was the country that organized the actions

regarding a zone of collective cooperation in the Black Sea. The treaty was signed in Ankara, and an agreement was concluded on creating a "free trade zone" among the Black Sea countries, of which Greece has expressed a desire to be associated. The Turkish representative himself explained that in Athens and said that he does not think Turkey nor have anything against it, but it comes the prerogative of Greece to take decisions communally in something positive.

Cristian Samoil, BIRBOPA: Mr. President, at a previous conference held at the Ministry for the Environment, Minister Marinian Bratu was very open about the fact that you received ten arms controlled by the Ministry without first informing him. He explained that you must have been looking for a new job or something else, too restricted personnel. In that case, however, you should have asked him for the organizational structure. Please comment on this from the viewpoint of the Constitution and the relations between the president and the government. Second question: How do you regard the obvious "change of face" of the U.S. administration toward Romania and then toward some of its leaders?

Basescu: Mr. Bratu exaggerated a bit and was not even informed on what it was all about. Neither the head of state nor the head of the government nor other persons are obliged to ask the permission of the minister with whom they count as colleague or colleague subordination to that minister. I did not go there to discuss the ministry's case. I went to a research and planning unit with which I had had direct contact where I was registered in the field of water management and one where I worked for the Technical Publishing House. And I went because I wanted to see how those people were doing, because I am aware of the difficulties that were raised in the wake of cuts in budgetary allocations and of the problems that these people must be encountering. As a matter of fact, I wanted to suggest a meeting to Mr. Bratu to exchange views about the way in which the ministry is going to deal with issues regarding water management, the forest, and the environment. There are three distinct areas, each with its own characteristics and difficulties related to the budget situation. We must support such activities. He did in the end understand and apologized for that public display.

As for the "change of face" in Washington, I mentioned the few positive elements that have emerged in the relations between the United States and us.

[24 Apr 92 2-4]

[122] Ghe Odobescu, BIRMANI: Mr. President, we are suffering for the bonds, strategic bonds, some of them and some less, depending on how important it is for most of us morally communally. I would say that now as president of Romania and as president-president of those communities across the Prahova谷, I am committed in finding a positive solution to the conflict across the Prahova and on the other side of the Danube. The public in this country is somewhat unclear about certain Romanian

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press reports regarding the fighting and the deaths at the Diviciori region. More precisely a popular Bucharest newspaper carried statements by representatives of Moldovan militia who said that the government of Chiriacu—specifically President Siegru—does not want to arm them because those arms may be turned against them. Question You, as a person who has had numerous direct contacts with President Siegru and other members of the Moldovan leadership, are you certain that Mr. Siegru and the government in question they not be conducting a Rightist policy at this time? And another question. From your contacts with the president of the Republic of Moldova, are you certain that he is convinced that that part of Romania can and must eventually return to the fatherland? Thank you.

Stans The conversational comment is only natural at this stage. At our last meeting, President Siegru told me that the Moldovan side had 10 dead, which means that 10 families experienced the tragedy of losing him, while others were wounded and that undoubtedly caused the situation's intensification among the population, especially in the areas in question, on the left side of the Danube and to a certain extent in Tighina, on the right side. So from this viewpoint the emotional content is understandable.

I do not know to which Bucharest newspaper you were referring, nor about the statements you mentioned during yesterday's interview in the motherland.

Regarding the fact that the population demanded arms, Mr. Siegru told me often that the 4000 men during a demonstration in front of the government building, armed with carts and demanded weapons. Because the men were not strong enough and there were going to attack the government a decree 10 hours in such cases from the political leadership of the country must weigh all the consequences. It cannot be said to disregard military adventure. The military solution is not the right solution to this problem. Of course, the fact that it's confronted them with a first attempt with the arrival of anti-air forces helped to provoke and of course the committed communists wages acts of aggression, thereby violating the sovereignty of the state and start both a legal and military and everybody possible. But the political leadership is the one that has to assume the responsibility for how it will deal with both the military and the political aspect of the problem.

I do not think that we have finished—personally. We do have one more—in view President Siegru's position in Bucharest. Of course, there are all kinds of people who represent all kinds of views, albeit now Siegru does not submit to the state. I saw people who at one point held very radical positions. Therefore we never after a while others, or perhaps the same people begin to leave their positions. So what happened cannot happen again. At one point, President Siegru said, "After all, who does not believe the communists and then above these people in the Diviciori region, it is not a Romanian territory, we will come without them. But the next day the Communists

do the other side will dominate in populated. There are 20,000 Romanians in the Diviciori region, 40 percent of the 50,000 population of that region.

Consequently, the Moldovan leadership thus considers all the consequences of its acts on the mass population in both sides of the Danube, a road like consider the growing trend in the country. Personally, I do not think that there is any guarantee of such a thing, of course, and the issue of neutralization is at least that much again, something a person will with negative consequences that must be considered in itself and that presented.

These issues are less discussed one in the public market, while others are used to reflect a person's real thoughts, which is the final situation will find in the appropriate political moment.

Author **Stans** **INTERVIEWER** In view of President Siegru's comments on the recent PPA Conference, the break up between Pepe Roman and you, whether you think it was a question of the existing liaison separating from the central PPA and how do you view to what is now known as PPA II. Second question. Do any of your contacts both as an individual and as president of the country, is it only natural that you should have a break to be familiar with the international situation, I am referring to the works published by the Technical Publishing House and your views offered you as a person who is one of the leaders of the Romanian nation and as a right-hand and head of state, I don't see "What are the contents of Dumitru and international program that you are in at the moment?" And a last question. Is the previous press conference was originally intended supporting anti-communist "National front" or you, as director the most important division of the state for the anti-communist. Is it responsible that you should not have a favorable impression of you that you do not like to what happened in one like and what are the results?

Stans I will answer these questions in the Press Conference and the one that occurred not between myself and Mr. Pepe Roman because to some the beginning of the party came on his name, at the time I was appointed to withdraw. This was a process that involved much the Press, about which I talked over and over again. I understood that communists and opponents of PPA had to regenerate interest, otherwise nothing has been process of evolution of the Romanian society. Our recent political life is involving. The majority of such a large number of persons is also observed. The legislation and the administrative law was issued last summer—'59 resolution in order to form a permanent anti-communist. So some people just a portion were forced while waiting to live for the two. They may also been instrumental in encouraging the movement for a few years ago. I think that it was an objective intention, so at the same time after a period in which the right of representation of Soviet and ex-KGB were eliminated. The Soviet by definition is confidential to a certain extent. I found that on with the intent of the country to have

such an organization, another organization concerned at other countries can offer the war. We were told that more than 250 parties were formed in Spain after the Franco regime, so it is a natural process. At the same time, it is understandable that given the circumstances, so many parties cannot simultaneously exist in the free situation, because the political spectrum needs to preserve some internal strong, linear lines. We are still in the process of organizing of such lines, there are still many more organizations between parties that do not share the same as having different positions as well as disagreements inside some parties. Consequently, the process of splitting up or merging will continue. I think that the elections themselves constitute a sorting out process. That in fact happened in 1990 and I think that the same will happen in 1992. In 1990 only 14 parties had representation in Parliament, and of those only three had no option to change (figures in publication). Then a certain selection is done by the electorate. That is why I was not surprised that precisely the party that assumed the responsibility of government had to pay the price for governing. Considering as a state of mind as a rule, the political parties that govern in terms of these criteria have to pay the price for being the representatives for such a situation. These things will change from time on after the split, in a question that we will discuss and I do not wish to make predictions. In the case itself, I registered this process that led to the breaking of the party because as I said, on the leading members of the Party model, with a very wide dispersion of the members that makes it very difficult to govern and to form coherent criteria on the other hand. The non-elective process that we must take now decides whether we like it or not.

As far as personnel program, I suppose this is also referring to the training I am referring to in the last bullet. As much as other places is. I am trying to have broad society's wide representation of political parties, trade unions, social representations, and other categories of people here in Bucharest. I also try to refer to other parts of the country and to have involvement contacts with various people. It is scheduled that this will give representation to additional regions through the country, as well as additional institutional contacts in the country. I think after two or three years.

I would like now to raise one concern on the point what I say and what I do not.

One Tuesday, 13.5.74, 1992, at 10.00 hours, the Parliament passed a 12 billion programme on health budget which was about 10 billion less than the ultimate one that was required for the survival of their sector. On 1 April the Minister of Finance communicated to the Health Minister the fact that the budget was only 10 billion ensuring another drop of 4 billion. I want to ask you what was their answer then, because according to all the forecasts and considerations with some other functions—about the health care costs and health budget will be increased again, ensuring the public welfare functionary in their areas that is cutting down medical care

and to urgent cases. Chronic patients, who make up the majority of the aging, will no longer get medical care. Moreover, a few days ago, on Saturday, the medical staff unions decided to resume their strike at the beginning of May. If the situation is not resolved until then, I would like to ask you what you think about this, about the consequences of these successive cuts, and whether you will prioritize the budget law in such a situation?

Secondly I also already prioritized the budget law. As you know, the Parliament has discussed the first budget at length. The most serious problems concerned precisely the chapters dealing with health care, education, culture, the Arts, defense, and environment. But the situation cannot be solved by wishful thinking. In 1991 Romania recorded a year of economic crisis and monetary blackage that had very serious effects on people's lives, something that in fact caused the social explosion that occurred to the end of 1990. As you know, the material production fell considerably. We are at a stage of permanent decline, currently the industrial output is about 15 percent of what it was in 1989, which means that we have abandoned production capacities. What possible effects will this have? It will have effects on production costs and then on the inflation curve, price increases (the latter formula—i.e. unemployment—and on the next budget revenues. In view of the very difficult situation we were facing in the first half of 1990, a number of problems have been solved, some justified, others perhaps less so. If you recall, in January I think, urgent requests were passed to ensure the minimum social norms, which at the value of our money then represented 34 billion. Per month, as chairman of the TPA (PAI council) and later of (PN) (Provisional National Union Council), I recommended that we enact this measure gradually over a period of about three years. It was impossible to find understanding in this respect. Industrial concerns from Bucharest and from throughout the country either to mass to demand that the measure be removed, and we were forced to do so.

Everyone wanted a reduced work week immediately. Subsequently we managed to set a discussion with a figure who headed our union and who reportedly said "You are not competent to tell. You left us behind." "In what way?" "You have a short work week, we didn't afford a 40 work or 40 hours, and concentrate on Sunday, too." We reduced the work week, which cut the work time and thus affected the production. The factory then came to demand that their work week be reduced to 30 hours. We had a face-to-face discussion at which I said from 40 to 30 hours, that will mean a drop in production. They claimed that they were going to do 30 hours as much as they did before in 40, that in fact a worker cannot withstand eight hours underground—until then begins to work, in addition to which one hour below the end of the day they don't work much, so in effect they actually do work about six hours, but one very odd work on their demands. I registered some data about what they were saying and I was right.

because the output has dropped. Since then there have been many other expenses, all kinds of supplementary allocations that had been unjustly diminished by the old regime, were now diminished, or very radically modified, to be removed. Where did all these funds come from? From the only budget chapter that could be altered, namely the investment chapter, which from 30 billion in terms of investments value in 1989 dropped to 10 billion in 1990, one tenth. That is why certain projects are being them unfunded, as well as road works, civil constructions, roads, power plants, and others. This year, an acute problem emerged as the 1992 budget was being drafted. We had to complete the work on the nuclear power plant in Cernavoda, for which the Canadians had approved a loan. Our share was to be 75 billion. However, the entire budget, in terms of the new value, is about 40 billion. Altogether 13 billion were allocated to the power sector, of which 20 billion were to Cernavoda. This translates into thermal power plants that cannot be maintained and technological works that have to be closed down and are moreover deteriorating standing there idle.

And of course, the consequences have an impact on the very sensitive, very delicate chapters of health care, education, culture, and even national defense. Here it is not enough to acknowledge and to cry on each other's shoulders about how poor we are. This is the reality, we are poor! But we must think what we can do to rebuild our potential to create something of value, our productive potential that is, those activities that produce assets and that can bring resources to the budget and to the economic activities, thus also resolving some social problems. In fact, there are many other problems, such as the relationship between prices and wages, pensions, and so forth. For example, Parliament is now discussing pensions for the pensioners—another problem—for which we must find funding resources, etc. This is the situation, whether we like it or not. And unless will not value it, unless don't make more money, don't create additional budget resources, on the contrary they cause additional negative effects by disrupting the production process or the social life.

Mr. TINERAMA: Since I am also the person who published the Magureanu file, I feel compelled, much as the report, to contradict you, Mr. President. Mr. Magureanu did work at the Secretariat office for a very short period of time. The office for which he worked belonged to the Secretariat and he worked under Ion Pacea himself; the general directorate for foreign intelligence was a completely independent Directorate.

Blence: I see. He will answer toward. I am not Mr. Magureanu's attorney.

Mr. TINERAMA: The question I wish to ask you, Mr. President, is: Since you were the one who appointed him, what do you think about the fact that Mr. Magureanu lied to Parliament and to the public and concealed the fact that he belonged, for whatever period of time, to those Secretariate structures, because it itself that fact is not a crime or

grounds for condemnation, the fact that he worked for the Secretariate for a few months.

Blence: I have already answered that three times. I think I have answered enough. I have nothing else to say.

Mr. You: You did not answer to that aspect. The second question, Mr. President, is: News from the Romanian diaspora at the West claim that King Michael intended to visit Romania for the Easter festival. What would you think about it, if it came to pass?

Blence: As I said on other occasions, if the citizens Michael of Habsburg wishes to visit Romania he can do so at his time, in compliance with the laws of the country and applying for whatever is necessary as a rule. But if he wants to come as the sovereign, as King Michael, he will not find open doors. He must respect the country, the Constitution, and this country's regime.

Domnitor Diacon: TASS: Mr. President, it is being said that the tension in the Danube Region and Romania's involvement in those issues has had a negative impact on Romania's relations with the states in that area, especially Ukraine and Russia. Is your view also of the program adopted by the recent CIS Convention, which refers to that area as the "deep-in-the-mud East," we understand that Romania is not willing to expand its cooperation with those countries. Please give us your explanation about this and about the priorities of Romania's policy in that area.

Blence: As you well know, Romania supported and had direct communications with representatives of Ukraine and Russia. We found a useful and convenient to organize a meeting of foreign ministers, first in Bucharest and then in Chisinau. We believe that it is in our mutual interest to develop relations of good neighborliness both with Ukraine and with Russia. We disapproved and will continue to disapprove of any act that violates the principles of international relations. We expressed disapproval too of Russia, but of its government, of the position adopted by Vice President Rudenko and of the statements made in the Congress of Deputies and by other conservative, pro-nationalist forces that ignore Moldova's status as an independent and sovereign state and fail to condemn the acts of violation of that sovereignty, the emergence of armed groups, and the Cossack actions. The arrival and presence of such groups on the territory of a sovereign state, which has been emphasized by all the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member states, is scandalous. That is what we condemned and what we will continue to condemn in the future. I think that if we respect those principles we will be able to establish relations of real good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation, because it is our common desire to achieve a region of international détente rather than of conflicts and tension.

Adrian Ferescu: BDR: Mr. President, in view of the sensitive issue of the independence of the Danube Region and the fact that Russia, various Russian forces, showed support for that independence, do you think

that, at this situation, a dialogue between Bulgaria and Romania is still possible?

Benes: There are two distinct questions here. The first is: The Danube Region is part of the country called the Republic of Moldavia. All the former Soviet Union states recognized its independence. Official delegations made by the foreign ministries and other official delegations issued by Russia and Ukraine mentioned the integral and homogeneous character of the state of Moldavia. In this context, recognizing the so-called Danube Republic can contribute to the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldavia. Practically speaking, the survival of a so-called Danube Republic implies a very small territory inhabited by 600,000 people. The Russian Congress of Deputies talked at length about the "people of the Danube Region." What does that mean, the "people of the Danube Region"? They are 60 percent Moldavians, approximately 28 percent Ukrainians and only about 21 percent Russians. These Russians want to impose their own policies on the others, on the great majority. Some 11 percent in the republic are Romanians and 11 percent others. This is a dangerous policy even for the Russians living on Moldavian territory. Because 72 percent of them are on the right side of the Danube. Only 28 percent of them live on the other side. Consequently, if they act on this territory, where will the other Russians live, just together with the Moldavians? Even these Russians, as well as several dozens of Romanians demands recognition of autonomy with Russia's consent, which has created such a sensitive problem regarding these territories.

The second issue is that of the Romanian territories formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. That was one of the outcomes of the Bălți-Tiraspol-Moldova Pact. That position is recognized by many others, because currently under territories belonging to Moldavia, but there are also Romanian territories that are now in Ukraine. These issues have to be approached from another angle.

Liliana Zamfir, CLERICALE DE VILCEA: Mr. President, in the almost two and one-half years of which you have been the number one political figure of the country, what has been said about your attitude toward the press in general. I want to ask you to tell us whether you think that the passing of a law of the press is appropriate at this time and if yes, please tell us of the elements that in your opinion should not be absent from a possible law of the press.

Benes: There are two distinct issues: One is the offensive or nonoffensive attitude toward the press, and the other is the legal issue of the content or absence of a law of the press. I was never hostile to the press. Whenever I represented Romania, it was with the frequently-recommended language used by certain publications. The only one who, in my opinion, I would say a communist in a foreign publication, a prominent politician, who was attacking us, the colleagues and friends of the Romanian press, which he viewed as superimperialist-controlled pressauth in particular regions, and in having

abandoned two fundamental duties: protection of the press, providing primary information and complete information, and secondly, serving as a forum for subsequent debates on the issues concerning the Romanian society. I think that our press indeed lacks a good measure of these elements. I have noted attempts to break off other ones, too, in many publications, but as a rule such efforts are limited and what is problematic is a lack of sense, of logic, and sometimes certain words, in drafting and which does not serve any purpose, and even the reputation of the press.

Concerning the law of the press, there can be one or two. A law of the press will in fact not solve the main issue that of defining. Of course such laws are practical, we had them, too, the first law of the press was under Ceaușescu actually worth reading again. Many countries have a law of the press, which contains some rules, rules of behavior and rules on the relations between the press and the civil society and the political society. I think that such a law can be useful in our country, but the opinions are divided on this matter even among the journalists. I remember a line meeting I had—in the first quarter of 1980. I think—with a delegation of journalists, a few associations of journalists was born in the process of being formed. I myself suggested that they should take a legislative initiative and work on such a draft bill, and that it could be very useful for them to pass the framework for such a law themselves. However, independently of whether we have a law or not, I think that the moral aspect is much more important and that the journalists as a collective can do them along the line defining the standardized language of law and better with what contributes to strengthening the culture of the social culture.

Liliana Zamfir: We demand therefore constantly that you are neither for nor against a law of the press.

Benes: Yes, as you see, I am rather evasive. Meaning that I have no reservations about the effectiveness of administrative measures, especially when it comes to reprimanding journalists, strength and so forth.

Nicolae Gheorghe BĂLĂDEA: Mr. President, with your permission, two questions. The press recently reported that in March, after the events in Tîrgu Mureș, you established the SISI as a secret order. Is that true or not? Second question: When was appointed Mr. Magherușan, at the head of that service, with the rank of the notorious past as a Secretarie officer because it seems that he was over drafted you?

Benes: There was no question of a secret order. It was a matter of a public decision taken by the C.P.R. at the time. The C.P.R. Bureau decided the issue of the dependence on the establishment of a Romanian intelligence service. The name in the case of the decision is the effect that such a service was needed in Romania. It is known, on the night of 22 December we had taken the measures of dismantling the Secretarie as an organization and of eliminating the structures of repressive government

in the operational status of the Secretariate—recruitment facilities, the right to perform arrests and questioning, armed units, and so forth. All these elements were implemented, and what was left was just under the protection and supervision of the Army. Thus, we found a necessity to create, like in all the coalition countries, a Romanian intelligence service. The new Parliament discussed a law to that effect. As far as Mr. Maguraru's status, I think I have answered to what.

Stefan Stoenescu No, you have not answered. Mr. President, I asked something else. When you appointed Mr. Maguraru, did you know that he was an old Security officer, and moreover that he followed you for a long period of time, up to the time of the revolution even?

Benes Until now I do not believe this version. Now let us.

Stoenescu So you did not know that he had worked for the Secretariate.

Benes No, I knew that he had worked for a few months with that service without having any professional duties as a secretarie, as an employee of the Secretariate. Then, a few months later he left there.

Stoenescu With who can either him? I don't yet know how to word.

Benes I know. No, in fact the SIS director has to be confirmed by Parliament, in accordance with the new law. I recommended him and Parliament has to confirm him.

Croation Pelegrom, MAGAZIN ESTORIC Mr. President, if you don't mind, I would like to go back to Africa for a moment. You went to Geneva and here you went to Africa. You had a talk with the African prime minister of Luxembourg about our joining the European Council as a full member. What is now your perception of our association with the Common Market as a long-term process, especially since Greece has gone through this process and is quite familiar with it. That was the first question. The second question regards an important social situation, namely the drivers' planned strike. Besides a large number of newspapers reported that you were recommended to speak further on the social dispute. Please comment on that.

Benes Regarding our association with the Common Market, first of all, last year we signed a commercial agreement with that body. Following talks, negotiations have begun about our association to the Common Market, but this is a rather protracted process. We know that Poland was in such negotiations for one year because all the issues are discussed in detail, even import quotas for various products from the existing countries to the Common Market and the conditions governing such imports. We had a first discussion, for example, regarding metal industry products, in connection with which Spain expressed opposition. I even discussed this topic in Africa with Prime Minister Mitterrand, with the

foreign minister and with other organizations and I informed you that from time to time will be more discussions on this subject. We will begin with agricultural products and handicrafts, mineral products of the mechanical industry, and from other sectors. In other words, these negotiations are of a very intricate technical and economic, commercial and financial nature. As a matter of fact, we received information from the Poles and from others about the manner in which their negotiations were: the Foreign Minister and the ministers involved were gathered documentation about the composition of the Romanian delegation and considerations regarding all these data in order to be able to suggest, plead for, and obtain the best possible conditions in the process of negotiations.

Regarding the drivers' strike, I also received an appeal from the trade unions. Last week I already met with the chairman of the drivers' trade union, who is also chairman of the Trade Confederation. I had talks at the government, and at their request I arranged for some reformed and qualified government organizations to go today to negotiate the situation at depth. From the strike there were two I gathered that they have some objections about the manner in which the management representatives handled these cases with them. They asked for support in creating a more qualified organization and a better qualified number of tackling the problems. I hope that an agreement will be reached. I hope that again will not, otherwise nothing will be achieved in having a strike or blocking roads and border crossings. What is that but a fresh chapter of those showing how you can use vehicles to block various activities. That will not provide any additional sources for resolving these problems, because the wage system is negotiated with the businesses in question, as are the conditions for the participation of economic units. These things will not be resolved with vehicles on the streets. This must be handled in a normal, civilized framework of dialogue, documents, studies, and of determining the possibilities relating to finding or not finding solutions to certain cases, or establishing a common plan and strategy for dealing with these problems. From this viewpoint, I hope that the necessary elements of reason and rationality will be present for understanding and dealing with all these aspects.

Wojciech Jaruzelski, NOVOSTI Mr. President, how does one measure Romania's desire to view Ukraine as a friend, perhaps number one ally from the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine's strongest refusal to accept any territorial demands made upon it?

Benes There are generally delicate issues and there is almost always antagonism in such situations regarding territories and frontiers. There are also some international agreements by which we are bound: the Helsinki Agreement and the Charter of Paris. That, however, does not resolve the problem of historical and legal facts, and of the manner in which these ancient Romanian territories—Bukovina, for example—were in one case occupied and held by Russia for 180 years, from 1774 to 1918

(as published) without having any rights in Moldavia. Because at the time Russia, after a six-year war with Turkey, won from the Turks half of the Principality of Moldavia. But the Principality of Moldavia was an independent, although later subordinated to the Ottoman Empire which means that it only paid tribute to it, so Turkey had no right to give away a territory that did not belong to it. Consequently, Russia's occupation of Bessarabia and its transformation into a province for about 80 years was an illegal act that violated all the norms of international law. In 1940 Stalin and Hitler divided even further than the two. Not only did they occupy Bessarabia without any right, but they also occupied territories that never belonged to Russia, a small area that belonged to Moldavia, namely Bessarabia and Northern Bessarabia. That territory was then divided into three. The northern and southern parts were included in Ukraine—these territories did not belong to Ukraine nor to Russia—and the central, larger area, plus a territory that never belonged to Romania, the Danube Region, was formed into the Moldavian SSR. This is a historic fact for which there is legal evidence. We cannot ignore this fact. That does not mean that we have to shout "Romanians to arms" and immediately proceed to encroach those territories. This is not the way to solve these problems. We must find a path of understanding first of all independent of this conflict. We are neighbors and we will have to learn to coexist, to live together, and the best is to live in atmosphere of good neighborhood. We have many common interests, both economic, political, cultural, and others that speak for developing such relations of good neighborhood. I think we have found this kind of language regarding the terrain in the Danube Region, in the eastern Ukraine took an active, positive, and constructive position. Therefore, I think that aside from the dispute regarding us to be honest we will find ways of establishing relations of good neighborhood, leaving the territories and the people to resolve this matter. We will need this, too.

You see, for instance Germany and France tried to permanent solution over disputed territories. I am one that they can live and to live in over solving anything about the German disputed territories in France or Germany, and people are getting along. So the issue is linked to a general evolution, to both economic and political development and to eliminating the rigid elements from the relations between neighboring countries, something that in the end will help overcome the other conflicts that may have resulted at one point. We can hope for such a positive development.

Calle Nyman, AFP: Mr. President, what is the current stage of talks regarding the signing of a Brotherhood Treaty with Moldavia, because they were to be somewhat behind schedule; from what source did you hear of 1 January 1991 being the date for the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldavia, and who is the new Romanian ambassador to the United Nations?

Băsescu: The work on the bilateral treaty stopped progressing because of the recent events. I hope that the

negotiations will settle down and that we will continue to negotiate. It was the case that Mr. Magureanu discussed in April at the prime minister meeting with General Seghers that when the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the area between the Prut and Danube, as a first stage, was discussed and when a withdrawal schedule up to 1 January 1991 was discussed. The other matter will be laid down in a document, an agreement that will determine the status of that area, the conditions in which it will be maintained as long as it remains in that area, in accordance with the political leadership of the country, and the withdrawal schedule.

The ambassador to the United Nations has not yet been appointed.

Charles Claser, ITINERARIA: Mr. President, with your permission I would like to ask two questions. If possible, in view of the recent political developments in the country, what is your position regarding the communists? Secondly, regarding the Magureanu file and your own a captain word are intended?

Băsescu: Regarding the position toward the communists. We have a Constitution, a legitimate Constitution, so we must first of all go to Romania's present Constitution and then to the ones referred to the people in the referendum regarding the republican Constitution, where first article refers to the status of the Romanian state. On the other hand, at principle if you wish I do not think that a monarchy is the institution that Romania needs today. The Romanian people opted for a democratic regime and selected against a totalitarian regime in which the country's political leadership was not subject to anyone (monarchical, social) control. The communists, on the other hand, is an institution that is not subject to social control, is not elected, and is of "divine right," an institution superimposed on the civic society, the political society, and the society in general. So what are the reasons of a monarchic institution at this respect to the development of democratic principles in the country? I think that would be a very backward! I am not criticizing the existing monarchies. There, however, have some traditional roots, although their role has in fact been curtailed in the political life of the countries in question precisely because they are viewed as a heretical, traditional role rather than an active political institution specific of the democratic developments of the contemporary world.

I do not understand this great concern in Mr. Magureanu. I understand that you are asking the other questions. I will carefully check what you said.

Peter Strobel, ADEN AGENDA: Mr. President, how much greater do you think Mr. Radu Câmpeanu's chances are in the presidential election now than the PSD [National Liberal Party] has on the Democratic Convention?

Băsescu: First, I don't know whether Mr. Câmpeanu will run in the presidential election. Second, allow me to abstain from any comment about this, every party is entitled to decide on possible or not possible alliances.

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What is written in documents each party has to exchange and comes in line with the given importance of the country's political situation. So I cannot write my own opinion on what is best for a given party.

William Proctor, BELGIUM: Your Excellency, I expected the conference to have the following great world issue of Yugoslavia, a subject that was discussed in talks with President Karadzic, Prime Minister Milosevic, and even with the Serbian foreign minister. What is your view of the present developments, when recognition of existing rights is subject to a great diversity of opinions? For example, from Vukovar and in Belgrade, the recognition did not do any good, it has it added fuel to the fire. What is your position after these talks?

Basescu: In general, we believe the situation in the area will grow extremely and rapidly, also because the historical relations with Yugoslavia and with Serbia have been among the best. This is one of the neighboring states which we never had disputes throughout history, our relations have been governed by mutual understanding, support, and solidarity. On the one hand, we were saddened and worried about the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav state which was caused in the wake of World War II and what was maintained in the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian empire in Europe and the emergence of new ones. We believe that this matter is dramatic and easy for us people, but for the other region and for its stability. From the discussions I had either with Mr. Milosevic and even recently with Mr. Karadzic or others, or discussions with Czech political leaders, with Mr. Karashevici and Mr. Mihailovic—who also have great sympathy for and had good contacts with Serbia and Yugoslavia, and who is very concerned about the situation of Macedonia which is showing negative elements and reactions in some—I concluded that the main responsibility for Serbia's political leadership about the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are being considered. Not only has it not solved the problem, but it has contributed to exacerbating the conflict and a cycle of war in that region. The case has three ethnic components, somewhat over 40 percent Muslims and about 30 percent Serbs and Croats. The Serbs refused to participate in the referendum regarding the proclamation of independence of that republic, viewing it as unconstitutional, because the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaims the sovereignty of the three communities, leading a solution to all the problems requires a compromise between the three ethnic communities. The fact that two of the communities proclaimed independence ignoring the others and wishes of the Serb community turned out to have been a factor that深ened the internal conflict in that Yugoslav republic. Moreover the Serbs, who make up more than 30 percent, take up almost all percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Muslims and Croats take the remaining approximately one third. Thus the situation creates an even bigger conflict and things become even more complicated rather than being solved.

I am the chairman of a forum regarding Macedonia. Macedonian Muslims engaged in cooperation with a forum to plead with the European community not to bring into a state named Macedonia at last. Macedonia being the southern part of former one of the most ancient state formations with its political center in Thessaloniki. Giving the name of Macedonia to this area proposed for long time was perceived as a kind of invitation to make territorial demands in northern Greece. The reaction in the EU Council is very emotional and the former German foreign minister spoke about the European Community's desire to recognize the Macedonian state. No, Germans should respect this in the European Community, but as far as we are concerned, we stayed from the governments. Thus, the situation has led to tensions in the political life of Greece, too. Indeed, it is a delicate problem that is affecting the stability of the entire country and region.

George Simion, ROMANIA: Before the end of your visit in provinces of Romania, can you tell us what was the greatest satisfaction and the greatest disappointment of Romania's free elected government after World War II?

Basescu: It has not been an easy task, from the very first moments of the events of the aftermath and right of 23 December, when we were in a state of congressional session and how shall I say, in constant danger to our lives. My greatest satisfaction is that during these two years we notifications managed to keep the country in balance because given the situation in the nights of 23 December a real danger created that the country would fall into complete chaos and anarchy. Notifications despite the incomplete difficulties, hindrance, corruption, and all kinds of attacks on the military during this period to maintain a balance in the country, in the society. Our main task importance was toward changing the aspects of the Romanian society, from the viewpoint of freedom, civil rights, and the foundations for a free government, we organized the election of May 1990 and reorganized a bicameral Parliament. Despite all the interests involved in the Parliament and Parliament members, it did work although and it fulfilled its main mission, in that task, which was to draft and pass the country's new Constitution. We have a democratic Constitution, based as well to the international political public opinion and the experts of constitutional law. I think that it was the central achievement of this entire period, along with other legislation affecting the basic areas of our social life, including the economic area and the academic where I will be a long and informed process, but great efforts were made and how shall I say are being made especially regarding the legislation and the establishment of several institutions that will complete the legislative and institutional framework of a modern democracy in Romania, with a view to launching the Romanian country on a modernization path or how will the process occurring in the world economy. Thus from the point of view I can say that I lived through a special historical period in the history of the country. I think that those who will judge us in 20 years from the decade important for now and with the changes, decisions and afterwards regarding to continue in the

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will evaluate this period in the history of the end of the century in our country as not merely a Romanian moment, but as a historical moment, as a special moment for the transformation of the Romanian society.

From the very beginning I was convinced that we were entering a difficult and laborious period and that we will have to go through very difficult steps. That is why I cannot but share the general apprehensions regarding the enormous hardships through which the Romanian society must now go. There may have been many things we could have done more easily had we had the necessary skills and the necessary favorable climate, but instead it is a case of because the tools or skills or means, especially in the economic area. For example, there people discussed me for some mistakes I made about the agriculture, as areas in which we could have acted more easily, more carefully and more patiently. But misapprehension begins to disengagement, which eventually leads to disengagement that worsens the economic situation. That is what happened in the Romanian agriculture, where we could have advanced more rapidly and could have reached an efficient agriculture. Now we will have to suffer for a few years until Romania's agriculture will have gained a new foundation. Neither the Hungarians, nor the Greeks, nor the GDR Germans, nor the Bulgarians have dismantled their large cooperative agricultural units. The trouble in our country was that from the vision of these forms of organization was of less realistic and that the state finally determined at the state organization, guidance and leadership of the cooperatives. Large-scale property structures, either in the form of private buildings, like the large Aradense Farms, or in the form of cooperative properties, most throughout the world. This is the way in which they increased agricultural potential and were able to facilitate the use of progressive techniques and technologies, irrigation, and so forth. That is the aspect we missed a step that we could have easily taken. That is one example, but there are many others. I listed only a few regarding some of the economic measures of 1980.

In conclusion, there are enough reasons for both satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

SMS Chief Economic Press, Logos File Directorate
Reference: Bucharest, 27 MAY 1983, L/1983
to Romanian TV, 10 May 1983, file 4

There were no direct consultations with Virgil Mărgărită, Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service. In another time, place and date we gave "The Romanian Who Was Still Alive in Our Country".

20 May 1983, file 4

(Text) (Text) Mr. Virgil Mărgărită, whether you are entitled to the fact or not, I do it for a few good words you have been the prime target of the press. During this time almost every self-respecting newspaper has carried at least several articles "Brother" or "no

among them there was one with a very striking title "There is No Such Thing as a Romanian Intelligence Service (SIS) Director". The article appeared in ADE-VASILE, of 22 April and was authored by Mrs. Irina Drăguș.

(Mărgărită) The kind of signs which unexpectedly to me came from a newspaper with a significant influence on the public, is not right. First of all, regarding re-creation as Director of SIS I can tell you—something that is actually well known—that this occurred on the basis of a decree issued by the former National Economic Council. That decree was the act on the basis of which I was appointed to that post by its then chairman, Stefan Ghinea. However, when Parliament came to discussing the bill on national security and the bill on the organization and management of the SIS, that first legal act was aligned with the provisions of the Constitution, as was only normal. To this title, the only provision that has not yet been carried out, for lack of time, was Parliament's validation of the operation of this service on the basis of the new bills passed. But from there to the statement that, as far as I am concerned, I do not even trust as to Broster, is a long way. It would function for two months on the basis of the legal provisions I just cited. I do not see why that should now be questioned.

As a matter of fact, I am requesting Parliament to postpone the re-legalization of the provisions contained in the bill on the SIS organization and management, had that, as I said, is only a matter of time.

(Text) Under the title "Warrior at the SIS" and "Coming to SIS Executive Cabinet Appeal to Parliament," the magazine CLUSTUL (No. 14, April 1982) carried a letter which reveals the existence of an opposition movement in your organization.

(Mărgărită) I have several reasons to think the author of that letter is my present successor for the SIS leadership apparatus. The main point was that all those who currently comprise the service command are in fact compromised persons. That is the usual technique for arresting all those in a certain position in a certain apparatus. For the purpose of casting doubt on the reliability of the apparatus itself and, of course, in order to compromise the person in charge of it. By charging him with having allegedly known the wrong ones, here I want to recall something that the public knows. I think from some of the previous apparatus, namely—first I carefully examined the personnel of this organization, as well as its command. Naturally, the arresting process must still be continued and we will continue it. If one of us is accused in the past that he accepted, he will have to prove that. I find it very difficult to believe that the entire command apparatus could be compromised. Especially since I used to serve, I was elected after a very strict examining done at the right time and drawn on the basis of a broad and accurate analysis of the professional profiles of each and every member.

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But there is also another fact. Which of our institutions, or what institution in the world, would radically change its command at some urging carried in some newspaper or urging itself based on an anonymous letter?

[Tome] Nevertheless, did the Parliament alerted you to having received such a letter?

[Magureanu] No. Not yet. But it is a known fact that Parliament is continuously receiving letters concerning some aspect of our activities. Or, for example, things that cast doubt on some member of the personnel of our service. These things are absolutely natural. As a matter of fact, such letters have been received not only by Parliament, but also by the presidential office. However, a letter like this one, questioning the entire command corps, is in my opinion the first and only of its kind. This alleged letter is nothing but one of the countless attempts artificially planted and purposefully directed against our organization.

[Tome] What could be the immediate effect of the public disclosure of the names of the members of the SIS command corps?

[Magureanu] It certainly cannot have a positive effect. Which was the purpose, to cast doubt on the present members of the command of our institution. And if we were to highlight the fact that we are an organization with a special status, in which keeping secrets is a major duty, the effect of the publication of the names of all the members of its command is particularly dangerous for the security of the service as well as for its operation, all the more so since this will be picked up by the international press. I think that in fact that was precisely the purpose. This is undoubtedly a unique case, stemming from the demolition teams that still reign in our country. But as the subject is the service designed to guarantee the national security, the negative consequences may be catastrophic. And finally, this will be another test that our command corps will have to pass. On the other hand, we will become even more careful about the behavior of those who make up this command apparatus.

[Tome] Is a sentence you said in Parliament and which made the headlines, you linked the press attack on you personally to an attack on the presidential institution? "Hit the one and you will bring down the other one."

[Magureanu] I do not think that you are stating this issue correctly. First, it was not I who initiated the attack on me, to the presidential institution in the press campaign, but those who launched it themselves. The fact that the SIS is committed to the country's president is clear and firm from the law. We are subordinated both to the president and to Parliament by the very premium to which our personnel is appointed. Those who obviously and without any grounds make the link between the two institutions with the idea that I then publicly announced—that if they hit our service the presidential institution will certainly suffer—are, in fact, I estimate, persons from those who launched this vicious slander campaign.

Indeed, supporting an organization like the SIS and destabilizing it must needs reflect negatively on other institutions as well, not only on the presidency. In my opinion, the weakening of our institution by a well-guided, coordinated attack, is of concern to any of the institutions of the national security: the Interior Ministry, the Special Guard and Protection Unit, and the Defense Ministry. That is on the one hand. On the other hand, I think that the long relationship between the country's president and myself, based on affinities and cooperation, is being grossly exploited.

[Tome] What discussions have you had with Mr. Ion Iliescu regarding the continual fire to which you have been subjected by the press?

[Magureanu] By virtue of my service duties I have to report to the president, and not only to him, about matters regarding national security vigilance and other matters of a major interest to our security. Needless to say, such reports have nothing to do with my personal relations with anyone, but with the duties I have toward the institutions to which we are subordinated. Consequently, I have more or less frequent meetings with the president. The last meeting we had, to answer your question specifically, took place before his press conference and it indeed dealt mostly with the press campaign unleashed against me and the service I manage. I believe that our relations were satisfactorily clarified on that occasion. As a matter of fact, at the press conference that followed Mr. Ion Iliescu clearly stated his view both about our organization as such and about my person.

[Tome] You said before Parliament: "From the very beginning, even before I assumed this position, I said that for seven months, while I was doing my military service, during the period between 1 September 1972 and 11 March 1973 I worked in a military service of the former Department for Foreign Intelligence (DRS)." Taking that statement as a point of departure, a well-known editor-in-chief, Mr. Ion Crisanu, concluded: "In a shabby attempt to defend himself, Mr. Virgil Magureanu claimed to them and to us that that was merely a matter of doing his military service. The press made a mockery of that claim basing on the ridiculous. As was only natural, it claimed that no one can have the rank of captain while doing their military service." What do you answer to that now?

[Magureanu] I say no need to once again explain that the entire slander campaign has a very obvious political aim. Mr. Crisanu's article proves that more clearly than all the other press comments. I do not find at all childish the emphasis on the fact that I stayed with that office for exactly as long as it took to complete the military service. I have documents and witnesses to prove that long before the end of the period in question I had decided to leave that office for good, because settling in an atmosphere was useless to my aspirations. In this context I want to recall that as of the beginning of 1971 I was a dischargee with the University of Bucharest, where the title of my thesis was: "The Nature and Social

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Function of Political Power." Thus, once I came to the Foreign Relations Department, it was very clear to the that I had to get away from that place. I repeat, I stayed there only for the period I needed to get my military retirement card, which as a matter of fact, I did. This is one aspect of the issue. On the other hand—and this is what the press is exploiting—I must stress the fact that no one could enter such a place without knowing a military rank. I can demonstrate, beyond any doubt, that several cadres who came there at the same time I did, were awarded military ranks, like I did, without having served one day in the army. That was the rule, and it was not we who had established it, but those who had accepted an into that special service. That is why I say that Mr. Chirac's interpretations in *EXPRES MAGAZIN* are not only puritan and completely untrue, but downright malicious, because they are designed primarily to support a preponderantly political campaign against me.

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(Tone) (Tone) you were also criticised for the fact that a relatively long period of time, several weeks, passed since the actual publication of your "file" in *TINERAMA* and until the first official reaction.

(Maguraru) I did not react publicly from the beginning because I looked upon this scandal as having originated in a fictional, artificially kept up manner. I did not and still do not attach to it the importance that the spokesmen of this slander campaign gave it. I made a point of keeping my distance from this kind of campaign both in terms of time and out of principle, so I acted accordingly. Perhaps I would have done better not to give it any attention, in view of its evidently aggressive aims. I believe that some of the people who engaged in such an intentionally destructive action are morally malicious and that they wish to seriously disinform the public in the country, not only regarding my person, but also the institution itself. I always tried to draw a separate between myself as a person and the service I manage, precisely so as not to provide fuel for the evil of such calumnies. Against this backdrop we see the theme of a kind of existentialist philosophy emerging, what used to be known as the "tragedy of guiltless culpability": since no specific guilt can be assigned, it can be imagined about anything. This is a point of departure for afterward developing a usually pernicious but usually unfounded viewpoint against a person.

(Tone) Do you think that there is something or someone specific behind these developments against you?

(Maguraru) I do not think that in the present context who or who is behind this slander campaign is very important. But I do believe that for those journalists who engaged in the campaign, artificially inflating something that is actually not very relevant, this can in no way bring them honor. I am very sure that most valuable journals and reputable newspapers nevertheless participated, even if only by quoting otherwise tendentious material carried in publications specialising in sensationalism.

Anyways, reproducing pages from my former DSE file is in itself illegal. Currently a war of files is being waged in our country, which consists of extracting files from dubious sources out of archives and using them for the purpose of political blackmail. The SRI has nothing to do with the illegal traffic of such files. That is also the reason for which I have been pleading for Parliament to immediately take over all the archives of the former Secretariat from our storage.

(Tone) At the same time, it has been claimed that you recently appeared before Parliament "in order to sue it," and about your statement it was said that "Commenting on a case of yours goes beyond Parliament's role as an open forum for Mr. Virgil Maguraru."

(Maguraru) This is another facet of the same malice and manipulation. The things I said in Parliament were very clear and were very precisely phrased to the question I was asked in Parliament. I do not intend to go back to that three-point question because it is already public knowledge. Parliament did not fail per se to answer. In my opinion, the viewpoints expressed there were responsible and clearly different from the officially stated position that appeared like telegraphed to a specific procuracy-of-section. I think it became quite evident that in fact those who today claim that I allegedly manipulated files are in reality the very ones who are endeavouring to manipulate both the press and Parliament.

(Tone) Can you prove that Mr. Gheorghe Voiculescu purchased the file that reached *TINERAMA*?

(Maguraru) The fact is notorious—there are witnesses to that, also in the Romanian Parliament, especially in the Senate—that Gheorghe Voiculescu wrote to various people with that file, repeatedly trying to get it published. In the end an arrangement was struck about publishing it in *TINERAMA*. There is no need for me to prove the dubious acts of the former senator and present diplomat Voiculescu, who almost continually behaved dishonestly and outside the law. You must remember the thundering sentence of the alleged "communist punch in Romania." I am not telling you anything new when I say that, considering the drift of documents and their manipulation for the purpose of slander, the case as such was a matter for the Prosecutor's Office.

(Tone) Please comment on another particularly trenchant statement you made in the same response to Parliament: "This file—and this is my final request—this file and other evidence should be investigated by the special commission that is inspecting the SRI's activities and thus more, too. If one comes to that file or in other documents will prove that I carried out activities incompatible with the position, you can have the investigation at once." Do you still stand behind those statements?

(Maguraru) Of course. I hope that such an investigation will begin as soon as possible, in order to shed light on all the events relevant to the post-communist actions and in fact, on the entire history. I want to reiterate that I

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udent will present my resignation to Parliament if even one of the documents or one of my actions will be shown to be incompatible with my position. I will request that absolute priority be given to bringing to light everything concerning my better known or less known activities, both before and after December 1989.

[Tone] Regarding the file itself, was all of it published in *TINERAMA*?

[Maguriana] No, not all of it. This campaign is probably intended to continue. Only a few points regarding the biography were published out of it.

[Tone] What else is in that file?

[Maguriana] Forget me, but to me these things are too insignificant. As I said in Parliament and as I said before the appearance in Parliament, as far as this file is concerned, I have no reason to hide anything that is in it. I have already heard that the psychological test results will soon capture the attention of several newspapers.

[Tone] Since your appearance in Parliament to date has any concrete step been taken to form the investigation committee you requested?

[Maguriana] I have not been told anything about it, but I will insist that the committee be formed without delay.

[Tone] Here is another matter that is now being laid at your door. "Is Mr. Virgil Maguriana's case," Mr. Ion Creanga stated, "the only reason for your audience—no other remained obscure to this day." He neither published any book of yours, nor sent any letter to Radio Free Europe. Asked about that, Mr. Virgil Maguriana declined to answer. His gesture seemed to conceal a desire of bragging. I, however, believe that what it does conceal is concern about telling who he was exiled.

[Maguriana] That is not true. I do not decline to answer such questions. But I did not think it was necessary to push to the fore that aspect of my history. I do not view myself as being burdened by my past; on the contrary, I believe that my past is a valuable asset for me and for my present attitude. After December 1989 I did not think it was necessary to try to make political capital out of a past in which indeed I clearly adopted some well-known attitudes against Ceausescu. If I did not make these things public it was not at all because I had nothing to conceal. Once again, all these things can be disclosed at any time.

But then, there is another aspect. At a time when there are so many urgent issues in our society, when we are experiencing so many hardships, and when, last but not least, a lot of people are trying, with due courage and accomplishment, to paint themselves as dissidents of the former regime, I find it indecent for me to come and claim a status that in fact I assumed at the proper time, motivated by a clearly authoritarian political option. Consequently, I regret I have to disappoint so many people by making this statement, but I do not consider

myself burdened by my past. That goes provided me with spiritual support for what I now am and for what I have been doing since December 1989 to this day.

[Tone] Just so as not to be accused of evading the answer regarding your dissidence, please disclose to us at least the reason for which at some point you were unwilling to the protection from the former Party Academy.

[Maguriana] Since some day you may want to do a serious interview on this topic.

[Tone] Why not? I do not think that an colleague of *TINERETUL LIBER* will have any objection.

[Maguriana] ...and when I believe that many other things have not been clarified in this interview, I will limit myself to a very brief answer to your question. At the time when I was removed from the former Party Academy, I was told the following. That my political attitude was incompatible with the nature of the institution in which I was.

[Tone] Who told you that?

[Maguriana] The former president of the Academy Brana Pana himself. The decision had been passed from very high up. The person who issued the expressed order to remove me—and I do not doubt that the Secretariat itself was behind that order—was the secretary for propaganda at that time, Commissar Chiriac. The order originated with him. At the time no one talked to me and that was worrying, because I did not know how much of my attitudes against the former regime were known.

[Tone] In a recent interview you said that the outbreak of the revolution caught you in Zalau.

[Maguriana] True. I said that on 22 December I was in Zalau, where, from the balcony of the persons prefecture, I talked to the crowd that had gathered there. This may be the moment to tell in very few words, how I got there. I suspect you know that I come from that area and that the station was at about 30 km from Zalau toward Marasesti. I did not have time to get home. I had left on the evening of 21 December from Bucharest, fully aware of the fact that in those circumstances I was being extremely watched, but not suspecting that, although predictable, the events will occur so rapidly. I thought it was better to go into isolation. So that night I left on the train for Zalau; the next morning I started back for Bucharest, where I arrived in the morning of the 24th. My meeting with those who had then assumed the provisional leadership of the country took place at the Telecasa, precisely during the most dramatic moment, when the building was under violent attack by the forces intent on re-establishing the power.

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[Tone] [Tone] Mr. Director, at the risk of annoying you, allow me to read out to you a few other sentences, toward the end of Mr. Ion Creanga's article entitled "The

Muguratuș Scandal. "Vergă Muguratuș... I had the honor of reading out the CPSU's communiqué at the meeting of 24 December. He attended the Conference trial. If we consider the capital importance of that trial for the new team, we will realize that Mr. Vergă Muguratuș was a first rate personality." (i.e. "The revelations made by Silvia Brucă, Nuclear Military and Nuclear Radio shed light on the existence of a plot against Corespondent. The three especially stated that the Securitate was represented at the plot by Mr. Vergă Muguratuș.")

(Muguratuș) Once again I find myself compelled to point out that the article is nothing but a little piece of slander that completely disqualifies its author. About my presence at the trial of the Corespondent couple I have talked on other occasions. I have publicly stated that my presence at Tigrilești did not assume any special role. I was just there simply as a witness and I behaved accordingly. Had I behaved in any other way or if, as it is being suggested, my choices had been different, it is difficult to believe that, for example, Gheță Voicu Voronel would not have explained the fact to me.

As for the "revelations" made by Mirela Silvia Brucă, Nuclear Military, and Nuclear Radio, that is once again a speculation. The three could not have attributed to me—and as far as I know, they did not—the role of "representative of the Securitate," because even if we were so far as to assume that they had wanted to do so, unlike Ion Creangă, they would have known that such statements must be proven.

(Tone) Now comes a question that we cannot evade in this discussion. What do you predict will be the effects of the disclosure of the files of former Securitate informers?

(Muguratuș) My conviction is that our significant step regarding the transparency of our social and political life will be first of all our free access to informant surveillance files. Thus, all the citizens will get a clear image of how the former totalitarian regime oppressed them and will know who were those who contributed to this generalized repression of the Romanian people. Near the lists of former Securitate informers, of those who betrayed their colleagues and friends, are their paths; they will reveal the informer who, for a handful of silver, snared the faith or the ideals of friendship and solidarity, and caused irreparably breaches in our resistance against the totalitarian repression, thus betraying the most sacred ideals of humanity and solidarity of their fellowmen. Thanks to the disclosures that will be made and the clear distinctions that will be made, we will be able to demonstrate that we are not a nation of informers or traitors, as some are now trying to claim precisely in order to cover up their own complicitous past.

I have recently had other opportunities to study how these disclosures will end up providing a generally needed moral therapy. This is not a matter of publicly revealing the names of those who in the past contributed to

offending the national interests, or those who made an honest contribution to maintaining democratic order. Granted their conduct or crime against Romania, but of those who indeed managed their dignity under the circumstances and in the face of avarice and treachery.

At the same time I want to stress another aspect of the situation that everybody ignores: the in fact I already said this at the beginning of our talk:

Tone) Please.

(Muguratuș) The successive declassification campaign undertaken in the domestic and foreign press cannot be seen as anything but the義務 of some people to cover up a definitely compromised past by means of selective accusations and especially by completely reading the truth. They will do anything possible in order to close down or even openly cancel the Parliament's decision to publicly disclose the files of the Securitate informers and informants. I hope this will not happen. Of course many, especially the more crass among us, will undoubtedly be in need for huge surgery. Because more than a few of the present champions of democracy will want to claim to have been born too long ago, left no trace behind. Parliament is determined to banish this process of file disclosure. More than after the revolting charlatanism, will never cease to persist in our country.

(Tone) Unfortunately, among those who err in the past there should be people who, after serious reflection, read the fact and finally submitted to the memory of freedom.

(Muguratuș) Inevitably, this action requires great tact in order to not harm this endeavor. We must guard against panics and in particular we must strive to be just. I also hope that the victims' organization and the former participation in crime affords at least some of those who took the wrong path in the past will straighten out. It would not be natural for some people to have to make penitence for their past behavior. But the result must be known. That is the only remedy by which we can attain understanding and solidarity. And solidarity during this housing files and granting free access to them will obviously have to be done under the sign of our legitimate freedom and also with the broad comprehension of the judicial bodies that will be specially constituted to review specific organizations in this operation. My hope is that the SRI will not be at the expense of a few of the actions that will take place. We must carefully ensure that our personnel do not participate in even the most minor of the stages of this disclosure.

Tone) What do you think will happen in the "Muguratuș scandal?"

(Muguratuș) For me this entire affair is a closed book. Having been artificially kept up, it can only share the fate of any slander campaign and fall into oblivion in the absence of any effective support. Speaking strictly

for myself, this presented one indubitable advantage: It gave me an opportunity to once again request Parliament to pass a decision on my past and my present status as soon as possible. These things must be set straight once and for all.

[Tone] If in the end you did have to resign, to what other area would you turn?

[Magureanu] In such a case I will finally turn to my lifelong aspiration, which on the one hand was to ensure a systematic, long-term association with university education in line with my level of training, and on the other hand to utilize my entire theoretical experience in order to provide skilled services for the development of Romania's political life.

[Tone] Having said all that, what does the SRI director fear the most?

[Magureanu] I have no special reason for fear. Except for God, whom we must all fear, I can say that I fear only my own limitations and the fact that I may be unconsciously erring in matters in which no one in my position should be allowed to err. My only chance is to be able to maintain this fragile balance of honesty. I cannot consider myself a man without mistakes, on the contrary. Like anybody else and perhaps more than others, I am also subject to such risk. But whenever it was a matter of extremely serious and important issues, I strove—and my conscience is clear on that account—to be very clear-sighted and to keep a cool head.

Magureanu on SRI Problems, Relations With Russia

92B400118 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
23 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service. By Octavian Andronic; place and date not given. "Publishing Dossiers of Secretaries Informers Will Serve Moral, Social Therapy"]

[Text] [Andronic] In the last few weeks we have witnessed a veritable... non-electoral campaign generated by the revelations published in TINERAMA. Your resignation is overwhelmingly demanded, even from the directors of the government party. Are you thinking of meeting that demand? How can you refuse the main charge, that of insincerity?

[Magureanu] A few days ago I had an opportunity to talk about that subject in Parliament. I do not think I can be accused of insincerity because my membership in the former foreign intelligence organization, for a very limited period of only seven months, had been made known before. I am not surprised that these attacks, which were maintained in the press and have also proliferated in Parliament, come from government groups. In fact, I do not think there is any complete unanimity of opinions between some of those who demanded my resignation then and our present regime. Yet I think that some

members of Parliament, and with them I do not want to unilaterally assume the right to be the only party with valid opinions, demanded my resignation then just on the basis of the accusations you mentioned. Some journalists did so too. I would like some day to be able to keep my resignation available for situations in which this dismissal from my post is really absolutely necessary, and if there are such reasons some day I will be the first to submit my resignation without waiting to be called upon in Parliament or summoned in the press.

[Andronic] You have been blamed for tolerating the activation of some elements who are compromised or incapable of adapting to the new course of society, in spite of your initial declarations and commitments when you came out in favor of renovating the staff. That has started a real crisis of confidence.

[Magureanu] I think the matters have to be differentiated. We have always tried to sort out that staff carefully and to keep on it only the workers who are compatible with the new status of an intelligence officer. It is still very possible that we have not finished that process, that some of them may very well still be at odds with the process of democratizing Romania, or that their moral conduct probably conflicts flagrantly with the latter, just as I think the phenomenon is still present (unfortunately) in other institutions too, although I would not want to extrapolate our own situation onto those of others. As for a confidence crisis, I think it is artificially maintained, because it is a pretty far cry from noting the existence of a few or more workers who are not yet assimilating the standards of democracy or who are entirely incapable of ever doing so to considering the whole institution along with its chief morally unworthy.

[Andronic] Don't you think that a crisis is indicated, in a way, by the frequent flows of information and data from within the institution to the mass media and to some political circles?

[Magureanu] Unfortunately that confirms the fact that there still are workers on our staff who have not adjusted and cannot adjust to the moral standards that our society considers reasonable. I believe that if these flows are still going on it is expressly due to that fact, as well as the fact that at this point probably because of a particular kind of psychosis, everyone is tempted to offer moral advice to anyone, and some regard the flow of information which blatantly violates the operating rules of our institution, as a suitable means of taking vengeance on someone.

[Andronic] Do you think there is dissent within the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service]?

[Magureanu] No, I would not assume that yet. There are probably quite a few who are incompatible with our status just as our own mistakes very probably displease some of our workers. It is possible that the present management of the SRI has not succeeded for the most part in presenting a sufficiently balanced image of a management in accordance with all the operating rules of

the institution. But as I said all that is not sufficient enough according to the data that I know, to enable us to assume that there is any dissent within the institution.

[Andronici] Do you think the institution is ready now to protect the national interests that it has a duty to protect?

[Maguraru] Yes, for the most part. We can provide, at the major aspects of the intelligence situation, data on the social climate, the geopolitical context around us, and the compatibility of our national interests with the contrasting trends within and outside Romanian society. I believe we can evaluate all of these correctly at the present time.

[Andronici] What do you think Romania's situation is now from the standpoint of national security?

[Maguraru] We are evolving in an external context marked, as you know, by a crisis. And in a given context the most vanguard trends are encouraged. In my opinion the view that political extremism is gaining ground in our society and that our social climate could deteriorate from one day to the next should not be aggravated. On the contrary I could say without being able to present a picture that is at all reassuring, that some particularly critical points, with great potential troubles that could be anticipated, have almost passed. And I cannot help associating this with the fact that imperceptibly, in the meantime, the social mechanism has begun to operate, at least as regards its corrective aspect, and consequently as a reflection of that economic foundation, the political mechanism of society has too that which pertains to pluralism and observance of the basic standards of democracy.

[Andronici] What arguments could you offer as in support of the idea of political reconstitution?

[Maguraru] To accept what has been written in the press, reconstitution is not an idea that requires keeping your distance from everyone and rejecting any kind of contact. We have viewed reconstitution in a very flexible way, as trying to reflect all the voices and impulses that the social climate generates and the various trends in Romanian society, as being receptive to the trends that can degenerate, as determining exactly what troubles, what tensions and what imbalances can arise, and as trying to prevent them. We must become the spokesmen of those sounds of alarm that occur in any society, while keeping in touch with the most varied units or groups, even with those that border on extremist attitudes at any given point, not in order to channel them or turn them against society but to try to moderate their bad effects if necessary. And finally, I do not believe that those who really know the activists of our society and that of its director could say that they were ever rejected in the approaches or requests that they made. It is more than clear that we have not been successful enough in pleasing everyone.

[Andronici] Do the "rejection phenomena" seem more pronounced to you coming from the government side?

[Maguraru] No. I cannot say that. We are collaborating normally here with all the institutions making up the national security system, and there we give information to the normal units to all those who take the responsibility for managing important issues of our security. The statement also applies to most of the party leaders. If we still have problems concerning difficulties with some of them it is not always just our fault. We probably have our limits too.

[Andronici] I have to be more specific. Do you think your disagreement with the Front is still blocking any communication?

[Maguraru] I do not understand the question very well.

[Andronici] Is there any chance of re-establishing和睦distance with the "Roman wing" of the Front especially?

[Maguraru] I have had an occasion to say that in public I have no disagreement of any kind with the wing you mentioned, nor do I want to have one, to say nothing of aggravating these tensions. But there is always a tendency there which I cannot accept, to regard on the personality and the institution, as a conservative and obstructing force in our society. It is an artificial image and I do not feel that we have anything in common with it.

[Andronici] Does that come from misunderstanding or the reverse of the problem?

[Maguraru] I think the wing you are talking about tends to gain a political advantage from presenting as its some conservative and obstructing forces. But that is all.

[Andronici] Is not given you and your side, what were the contributions of your December 19 December 1989? (What did it consist?)

[Maguraru] Mr. Andronici, I have taken up that subject to many times that actually I do not think I am well disposed now to be able to answer such a question, and the pressure of current events is so great that I would like you to save room later for such a subject.

[Andronici] This suggests another question that could enter into the same context. Where did the events of December find you and what action did you take then? Do you think there are unclear areas in the very brief interval in which the revolution was actually achieved?

[Maguraru] There are quite a few questions that it is our duty to answer, and we are preparing a report on them that it is up to me personally. I could say that the events were a partial surprise only in their sudden occurrence. These events after all were desired by the majority of the Romanian people and had been expected for a long time. But the way they happened leaves quite a few unclear areas (in adopt your term) that we have to clarify. Personally the events took me by surprise either where in Transylvania or more accurately in Zalau

when you I went back to Bucharest and tried to sort it out. At the time I did not know what to do with them.

[Andriano] What were your motives and reasons for appearing on the panel of Ceausescu's judges? What was your role in that trial?

[Maguraru] My answer, at that construction, at the trial, I presented myself as the very briefly to the present president to the effect that I would be needed there as a witness. I made no contribution to the proceedings at the trial. I did not influence it in any way, and I always respected the aspects that I had been assigned.

[Andriano] Did you consider Bessmenni to be a closed chapter?

[Maguraru] No. Bessmenni is not a closed case because it was found that there were a great many instances of destruction of documents vital to clarification of some things that happened in Romanian society and of some others committed by the former Securitate in the totalitarian period - things that happened not only in the vicinity of that name but also throughout the country, so that I could always say that from December 1989 to the summer of 1990 and probably later this date Bessmenni ruled in many localities in the country, leading to a great extent to the destruction of a considerable part of the documentation on the phenomena that we mentioned.

[Andriano] There was a great commotion about the "Maguraru dossier". What is it all about?

[Maguraru] I knew all along that a certain person, whom I also named, had taken it without any authorisation, and the explanation she gave is totally unsatisfactory and inadequate. Actually I had known for a long time that she had this dossier, but the reason why I ignored it and took no step of any kind to obtain it was partly that a copy of the dossier had been sent to me and partly that I once even believed that there were no longer any such documents on the person in question, so that I was really surprised later to find that she had offered excerpts from it to various newspapers in Romania for publication.

[Andriano] What do you think the effects will be of publication of the dossier of Securitate informers holding important jobs today in the state administration and institutions? Parliament has made a decision on this, if I understand it correctly.

[Maguraru] Parliament is about to make such a decision, and the effect will be one of moral and social therapy, beneficial and necessary in my opinion. It is a matter of having the best possible image of the past of those who hold various positions in Romanian society and of the way those people and others operated in support of the former repressive organs. I think it is a necessary trial. We must not deceive ourselves that this trial will be finished off at once, but I think that light can

be shed in a very short time upon the origins, contributions of certain people who held important positions in Romanian society of today.

[Andriano] Do you think the other (the action) will bring considerable surprises?

[Maguraru] I like to believe that the effect will be limited and without too great surprise. In general I do not think it will lead to reconstructing an great part of Romanian society. And the effect, as I said, can only be a necessary moral therapy.

[Andriano] You see, I am asking you this question because certain groups and certain theories so far mentioned have brought us to the point of believing that we are a nation of informers. Should such a theory be justified? To a greater or less extent, have you here also in this interval to determine how common that phenomenon was?

[Maguraru] We just have to study the real extent of the phenomenon. But what I can tell you is that from what is known so far and from the investigations that have been made it is impossible to eliminate all of Romanian society over substrate. It is an aberrant image that has nothing to do with either our people's character or the real extent of the phenomenon in the past. Moreover there are interested persons who had a destructive attitude to the past and who are interested in presenting this documentation on the scale of the entire people. That is a separate problem. It is the subjective image of some. But we must proceed with tact, making a fine distinction between those who were informers or snitches if you will allow me to use a colloquial term; and those who, out of considerations of concern for the national interest, intended to collaborate with the part of the organs of the time that had no repressive political functions but those of defense of national security.

[Andriano] Under what circumstances would you be disposed to give up your mandate as director of the SRI?

[Maguraru] I will review my right to reply to that question in the course of the next few months according to the global developments and those in Romania. But in no case will I make my resignation available to those who are expecting it until they make it sufficiently clear what my real contribution has been since I took this office until the present time.

[See, p. 2]

SRI Director Virgil Maguraru has made it known that 27,354 dossiers of the network were either stolen during the events of December 1989 from the archives of the former Securitate or destroyed by the officers who held them. He also said that he is ready to make all the documentary material available that was taken over by the SRI from the archives of the former Securitate. He stated that the SRI has 1,267,144 dossiers for archival purposes [untrue information]. On 22 December

1988. Vergil Magureanu said: "42,410 persons were in direct contact with Securitate officers. Magureanu said at the same time that the MII has 613,333 documents of the network that refer to 473,563 persons who collaborated with the Securitate organs at various periods of time."

Economic Wars Started as National Bank Policies

428-0187408 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBEREA
in Romanian 21 Apr 87 pp 1-7

[Article by Alexandru I. Mihai: "Economic Agents Aggravating the Decline in the Economy"]

[Text] While persevering in the policy of the personal dictatorship that he had established in the field of finance and banking, the governor of the BNR (Banca Națională a României, Romania's central bank) regarded merchants' fixing as part of his own field. Although due to the recovery of the economy from the aggregate currency crisis, approving purchases of foreign exchange for imports, foreign insurance and transportation, etc., is not a natural attribute of banks or more precisely, of the BNR, as the operations were performed in the last period.

Although the prime minister, in an interview granted to ROMANIA LIBEREA recently, acknowledged that he erred in letting the BNR make important decisions in the economic-financial field, nevertheless he is still reenforcing the decisive role of the BNR in approving purchases of foreign exchange. As long as the foreign exchange obtained from exports is all received by the economic agents, approval of purchases of foreign exchange for imports by the banks, which are not directly involved in the economic processes, is abnormal. In their capacities as supervisors and regulators of the macroeconomic processes, the Minister of Industries, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade and Tourism, as well as the Ministry of Economy and Finance, should have the last word in making these decisions. The precedent so far shows a misconception in the management of the economy and finance, especially in this extremely difficult period of transition.

In recognition of the acute shortage of currency, it was announced that the priority in approving purchases of foreign exchange will be on imports of crude oil, gases, energy, coal, equipment, raw materials and metals necessary for industry. This criterion was observed for the respective products, but it was abandoned in approving the other imports, and foreign exchange was released in the order in which the requests were submitted. Purchases of large amounts of foreign exchange for party and administrative food and nonfood products were approved in this way, while fiddlers, timbers, seeds, agricultural equipment and highly important and urgent industrial raw materials remained unpaid for. The decision makers of merchants' fixing ignore the fact that livestock can start to die for lack of feed and we risk the loss even of our breed stock and pasture, that the population

can suffer from the lack of sugar, oil, butter and margarine etc., that hundreds of thousands of teachers can remain unemployed for lack of textbooks, seeds, timbers etc., and that some companies are going into technical insolvency due to lack of imported raw materials. The existence of the functions of industry and agriculture is questionable, because it is not enough to provide for imports of crude oil, energy and gases alone. The other production sectors such as agriculture and the timber and clothing industries are also important and urgent. They are also great producers of foreign exchange and are suffering terribly from the lack of it. The position of the management of the Banca Agricola regarding what is obtained for agriculture from fixing is also ridiculous in comparison with its extensive efforts to attract foreign exchange resources from Europe and even recently from Asia and America.

Delays of several months in honoring requests for foreign exchange have caused dangerous deteriorations of relations with foreign suppliers, who, after understanding why Romania's import requests for foreign exchange for which they have deposited the necessary sums in BNR, are not honored. They will certainly be led to seek good paying importers in other countries, which will result in a real disaster for the Rumanian economy. It is equally problematic how it was possible to approve thousands of requests for purchases of foreign exchange without any connection with the Super Plan (MF - International Monetary Fund) credits would be coming in that were inadequate anyway. In that way the amount paid was reached where requests for about \$400 million were approved and not honored. In merchants' fixing rates of foreign exchange are confused considerably with providers to sell. The commercial banks are accused for this reason by hundreds and thousands of businesses who, instead of confronting themselves with the particularly difficult problems (such as procurement from domestic sources, organization of production, recruitment of management and sales of products domestically and to export, as well as connecting for them, water, labor, energy and money) by beating a path dash to the banks. Although they are of major importance to the economy, approvals of purchases of foreign exchange are not controlled by any organ except the banks, which abuses concessions. Protected by the artificial barrier of 150 lei to a dollar that permits them to put only certain requests in the dash hopper of foreign exchange, and by the operating regulations issued by the governor of the BNR, who allows them and even invites them to honor the requests in the order of the dates on which they are deposited, and also by the secrecy of the banking operations, which no one can penetrate even if it is a matter of serious abuses, the decision makers of fixing operate at will and uncontrolled by anyone. We emphasize this because some economic agents, out of desperation or bad ideas, are trying to break up their requests for large amounts into several portions in order to conform to the ceiling of \$100,000 to which approvals are given directly by the commercial banks. There is also a tendency to make several requests for the same products on different dates or in

Different banks. Those can evade the controls exercised by banks because of the large number of existing requests.

The commercial banks have paid nominal interest rates of 2-3 percent on the sums deposited by the economic agents for purchases of foreign exchange and no interest on the available funds on account, which is over 10 percent higher. When we consider that the average amount of the sums deposited in the last period was about 100 billion lei, it follows that the difference in interest comes to about 1 billion lei for only 30 days, so that the economic agents are not only not granted the foreign exchange but are also causing heavy losses.

From day to final overturning has meant a series of errors and abuses foreseeable from the time it was instituted. Companies with high potentials and export traditions recognized in their countries, as well as others formed under the revolution that have export incomes either in order, are waiting for months for even a part of the foreign exchange that they have generated and are curtailed their activities accordingly. Such a bottleneck of imports and production resulting from wrong regulation has not occurred anywhere in any country even at wartime. The present rules have transformed foreign currencies into a strange category apart, far from what they are in reality, namely money, as well as the law, which belongs throughout the world and at all times to those who generate it. The essential fact is constantly overlooked that the state and the economic agents who do not generate foreign exchange can acquire currency mainly out of the surpluses formed by the economic agents playing a large part in exports. If we add to that the freezing of the rate of exchange for more than 40 days at 170 lei to the dollar, which is unacceptable because by definition fixing means dual floating and consequently change, we have a complete picture of the present foreign exchange policy. It is a dark portrait, and a disqualification isolates the Romanian economy from the rest of the world.

The way out of the present tragic situation is to grant foreign exchange to the economic agents who generate it since they can sell the surplus to the bank at the rate of the day and accordingly on a strictly commercial basis. The shock will be hard and long, especially if the new massive devaluation of the lei is accompanied by a doubling of bank current rates (an action about which we have great reservations and to which we will return).

As an immediate measure, it is necessary to abandon the present banking foreign exchange practice through:

- Approval, by the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade and Tourism and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, of sales of foreign exchange to the economic agents;
- Authorization of the deposited sum that cannot be honored;

The present realization of the IMF loan is hardly enough for payments for crude oil, grain and energy

imports required by the government, for opening new credits and for some pressing needs of industry and agriculture. Requests for about 5,000 billion will accordingly remain suspended.

- Acceptance of requests for purchase of foreign exchange valid within the terms of existing credits while deposits or leis are given up entirely;
- Immediatum recognition of the difference between the interest granted on the blocked sums and that paid on available funds on account regardless of the periods of deposit, whether they are days, weeks or months;

Who will decide all these things is not yet a simple question.

Social Assistance Benefits in 1990-91

02.05.91 Bucharest RUMAFILE ROMAD INFO

[Report by Alina Vlăduță, "The State University"]

[Text] According to data received from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the social protection program promoted in keeping with the conditions of the transition and of a market economy for the 1990-91 period featured the following major benefits:

- I. Unemployment Benefits
 - 1. Unemployment payments
 - Recipients: Wage earners without a job and school graduates
 - Benefit level: A percentage of the last indexed tariff salary payable for 170 days (55.11-60.70 percent according to case)
 - 2. Training and retraining
 - Recipients: Wage earners without a job and school graduates
 - Benefit level: A percentage of the last indexed tariff salary payable for 170 days
- II. State Social Security Protection
 - 1. Allowances for temporary work incapacity (labor accident, disease, pregnancy)
 - Recipients: All persons incorporated in the state social security system
 - Benefit level: A percentage of the previous salary calculated in keeping with the number of years of employment (50.45-75.41 percent, according to case). The allowance will be granted depending on the nature of the incapacity and the time of recovery, but may not exceed two years after which time the person will be recommended for retirement.

2. Allocations for maternity leave and for caring for each child or babies of up to one year of age

—**Recipients:** Women employees included in the state social security system.

—**Benefit level:** A percentage of the mother's previous salary, calculated in relation to the length of service (30-45-45 percent, or 94 percent for the third and following children). Paid leave representing 45 percent of the previous salary will be granted to employed mothers for the purpose of caring for babies under one year of age.

3. Age pension

—**Recipients:** All the persons included in the state social security system at the age of 62 for men and 57 for women and a length of service of 30 years for men and 25 years for women. Persons excluded in employment group I and II and mothers of more than three children will benefit from an age reduction at the same length of service. The age of retirement may not be under 50.

—**Benefit level:** The pension will be determined by varying percentages (65-54 percent) according to employment group and the average salary for five of the last 10 years of employment.

4. Pension for loss of working capacity (invalidity)

—**Recipients:** All persons included in the state social security system with at least five years of employment.

—**Benefit level:** Varying percentages depending on the length of service and employment group, and the salary for five of the last ten years of employment.

5. Survivors' pension

—**Recipients:** Survivors of employers included in the state social security system (children and spouses).

—**Benefit level:** The pension will be calculated in relation to the number of survivors and the salary of the deceased: the entire salary for three and more survivors, 75 percent for two survivors, 50 percent for one survivor.

6. Additional pension

—**Recipients:** All the persons who contributed three percent of their salary for additional retirement income.

—**Benefit level:** A percentage of the calculation base used to establish the state social security pension or keeping with the number of years of contribution.

III. Social Assistance

1. Family allocations

a) State allocation for children

—**Recipients:** Families in which one or both parents are employed in a state enterprise under an unlimited labor contract, regular army members, conscripts, students, state social security pensioners, military personnel and 10% of poor disabled, orphans, and widows; recipients of social aid, survivor children, and unemployed.

—**Benefit level:** Varies in relation to the number of children and recipients' income.

b) Assistance for mothers of several children

—**Recipients:** Mothers caring for three or more children of up to 18 years of age, or up to 23 if students. Once established, it continues to be paid for life (as published).

—**Benefit level:** 400 lei for mothers of three or four children, 500 lei for mothers of more than five children.

c) Birth allocation

—**Recipients:** Allocated as of the second birth.

—**Benefit level:** 1,500 lei for each birth.

d) Assistance for spouses of conscripted troops

—**Recipients:** Unemployed wives of conscript soldiers whose situations comply with the law.

—**Benefit level:** 1,148 lei in cities, 928 lei in villages.

e) Quarterly money relief

—**Recipients:** Persons incapable of working and without an income of their own, whose legal supporters have an average income under 1,000 lei a month.

—**Benefit level:** 2,953 lei every quarter.

f) Ad hoc money relief

—**Recipients:** Old pensioners and chronically ill without a livelihood, or justified cases.

—**Benefit level:** 1,124 lei, at most four times a year.

g) Foster family allocation

—**Recipients:** Minors placed in foster care with a family or entrusted to a family or person in keeping with Law No. 31970 regarding the care system for certain categories of minors.

—**Benefit level:** 1,519 lei a month.

Mixed Local Response to UN Force Presence

AKTUELLER Hamburg DER TSCHECHISCHE ALLGEMEINES
SONNTAGSBLATT in German 8 May 92 p 6

[Article by Alexandra Stiglmaier: "We Are Absolutely Neutral" UN Peacekeeping Troops Have a Tough Mission; Bosnian Croats and Serbs Expect Much From Them but Generally Dislike Them"]

[Text] "This is for peace," the Canadian UN soldier says as he sticks the UN emblem—a white globe and laurel wreath on a blue background—on the child's smock. The young mother smiles at the soldier. Before she pushes the smock on, they look at each other for a moment, a bit embarrassed, then wave and go their separate ways.

In the western Slavonia town of Dvorac, near the front line in Croatia, one sees more and more UN soldiers. They sit in the sidewalk cafes, drink around in the white caps and tracks proclaiming "UN" in huge letters, jog through the town park, and flirt with the young women.

Dvorac is the base for two Canadian UN battalions, an infantry battalion of 800 men and an engineer battalion of 400. While the engineers joined Croatian soldiers in clearing the minefields laid by both Croats and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) during the fighting, the infantry has spent the past days and weeks setting up their housing, two new camps and a former JNA barracks. They have also established contact with the military commanders on both sides of the front line. Throughout all this, the officers have ordered their men "to show the flag," as Captain Robert Stokes of the Canadian infantry battalion puts it. "It is important for people to recognize us by our signs and symbols, for people to see us and come to trust us."

The residents of Dvorac will have not made up their minds about the UN actions. "They are nice," almost everyone agrees and the Canadians have already helped some people repair the war damage to their houses. But the Croatian soldiers in Dvorac are very suspicious of them. "It is always bad to have an outsider come in to straighten things out. And the crane-dim came just when we were recapturing territory. Now the Serbs are shooting at us and we cannot shoot back," they complain.

Already approximately 6,000 UN troops have been deployed in the former Yugoslavia. The remaining 6,000 are scheduled to arrive by mid-May, at which time the peacekeepers will start work on their actual mission: withdrawal of the JNA from the three cross areas of western and eastern Slavonia and Krajina, which the JNA and Serbian irregulars will occupy today. Total disengagement of the three areas, the takeover of control by UN troops and the return of refugees. What will happen then has only been laid down in outline. All the UN peacekeepers care about is that both sides in the war have agreed to that outline and have given consent. That is what they have done so far. The constant refugee at all UNPROFOR

[United Nations Protecting Force] press conferences is that problems will be solved as they arise. However, there is still considerable mistrust of the UN peace plan. The Croats fear that they will lose the occupied territories forever after four approximately one-third of Croats. For example, the UN plan calls for the local authorities to remain in power in the occupied areas, and, since the expulsion of the Croats and the arrival of the JNA, those are mostly Serbs.

Although the local police force is supposed to be restructured after the demobilization to match the prewar ethnic composition of the population, the Croats find it hard to imagine working "with Serbs who have borne arms against Croats," as Croatian President Franjo Tuđman admitted in February. Not to mention that the approximately 600,000 Croatian refugees will not be happy to live next to Serbs again after their return. And the Croatian Government is unhappy that the UN plan expressly rules out the application of Croatian laws in the three cross areas. The United Nations in New York is negotiating just what laws and currency will be used.

Ten days ago, when a group of several hundred Croats was driven out of their Serbian-occupied villages in eastern Slavonia, despite the presence of UN soldiers, the Croatian media expressed outrage. The Croats were convinced that the UN forces in eastern Slavonia (they were Russians) were siding with the Serbs. According to UN press spokesman Fred Eckhard, however, the UN soldiers did not find out what was happening until it was too late. By the time they arrived on the spot, the persecuted Croats were so frightened that they really did want to get out.

At that point, the UN soldiers did at least escort the bus convoy carrying the Croats, according to Eckhard, and so saved them from having to cross minefields to get to the Croatian side. Since then, UN troops have been on patrol in eastern Slavonia day and night. Sandi Nambiar, the Indian commander of the UN troops, promised in an open letter reprinted in all the Croatian newspapers that, as soon as the UN troops had completed their deployment, they would take on complete responsibility for everything that happened in the combat zone and "spare no effort to enable the unfortunate families to return."

Nonetheless, some people in neighboring eastern Slavonia are very bitter about the UN troops. The 1,650 men scheduled for deployment in this sector have already been there for four weeks and are for the most part stationed in the Serbian-controlled area. But Osijek, the largest city in eastern Slavonia, continues to be under daily attack from grenades, mortars, and rockets.

The UN soldiers operating in the former Yugoslavia understand the reasons for the missiles they encounter on both the Croatian and Serbian sides. Nor does it concern them that the two sides interpret the UN plan differently. Whereas the Croats hope that the UN troops will liberate the Serbian-occupied areas, so to speak, and

that Croats will then regain full sovereignty over them. the Serbs hope that the UN soldiers will stay as long as possible and protect the population, which is now almost 100 percent Serbian, from Croatian attack. The UN representatives' response to these differing expectations is always the same: "We are absolutely neutral and have a clearly defined mission. We will create a lasting peace here, everything else will be decided at the Conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels."

What the UN representatives find far more disturbing is the civil war that broke out a few weeks ago in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN headquarters is located in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital. Although the 380 UN workers in Sarajevo are not in danger yet, their work has become very difficult. Countless UN convoys have been turned back at roadblocks, shells have fallen just a few meters from UN headquarters, and from time to time the telephones stop working. Although the United Nations has transferred part of its administrative staff to its Zagreb and Belgrade bases for practical reasons, for political reasons it does not want to abandon Sarajevo. Fred Eckhard explains the decision to remain with the commitment. "We cannot stop the fighting here but people

will see us as having a stabilizing effect on the situation." In Sarajevo the UN troops also provide practical aid. Last week they helped the Muslim/Croatian authorities rescue 60 patients from a burning hospital and monitored the evacuation of some 150 women and children from neighborhoods near the embattled airport.

However, the UN forces have given up the original idea of establishing their logistical headquarters in Banja Luka, the capital of the recently proclaimed "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Financial reasons played a role in that decision because the United Nations itself admits that the working conditions in Zagreb and Belgrade are excellent, but concern for the safety of the UN personnel in the area was also a factor.

In the near future the United Nations plans to dispatch 40 military observers into the war zone in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina. What happens next will depend on developments on the ground and on what the United Nations decides in New York. "However," Fred Eckhard declares, "we are eager to help the people here if the local authorities cannot cope with the problems."

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